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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis an attempt is made to identify the capabilities 
and limitations of the human decision-maker in multi-stage decision 
tasks and to investigate and evaluate methods of aiding him, particularly 
with the use of on-line predictive displays. In multi-stage decision 
tasks, the decisions already made by the decision-maker affect the' 
decision situations he will subsequently face. This requires that 
experimental studies of such decision-making must present equivalent 
interactive decision situations. Although the necessary methodology 
for such studies is rather complicated, the results thereby obtained are 
more relevant to many real-life situations. 
The systematic investigation of a number of issues which are known 
to be important in many actual multi-stage decision tasks is facilitated 
by a simulation of a soaking pit scheduling task on a PDP-12 computer. 
The task interface consists of a visual display unit and an alphanumeric 
keyboard. 
The first part of the study consists of an examination of how human 
decision performance is affected by input uncertainty. It is found that 
input uncertainty results in a considerable deterioration in decision 
performance; in addition a significant increase in the on-line activity 
is observed. 
The second part of the study reports how decision performance is 
affected by the presence of a predictive display, i.e. a display which 
allows the operator to forsee the consequences of possible future actions. 
The value of a further "heuristic" display which shows decision sequences 
. in the recommended order of consideration is also examined. The main 
findings from this part of the study demonstrate that the predictive 
display is useful under deterministic-conditions. 
In the third part the value of the predictive display under 
uncertain conditions is examined. It was found that a simple 
deterministic predictive display improves the general level of ~ 
performance. However, the achieved level of performance is much worse 
than the achieved level without uncertainty. 
In the fourth part of the study two t~s of presenting and 
evaluating uncertain input information are examined. I~ is found that 
information about the parameters of the underlying.uncertainty 
distribution leads to a considerable improvement in decision performance. 
All the findings are discussed within the context of a detailed 
analysis of the individual strategies and decision models. The analysis 
is facilitated by the use of traditional and novel techniques which 
demonstrate the large individual differences in decision qehaviour between 
subjects. The value of the findings and their applicability to real-
world tasks is discussed, along with the use of the experimental task as 
a tool for further investigation into the field of multi-stage decision-
making. 
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Organisational Structure of the Introduction and TheorX 
The general objective of this thesis which has been explicitly 
" . , 
described in page 70 was to develop aildecision aid for stochastic multi-
stage decision settings by creating an efficient ma~-computer co-operation. 
In reviewing the existing literature on decision-making and computer 
aids, it became quickly obvious that it is very difficult to reject a 
particular piece of research as irrelevant to the present thesis. Since it " 
is well accepted that the literature on decision-making is loosely 
structured, the author could easily have removed many problems for himself 
and possibly for those who would wish to read the thesis, by simply, 
concentrating on few papers which seem to be directly relevant to the stated 
objective. However, this has not been done because it is the firm belief 
of the author that most decision-making studies have something common to 
share: the human decision element, the behaviour of whom presents 
similarities irrespective of the specific feature of each setting. It was 
therefore necessary to discuss some aspects of human behaviour within a· 
general structure of the decision process and to describe some decision aids. 
which have been developed to cure specific human inadequacies in complex 
systems. This was done in the Introductory part. 
In the Tbeoretical part however~ the taxonomy of decision tasks is 
followed by a detailed definition of multi-stage decision processes and a 
'.1",-
rather exhaustive exposition of the behavioural research in this particular 
area. The use of decision aids in multi-stage decision tasksis treated in "a 
separate section. In the final section of the Theory, a measure of the 
difficulty of multi-stage decision tasks is defined, based on decision tree 
concepts,and an attempt is made to explain human inadequacies and the use of 
predictive aids. 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
1.0 General 
How do you design a good decision aid? Clearly, this depends on 
'the type of the problem environment and on the capabilities of your 
decision-maker. This is an age of rapid technological progress that 
creates more difficult and more important decision problems as it provides 
man with ever more ability to manipulate his environment. The need for 
decision aids has not gone unnoticed. There is enough evidence indicating 
that over-simplistic use of information is found in a variety of, decisfon 
situations. A decision-maker left to his own ,devices uses, out of 
desperation or habit or boredom or exhaustion, whatever decision aids he 
can, indeed anything that pre-packages'information for him (Agnewand 
Pyke, 1969). It is not surprising therefore that a lot of effort has 
been focussed upon the decision-making process itself. 
According to Schrenk (1969) an idealized decision process consists 
of three main phases. These are problem recognition, problem diagnosis 
and action selection. Each of these phases is made up of a number of 
intermediate steps. Undoubtedly the contribution bf this, and similar 
models e.g. Simon (r957) it valuable in structuring the decision-making , 
tasks in well-defined situations. However, ill-defined problems exist, 
and the uniqueness of the human decision-~aker is that he can cope 
reasonably well with those problems. It is often extremely difficult to 
identify the various steps of the decision process .in order to create 
methods for aiding human performance where deficiencies are observed. 
However, among behavioural scientists the influence of the idealized 
decision model was great and ~f nothing else, extensive use of the reported 
terminology is made. 
Wisely enough the great majority of investigators have focussed 
their attention on decision behaviour in specific situations. This,of 
course, prevents them from making any wide generalizations on the ways of 
aiding human decision-makers, but the decision aids are applicable in the 
specific problems. However, one generalization about human behaviour is 
generally accepted, that man as a behaviour system is relatively simple. 
The apparent complexity of his behaviour is largely a reflection of the 
complexity of the environment in which he finds himself (Simon, 1969). 
Humans may be described as "General Purpose Control Systems" because of 
their ability to adapt in a variety of situations and to resolve non 
related decision problems. It is almost certain that optima1ity is 
sacrificed for the sake of flexibility. The mechanisms by which this 
simple behaviour is controlled are by no means simple. They must be 
very sophisticated in order to create sufficient freedom so that the 
adaptation in the different environments is achieved. 
1.1 Necessary Conditions for Effective Control 
Human decision problems can only be described by studying the environment 
as well as the decision-maker. According to Tocher (1970) the necessary 
conditions for controlling a particular problem environment are the 
existence of an action set, a set of action times, a predictive model and 
an objective. The decision-maker determines the existence of a problem 
from the discrepancy between the actual and the ideal achievement of 
objectives, diagnoses the situation, decides about corrective actions 
using the predictive model, and takes action at the specified times. 
Decision-making is impossible without· a predictive model since any 
decisions can only affect the future. Unfortunately, most models are 
imperfect and their predictions bear little relation to actual behaviour. 
1.2 The Predictive Model 
The predictive model is either externalized or internalized. In 
the former case it requires a simulation model of the controlled 
environment, usually a computer model. In other circumstances it may 
take the form of a stateboard or of another type of decision aid. The 
internalized predictive model is a mental model. The nature of the 
mental model is not well defined in sp~te of the considerable amount of 
research in this area (Crossman and Cooke, 1962; Beishon, 1969; 
Bainbridge et al. 1968; Attwood, 1970; Kragt and Landerwee1d, 1974; 
Bainbridge, 1969, 1973, 1974). Most of the investigators have used 
verbal protocols to elucidate the structure of the mental model. 
However many of the functions are carried out subconsciously and 
2 
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therefore resist exposition through verbal protocols. Rasmussen (1974) 
contended that the subconscious functions which include the internal 
dynamic model of the environment allow the human to operate in dynamic 
sequences which are too fast for perceptual feedback corrections. Recent 
work by Brigham and Laios (1974) provides confirmation that predictive 
control predominates over feedback control. 
The efficiency of the unaided mental model varies greatly among 
individuals and from problem to problem. Tocher (1970) reports that 
predictive models may suffer from three principle sources of inadequacies: 
1. The causal mechanism in the real world is not fully understood and an 
empirical relationship is used which only holds over a limited range 
of experience. Extrapolation beyond that experience may be inadequate. 
2. The mechanism is understood but certain parameters associated with it 
are only known approximately. 
3. The future behaViour may depend on future random events and only a 
probabilistic description can be given of the future behaviour. 
In the case of human decision-makers the inadequacies are caused by 
poor information and by internal limitations. Yntema and Torgenson 
(1961) suggested that empirical processes used by real-life decision-inakers 
may be surprisingly simple and that man's success in decision-making lies 
in his ability to simplify situationally complex problems in ways that 
enable him to cope. This according to Vaughan and Mayor (1972) may lead 
to reasonably good solutions but not to optimal ones. 
In a large number of studies, researchers have attempted to represent. 
the decision process by means of a linear model. According to the linear 
model if I l , 12, ••• , In' are the information inputs affecting the decision-
maker, then his decision D is adequately predicted by an equation of the 
form: 
D 
-t ~=l 1 b. I. + e + G 1 1 
where bi (i .. 1, ••• , n) is the weighting factor for the source If I~) e ' 
a random error and G1 a scaling factor (Anderson, 1974). 
It would be expected that a linear model will hatdly predict human 
decisions in most situations. However, research findings ranging from 
medical diagnostic tasks to judicial decisions and from personality 
characteristics judgements to managerial decisions have shown that a 
linear model has done a fairly good job of predicting the decisions (see 
Goldberg, 1968; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971 for extensive reviews). 
Despite the strong predictive ability of the linear model, many 
decision-makers maintain that their mental process is non-linear. 
Efforts of the researchers to discover any significant interactions 
revealing non-linearity of behaviour were not very fruitful. Although 
one group of investigations did succeed in uncovering non-linear effects, 
the contribution in predictive power was found to be small, (Hoffman, 
Slovic and Rorer, 1968; Rorer, Hoffman, Dickman & Slovic, 1967; Slovic, 
1969). In an important sense, linearity is contributed by the analysis 
rather than being an important property of the decision-maker. Yntema 
and Torgenson (1961) in their fundamental study on machine simulation of 
human judgement provided an impressive explanation of the insensitivity 
4 
of analysis of variances to non-linear effects. Green (1968), ,gave a 
similar explanation for the failure of Hoffman's effort to reveal any 
significant configural effects in the analysis of MMPI scales. However, 
it seems still uncertain whether the failure to observe non-linearity is 
due only to insensitivity of analysis or to the fact that data were not 
configural enough to reveal significant non-linear response from decision~ 
makers. 
Without doubt the predictive power of the linear model is 
unquestionable. It is capable of highlighting individual differences 
and misuse of information as well as making explicit the causes of 
underlying disagreement among judges in both simple and complex tasks. 
With regard, to the performance of the human decision-maker in 
uncertain environments a great deal of research, mostly with bookbag 
and poker chip'experiments, supports the conclusion that humans are 
conservative. The comparison of the actual human inferences with those 
of a statistical man shows that there are systematic discrepancies 
between normative and intuitive inferences (Peterson and Beach, 1967). 
Humans fail to extract all the information latent in samples of data 
(Peterson and Miller, 1965; Phillips and Edwards,. 1966). They tend 
to avoid making extreme probability estimates and they revise their 
opinion in the same direction as the optimal model but the revision is 
too small. Too much weight on early information has also been reported 
(Peterson and DuCharme, 1967; Dale, 1968). 
5 
According to Edwards (1968) the main reasons for conservatism are 
misperception, mfsaggregation and artifacts. Misperception is associated' 
with poor understanding of the nature and model of the information inputs 
generating the data. Misaggregation is the inability of the decision-
maker to aggregate various pieces of information and produce a single 
. I 
response. Artifacts are associated with the hypothesis that people are 
optimal when dealing with a certain range of odds but they hesitate to go 
outside this range even when the diagnosticity of data justifies it. 
However there is some doubt as to whether people are always conservative. 
There is evidence of liberal or even optimal behaviour when proper 
training is given (Briggs and Schum, 1965). 
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that human predictions 
of the behaviour of a controlled system are poor because of the reported 
inadequacies of the mental models. 
1.3 Generating Actions 
As mentioned, the existence of a predictive model is only one of 
the necessary conditions for precise contro1. With regard to the ability. 
of generating actions it seems that man also has difficulty. In general, 
people hesitate to generate a significant number of alternative actions 
(Kennedy and Scroder, 1964), and instructions do not seem to affect them 
(Vaughan et a1, 1966), and finally they repeat earlier actions and lose 
track of them (Gagliari et a1, 1965). 
.,'1,· 
6 
1.4 Timing 
There is evidence suggesting that humans do not always act at the 
proper times. Yntema and Torgenson (1961) pointed out the,decision-
maker is slow to initiate action. Sidorsky et "a!. (1964) demonstrated that 
submarine officers delayed actions beyond the optimal action times. 
Sometimes their lack of confidence in their ability ~o make accurate 
decisions causes delays in taking action even when they are able to 
make accurate decisions on the basis of the information available 
(Hammer and Ringe1, 1965). 
1.5 Criteria for Choice 
1.6 
Turning to the fourth condition for good control, namely the 
existence of criteria on the basis of which choice is made, there is 
evidence that the number of criteria considered for decisions is rather 
small (Vaughan et al., 1960). It would be expected that the more 
relevant the characteristics one takes into account in making decisions,' 
the better the decision will be. However, other evidence (Hayes, 1962) 
showed that when the number of criteria was increased, the decision times 
increased but the quality of the decisions did not improve, and indeed 
under certain circumstances it became poorer. In general, people tend 
to overweight some criteria and almost ignore others(Conno1y, Fox and 
McGo1drick, 1961). Shepard (1964) stated that the human ability to 
arrive at overall evaluations by weighting and combining all relevant 
subjective attributes is not impressive. There is little difficulty 
however in realizing that the evaluation was wrong after it was made. 
Human approach in complex control systems 
The foregoing paragraphs have made clear that none of the necessary 
conditions for precise control are fully satisfied by the human controller. 
In spite of that it seems that humans rarely deviate from optimum performance 
to the extent of justifying their removal from a decision system. It has 
~'04.0~ 
been proposed that deviations from Gptim~ performance increase as the 
system becomes more complex (Howell, 1967';' Kap1an and Newman, 1966) but 
there is also evidence which supports the opposite conc1usion-(Embert, 1972). 
--- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite popular belief, it is not still clear that automation 
always improves system effectiveness. Parsons (1972) has pointed out 
that system efficiency in existing systems can be improved further by 
making peo~le perform better, but apparently this has not been taken as 
seriously as it should be because improvements of this kind do not make 
money for industrial organizations with vested interest in selling more 
machinery. One of the main reasons for the controversy regarding 
human performance in complex systems is the inability to define the 
evaluation criteria. Research investigators tend to choose performance 
measures for which the relative contributions of the individual 
performances cannot be established (Jacobs, 1965). 
It is certain tha~ performance decrements due to violations of the 
four necessary conditions for precise control are not additive. If 
they were, there would be no hope of satisfactory control in many 
situations. Humans seem to use an integrated approach to problems 
which compensates for the inadequacies at each particular phase of the 
decision process. When, for example, the environment is probabi1istic, 
predictive models are used which depend at least on the uncertainty. 
When the complete picture of the environment cannot be formed because of 
human information processing limitations, man tends to form hypotheses 
and tests them by using selective environmental information. This type 
of model is observed in many situations. Rasmussen (1974) has pointed 
out that, in process control, this may lead to very efficient shunting 
out of low-capacity, higher-level conscious activities, but that at the 
same time this may prevent the operator being open to unexpected 
variations of the entire situation. The same model was used by 
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experienced operators in a simulated surveillance situation (Brady et al., 
1959; Brown et al., 1960). Those who gathered surveillance date (to 
check on hypotheses of unit movement, stemming largely from general 
knowledge about the problem, the terrain and time space factors) were 
more successful than those who wanted to collect complete information 
,before acting (Parsons, 1972). 
. 1.7 The Use of Decision Aids 
As mentioned, the need for effective decision aids has not gone 
unnoticed. Unfortunately, there is a wide lack of .rea1isation about 
the nature of the control process.. Decisions are of necessity directed 
towards the future. If information about future consequences of 
possible decisions is not available, it is only possible to make 
inferences from sensory data and from past experience. There is a 
tendency to go for displays other than predictive displays (which address 
themselves much more directly to the operators time-free predictive model 
than can any other kind of displays). There may be a number of reasons 
for this: 
8· 
1. The environment is not properly understood and consequently simulation' 
is impossible. 
2. The cost of simulation is too high and it cannot be justified from the 
potential benefits. 
3. The system designers are much affected by the presently prevailing 
design principles. 
It seems that at least in manual tracking tasks the last reason is 
very important. Pou1ton (1974) pointed out that "predictive displays 
are likely to be easier and safer for people to use. The evidence has 
been available for 10 years. Yet it has been neglected because it 
contradicts the Birmingham and Taylor design philosophy which dominated 
the thinking of human factors experts for the last 20 years. The 
fashions of design engineers are perhaps not very different from the 
fashions of designers in other fields. However they may cost lives when 
they lead to wrong design conclusions". 
The traditional methods of improving decision performance are the 
selection and training of decision-makers and the provision of procedural 
aids (Schrenk, 1969). For some strange-reason, selection is not based on 
the individual decision performance at specific task environments. MOst 
of the present day tests are effective in eliminating most of the 
completely unsuitable individuals. But this appears to be about as much 
as they can achieve (Lees, 1974). Training also presents many shortcomings. 
1.8 
.-': 
The right approach is followed by the armed forces through simulated 
operations of varying d~grees of realism; but there is generally little 
evidence about the validity of training procedures in industrial 
si tua tions • 
The two distinctive ways of aiding the decision-makers through 
procedural aids are the provision of improved information inputs and the 
augmentation of decision-making by computer aids which supplement human 
judgements. The first approach provides the decision-maker with more 
accurate information, improved coding, suitable organisation and 
sequencing of the information variables, but it does not interfere with 
the human decision process. In the second approach a functional model 
of the decision process is provided which supplements human judgement or 
recommends appropriate decisions. 
Information Displays 
There has been a considerable amount of .research on information 
display design, mostly on variables related to the discriminatory aspects 
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of display design (size and shape of letters and numbers, colour, brightness 
of lights etc.). Application of human factors research at this level is 
easy and can be performed by any designers. The important questions about 
the design of displays for improved decision-making, however, require 
involvement of human factors expertise at all stages. Research on the 
development of general guidelines for the design of displays that will aid 
decision-making is almost non-existent. This is partly attributed to the 
fact that in many situations the actual tasks performed by decision-makers 
are not easily defined. At the same time, the diversity of operator tasks 
makes it rather difficult to determine general, unqualified, guidelines 
about the design of displays. A useful general discussion on the design 
of displays for process operators is provided by Edwards and Lees (1971). 
It seems that until now the main reason for the neglect of research in this 
field was the difficulties associated with the effort to establish realistic 
laboratory tasks. MOst of the difficulties are now overcome with the 
utilisation of computer simulation. Some studies of the ways that 
information is encoded or organised have suggested that decision 
performance is affected by the type of presentation. Decision-makers 
can benefit from probabilistic information.if it appears in graphic 
form on a display (.:t.H.erman et a1., 1964). Batch displays which 
present data with only potential relevance are less effective than 
sequential displays which present only the data relevant to the 
decisions (Baker and Goldstein, 1966). Also, few displays containing 
complete data are preferred to many displays which require the decision-
maker to go from display to display to pull together the elements of the 
problem (Wakeman, 1962). 
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The type of information and the degree of precision affects decision 
performance especially under high loads (Kidd, 1959). Guidelines on the 
design of displays for a variety of military tasks have been suggested by 
Parsons (1972). These guidelines may also be valid to many non-military 
decision tasks. Singleton (1972 ) has pointed out that for a human 
operator to act e~fectively three kinds of information must be provided: 
1. Information about the policy and objectives. 
2. Information about alternatives and consequences. 
3. Information about the current state of the system. 
This is the minimum set of requirements for effective control but 
little is revealed about specific design principles. What should not be 
done according to Singleton (1971 ) is to simplify display presentation 
so as to reduce the required level of training of the operator involved, 
since the ultimate strategy following this approach is simply to eliminate 
operators altogether, that is, to design an automaton. .Display design 
must be based on the limitations and advantages of the human operator. 
Limitations can best be described in terms of stress effects, and also 
involve deliberately restricting his versatility in the interests of 
consistent system performance. 
It is almost certain that the reason for the lack of general 
guidelines of display design for decision-making is not just negligence. 
These days, entire concepts of machine and system design are transient. 
11 
A solution to a display design question today may be useless in the near 
future, since the operator may not be part of the control loop. Howell and 
Goldstein (1971). advocated that instead of looking for display guidelines 
it may be more useful to seek generally applicable principles of human 
performance which can be adapted to a wide range of possible display 
problems. These principles are mostly related to the human processing 
of information. Otherwise, the human scientist must be prepared to 
anticipate specific display requirements of the future. 
1.9 Computer decision aids 
The idea of helping the decision-maker by providing a model of the 
decision problem is not new. However, the realization that it is possible 
to simulate human cognitive processes with computers (Newell et al., 1958; 
Simon and Newell, 1965; Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963; Reitman, 1965) 
has led to the new epoch of decision aids: the computer aid. Yntema 
and Torgenson (1961) were among the first to suggest that a machine 'which 
makes decisions according to comparatively simple rules can be very useful 
aid to the decision-maker. Edwards (1962) proposed ·a computer assisted 
system which processed information probabi1istical1y according to the 
theorem of Bayes. These systems were called probabi1istic information 
processing (PIP) systems. Both papers have given impetus to 'a large 
amount of research. Much of the work has been accomplished within two 
basic schools of research which Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) have 
called the "regression" and the "Bayesian" approaches. 
1.10 The Regression Approach 
The regression type of decision aid is based on the finding that 
linear models simulate human decisions of complex stimuli very well. In 
many cases these simulated decisions may be better, in the sense of 
predicting some criterion or implementing the judge's personal values, 
than were the actual judgements themselves.' This phenomenon has been 
termed "boot-strapping". The ma~n advantage of the boot-strapping 
technique is that it is reliable. There is evidence (Cassidy and Kirby, 
1969) suggesting that different decision-makers examining the same 
d~ta may reach different decisions because of the relative importance 
which each places on certain aspects of the tasks. Further, the same 
decision-maker, because of many distractions, may not arrive at the 
,same decision on different occasions although he has available exactly 
the same values of information inputs. Some evidence (Dudycha and 
Naylor, 1966) suggests that decision-makers were inaccurate because of 
their inconsistency and not b,ecause they em~loy inaccurate weights to 
the information inputs. They concluded that,although humans may be used 
to generate strategies, they should then be removed from the system and 
replaced by their strategies. 
Boot-strapping has been explored by many investigators. Yntema 
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and Klem (1964) examined the ability of experienced aircraft pilots to 
make judgements regarding the relative danger of landing under conditions 
that differed along three dimensions. Pollack (1962, 1964) carried out 
two different experiments under more artificial but well controlled 
conditions. Both studies concluded that a machine using a purely linear 
decision rule arrives at better decisions than humans. Even when the 
underlying factors combine according to a non-linear rule, the linear rule 
does better than the humans who are not constrained by the linearity. The 
boot-strapping approach has also stimulated a considerable amount of 
research in managerial decision-making (Jones, 1967; Bowman, 1963; 
Kunreuther, 1969). In many cases the model of the manager produced 
better decisions than those made by the manager on his own. Similar 
results were found by Goldberg (1970) in clinical diagnostic tasks. 
Again linear models were more accurate predictors of the criteria than 
the clinical psychologists from whom the models were produced. 
Further demonstration of the ability to simulate human decision-
making in selection procedures comes from a study by Smith (1968). A 
strong relationship was demonstrated between human and computer output 
with a very high level of agreement. Dawes (1971) used a linear model 
to predict the selection committee ratings in graduate ,student admissions. 
It was found that use of the linear model could improve the selection 
procedures and cut down costs. A suitable amalgamation of the model and 
the judge might yield better decisions than from the decision-maker or ' , 
the model separately (Dawes and Diller, 1970). 
The research on the boot-strapping method has been largely 
concentrated on the predictive capabilities of the linear model. Itis 
therefore expected that additional care should be taken in situations 
where conf~gurationa11y non-linear cue patterns are significant 
components of the decision problem. One way to aid the decision-maker 
is to train him to use the configura1 cues. This was demonstrated by 
Hammond a~d Sammers (1965). Luce and Tukey (1964) have outlined an 
approach which combines the linear and non-linear cues in a boot-
strapping type of model. 
Miller et al. (1967) studied the behaviour of experienced tactical 
air controllers assisted by a computer in the task of implementing their 
sUbjective values in a resource-allocation problem. It was found that 
when computers combined the controllers subjective values with the other 
inputs (according to a prescriptive algorithm) the decision performance 
was better for nearly all subjects. Vaughan et al. (1964) developed a 
computer aid for tactical action selection. Human judgements, their 
weights and recommended courses of action were presented in a display. 
Hammond and Boy1e (1970) developed a computer aid called the cognograph 
that provides lens model feedback to the decision-maker. The lens 
model represents the probabi1istic inter-relations between the human 
(organismic) and the environmental components of the decision-maker 
situation. The lens model, which has proved to be an extremely good 
framework for describing human judgements, was developed by Brunswick 
(1955). Another relevant research program by Shuford (1965) has 
explored on-line application of classical decision theory to facilitate 
solutions in a wide range of problems. 
The acceptance of computer recommendations by the decision-makers 
varies from 0 to 100 percent (Hanes and Gebhard, 1966). There are 
many factors determining the degree of acceptance which include the 
personality and background of the decision-maker. The computer aid 
developed by Hanes and Gebhard was aimed to help all indecisive decision-
makers who can delay too long by doing nothing. However it seems that 
decision-makers may over-ride or reject computer recommendations because 
they utilise variables which have not been built into the computer 
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(Sinaiko and'Cartwright, 1959). It is likely that. decision 
performance of the ,best decision-makers is not improved by decision 
aids although the load may decrease. Some evidence (Schaf~er 1965) 
supports that experienced decision-makers degrade good computer 
solutions but improve the poor ones. 
1.11 The Bayesian Approach 
A great deal of research has been inspired by Bayesian processing. 
The notion of probabilistic information processing was first introduced 
by Edwards (1962). According to Edwards a great deal of the information 
which military and business decision-makers must use is fallible or 
incomplete. The basic idea of probabilistic information processing is 
that the techniques which have proved useful in dealing with fallible 
scientific data will also prove useful in dealing with fallible 
diagnostic data. It was thought that the most appro~riate technique 
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is Bayesian information processing. Bayesian processing is an application 
of a theorem authored by the Reverend Thomas Bayes, two hundred years ago, 
to estimate the probability of some event on the basis of fragmentary data. 
Suppose that it is possible to identify an exhaustive set of n 
mutually exclusive states of the world which are referred to as events 
H1, ... , Hn· A distribution of probabilities p(Hl ), ••• , p(Hn)·is 
assigned across these events which reflect the initial or prior 
uncertainty. In the light ofa datum D these probabilities are 
conditioned and they become p(D/Hi ), i = 1, ••• , n where· 
p(D/H. ) 
1 
'f 
_ p(DnH) 
- p(H) 
The impact of the datum D on each of the events Hi is represented by 
the posterior probability p(H./D). From Bayes theorem 
1 
~DnH)iS the joint probability of D and H. 
p(H. ID) 
l. 
p(H.) p(D/H.) 
l. l. 
.. L p(l\) p(D/I\) 
k:i!=l 
p(D/H.) is formally the probability that the datum D would be observed 
l. 
if the Hi was true. 
In this manner.' it is possible to incorporate new evidence with· the old 
and update the aggregate opinion following each datum. 
One of the difficulties accounted in applying the Bayes theorem 'is to 
estimate the prior probabilities p(Hi ). 
Edwards (1965, 1968) has pointed out that,whatever the initial 
probabilities are at the beginning, those probabilities will very 
quickly be swamped by the mass of incoming information and so can be 
chosen arbitrarily so long as the arbitrary choices are not too close 
to 0 or 1. Southard (1970) has suggested that there are some trouble-
some characteristics of real-world inference which make the application 
of Bayesian information processing rather difficult. These are:-
(a) Inadequacy of events - It is not possible to partition the 
'world in the form of an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive 
hypotheses. 
(b) Non independence of evidence - The incoming data are 
dependent and the combination of evidence according to the 
theorem of Bayes may be misleading. 
(c) Observational uncertainty - The environmental evidence is 
not perfectly identified. 
(d) Environmental non-stationarity - The relation between data 
and events ,changes over time~ 
(e) Data processing load - Enormous amount of data are available 
with low diagnostic values. 
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In spite of the drawbacks the idea of Bayesian information 
processing has generated a substantial amount of research. The 
Bayesian information processing can be used either for diagnosis or for 
parameter estimation. 
A major effort to evaluate probabilistic information processing 
systems within the context of threat evaluation was made at Ohio State 
University. There is a number of studies reporting the results: 
(Schum, Goldstein and Southard, 1965a,1965b; Briggs and Schum, 1965; 
Goldstein et al. 1967; Schum, 1966a, 1966b; Schum et al. 1966). Howe11 
(1967) summarised the results of most of these experiments. It was 
reported that automation of the P(D/H.) estimation was not practicable. 
~ 
The automation of the aggregation process can be expected to improve 
the quality of decisions by 10-15 percent. The superiority of automated 
over human aggregation increases as the uncertainty of input data and 
factors contributing to stress are increased. When automation of the 
aggregation process is not feasible human performance may be improved 
by manual or off-line implementation of some aggregation rule. This is 
only a summary of the thirteen principles which are stated in Howell's 
report. 
The effectiveness of the Bayesian processing in a pseudomilitary 
setting was tested by Edwards and his collaborators (Edwards and 
Phillips, 1964; Phillips et al. 1966; Edwards, 1965, 1966; Edwards 
et al. 1968). Perhaps the most important study was conducted in an 
artificial future world. The subjects related data to a number of 
hypotheses. The results showed that the group of subjects who were 
relieved of the task of cumulating evidence arrived at larger final 
odds than other groups. This according to the authors was a proof of 
the greater efficiency of the group where the aggregation was done by 
machine. 
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A third series of experiments involving Bayesian processing were 
performed by Kaplan and his collaborators (Kaplan and Newman, 1966; 
" Kaplan et al. 1963; Kaplan and Newman, 1964). The problem was to 
assess enemy strategy during a nuclear attack. The results were 
reported by Kaplan and Newman. The probabilistic information 
processing method showed superiority over the non-automated aggregation 
conditions. According to the authors, probabi1istic information 
processing systems might be most useful for those situations in which 
diagnostic decisions have to be made quickly and on the basis of small 
amounts of information. However if the implication of the data are 
very uncertain the probabi1istic information processing cannot be very 
effective. 
Probabilistic information processing systems hav~ also been 
proposed for non-military tasks (e.g. Gustafson, 1969; MCEachern and 
Newman, 1969). The approach seems worth examining in a wide variety 
of decision situations such as forecasting, medical diagnosis, business, 
etc. 
MOst probabi1ist1c information processing settings have.been 
examined within the context of situation diagnosis. Action selection 
is considered as a separate problem. At first sight, utilisation of 
the posterior probabilities to maximise expected values appear to be 
promising for action selection. However, it has been recognised 
(Edwards, 1965) that there are immense practical problems in applying 
. probabi1istic information processing for action selection. Some of 
them were identified in the foregoing paragraphs (event definition, 
etc.). Others are specifically related to action selection and 
include action invention, determination of the entries to pay-off 
matrices, etc. However, in spite of the short-comings,probabilistic 
information processing has much to offer in many decision settings •. 
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2. Discussion 
Several interesting points were highlighted in the foregoing 
paragraphs. There are as many names for decision inadequacies as 
, .' 
specific problem environments examined ~y various investigators. The 
wide variety of the reviewed decision settings makes it difficult to 
generalise research findings. One possible way to relate the existing 
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,research findings is to create an abstract super-structure of the decision 
process where every possible type of inadequacy occurs. It is unlikely 
that all inadequacies will occur simultaneously in every decision setting. 
However it is reasonable to assume that all inadequacies are included and 
adapt the model to the specific environment at later stages. The 
proposed abstract super-structure of the decision process is presented 
in Figure 1. The distinction between actjon and decision is a tenuous 
one for the purposes of our discussion and it will not be maintained here. 
Decisions can be 'defined as mental actions ~md the structure represents 
equally w"ell diagnosis or action selection. Another point worth 
mentioning: This abstract super-structure i~; not a model of the actual 
human decision process at a conscious or sub-conscious level. It is a 
useful framework for relating research findings from a wide research 
spectrum on human decision processes and involves all the necessary 
stages of an idealised control process. 
In the decisioD; super-structure, mul ti-di;:lensional information from 
the environment is monitored. If all objectives are satisfied, no action 
is required and the monitoring process continues. Information flows 
constantly to the predictive model and the monitor conceives present and 
future environmental states. If the feedback information from the 
predictive model implies that some of the obj ecti'!es are not satisfied 
or will not be satisfied in the future, there is a need for action. The 
next stage of the control process should therefore involve examination 
of the alternative courses of action and also exami~ation of the times 
when actions are permissible. When this examination is completed, a 
predictive process should follow to look ahead at the consequences of each 
action. Next, choice of the best action should take place. The action 
which is likely to satisfy best the set of objectives should be chosen 
and implemented. Finally, the state of the environment should be 
monitored to find out how the state of the environment was affected by 
the action. 
It is clear now that there are five major categories of human 
inadequacies in a general decision setting: 
1. Inadequacy to filter probabilistic information. 
2. Inadequacy to assess multi-dimensional information •. 
3. Inadequacy to foresee the consequences of actions. 
4. Inadequacy to use the best heuristics. 
5. Inadequacy to choose the best action. 
19 
According to Singleton (1971) the' main factors limiting performance 
within a system are: 
1. Information transmission limitations, 
2. Short-term memory limitations, and 
3. Stress suscePt~bi1ity~ 
In most .~ases, sensory and long-term capacities are.not considered 
to impose any serious limitations on human performance. However the 
long-term memory is organised on the basis of principles and strategies 
and since in many systems people do not discover the best 'strategies, 
there is some ground for doubt about the capabilities of long-term 
memory. It is almost certain that there is a high degree of interaction 
between the factors limiting performance. In many cases, for example, 
poor strategies are used as a result of short-term memory limitations •. 
Stress reduces short-term memory information transmission or breaks down 
efficient strategies. 
How then is it possible to improve human performance against all 
these inadequacies? Various aspects are discussed in the next sub-sections 
2.1 to 2.5. 
-. --...J • 
2.1 Filtering uncertain data 
There are two possible ways of aiding the' decision-maker. 
a. To filter the information by a mechanical device. 
b. To present the information in ways that permit the human decision-
maker to extract easily the diagnostic value of the information. I I . 
Probabilistic information processing is the typical example of the 
mechanistic approach. To the best of the author's knowledge this 
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approach has not been applied to multi-stage decision processes, but it 
has been found useful in diagnostic tasks. Although in most cases 
probabilistic information processing has been used for hypothesis testing, 
there is no reason why the basic mathematical model should not be used 
for parameter estimation. This can be found particularly useful in 
decision processes where some advanced planning is required under high 
input uncertainty. The idea is to get machines to aggregate probability 
estimates across incoming data by means of Bayes theorem. After all 
data have been processed, the resulting output is a posterior probability 
which is more precise than the posterior probabilities of unaided 
subjects which tend to be conservative. 
Probabilistic information processing has been found particularly 
useful in cases where (a) decisions should be made quickly and on the 
basis of relatively small amounts of information (Kaplan and Newman, 
1966) and (b) the fidelity of input data is very low (Howell, 1967). It 
seems that probabilistic information processing will also be useful under 
similar conditions in multi-stage decision processes, although this is 
only a hypothesis and it needs experimental ver~ication. ' 
Use of the Bayes theorem is profitable when prior information is 
not quite unreliable (and it' seems that in most cases that this is true), 
otherwise the 'contribution to the decision process is negligible. 
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When automation of the aggregation procedure is not possible then 
it might be useful to train people to make off-line impl~mentation of 
the Bayes theorem. Briggs and Schum (1965) reported that during some 
experiments in which a probabilistic information processing aid was 
tested, subjects became notably less conservative, i.e. they were learning 
to apply the Bayes theorem even in the absence of the aid. 
If the main problem is to take decisions on the basis of uncertain 
information, whose quality does not necessarily improve with the time, 
classical statistics can be useful. Some studies (Hake and Hymari, 1953; 
Shuford, 1963) have demonstrated that decision performance is often 
correlated with the parameters of the probability distribution of the 
uncertain input. 
Proper presentation of the uncertain data may also help the operator 
to extract the diagnostic value without any mechanical aid. Herman et al. 
(1964) have demonstrated that perceptual presentation of the parameters of 
the input information distribution improved decision performance in a 
simulated search-attack mission experiment. Consequently, perceptual 
presentation of the underlying distribution of the uncertain input and 
proper training may enhance decision performance in many decision 
situations. 
2.2 Assessment of multi-dimensional information 
There is almost a universal agreement among scientists that human 
operators fail to take into account combined evidence from many information 
inputs. This has led various investigators to construct mechanical aids 
which have been based on the decision-makers judgemental process. It 
seems that a linear regression model can do a remarkably good job of 
simulating this process. This approa~h has been explored by many 
investigators. 
When the mechanisation of the integration process is ,not 
possible, proper organization of the information presentation is 
expected to facilitate operator decision performance. In general, , 
research in this field is lacking although the existing paradigms show 
that the way the information is encoded and sequenced has important 
affects on decision processes. Experiments (Kanarick et al. 1969) 
have shown that, if the total amount of multi-source information 
exceeds the information processing capacity of the decision-maker, then 
he tends to overweight the important information and underweight less 
important information. The increase of decision time to enable the 
decision-maker to extract all the required information cannot be the 
answer in situations where information is up-dated quickly. Some sort, 
of selective information presentation or organization of the 
presentation, in ways which direct the decision process to follow the 
best way of digesting the required information, can be the answer in 
some situations. Baker and Go1dstein (1966) have shown that subjects 
found a problem solving task more difficult when they had all the 
required information presented in one display than when information was 
presented sequentia11y in different displays. In other decision 
settings, batch displays may be more useful. It is notun1ik1ey that 
batch presentation may reveal solution patterns which cannot be 
formulated in sequential displays. 
2.3 Foreseeing action consequences 
In situations with considerable' 1ag between command and execution 
a predictive facility may be particularly useful. The predictive ' 
facility provides advance information about the implications of 
.different courses of action alternatives, thus faci1iting future choice. 
The fast-time model on which the predictiye facility is normally based 
may be simple or complex. The predictive displays created by Ke11ey 
(1968) and Warner (1969), for example, are generated by exact replicas 
of the controlled system. Bernotat's (1972) predictive display was 
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based on a simple extrapolation procedure using a Taylor series. . A 
large amount of research is required to examine the optimum degree of 
fast-time model complexity on the basis of human requirements and 
simulation costs. 
The prediction span, w~ich is a measure of how far into the future 
the operator looks, is normally determined by: 
1. The amount of situation uncertainty. 
2. The number of alternative courses of action. 
3. The requirement for long-term satisfaction of the objectives. 
Decision time may be also an additional factor limiting the length 
of the prediction span. Some evidence in this respect is given by 
Smith (1972) who found that a predictive aid was not producing any better 
results because excessive amounts of time were needed to investigate the 
alternative courses of action. 
23 
Generation of the alternative courses of action may be carried out 
by the man or by the system. In general, man is considered rather a bad 
action generator and in many cases this task should be left .to the machine. 
The generation should follow an efficient order, so only potentially 
useful actions will be generated. Final investigation and selection 
according to objectives which cannot be expressed in formal algorithms 
should be left to the decision~aker. 
The possibility has already been discussed by Newel1 and Simon 
(1972) in human problem-solving situations. 
2.4 Use of best heuristics 
Although there is evidence of differences in the ability to form 
and use heuristics, adequate criteria of good decision-making are not 
available for many complex tasks. It is very difficult to determine 
whether good decision-makers in some situations are as good in other 
situations or whether good decision-makers in one condition are as good 
in different conditions. Research in this field is lacking. Selection 
I' 
techniques are based mostly on other considerations, (e.g. visual-and 
auditory activity) and not upon the real decision-making skills of the 
candidates. 
In principle it must be possible to train people to be good 
decision-makers. A reasonably good simulation of the real situation 
in which criteria of good performance are well defined can be helpfuL 
The trainees will be taught to use strategies used by the best decision-
makers. This could be done by observing the best decision-makers, by 
on-line instructions from the best decision-makers and by formulating the 
. whole procedure in a computer algorithm. 
If possible, the introduction of heuristic selection procedures, in 
a fast-time action presentation model, can be of great help in many 
situations. Basically, this is going to reduce the number of actions to 
be searched at any particular time and also the prospect of following an 
erroneous solution. 
2.5 Choice of best actions 
Man is generally considered a good judge of the relative importance 
of action selection criteria. However, when he actually makes choices 
he tends to over-estimate or under-estimate the potential value of the 
various criteria. There is no reason to allow humans to make the choice 
once the criteria weights have been specified. In the present state of 
affairs, unfortunately, this is not universally possible. Apart from 
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the fact that most decision-makers would not accept pure machine solutions 
(see Hanes and Gebhard, 1966, for an example), it may not be feasible on 
many occasions. 
Human inefficiency in choosing in multipl~ criteria situations is 
primarily attributed to short-term memory limitations. One way to help 
him may be to provide some sort of perceptual aid, i.e. to make the 
choice a perceptual judgement rather than an abstract arithmetic 
calculation. There is some evidence that humans in general produce 
better answers when they work with pictorial displays than when using 
matrices of precise numerical values, (Fitts, undated; Parsons, 1972) 
Boot-strapping procedures may also be found useful •. 
Undoubtedly efficient processing and presentation of data and 
provision of predictive facilities to' test various action consequences 
can be useful in many situations. However a major problem is to 
integrate all these facilities in ways that humans find easy to use. 
Optimal processing of information does not necessarily lead to 
performance improvements, and the potential of a predictive facility 
is not fully exploited if the input information to the decision-maker 
is not presented properly. Kaplan, Lichtenstein and Newman (1963) 
found that Bayesian processing cannot be considered a significant aid 
to the decision-maker when the implications of the data are uncertain. 
It is also likely that stress may be produced from inappropriate 
combination of otherwise satisfactory facilities. The proper inte-
gration of all functions in the same display may reduce stress in many 
cases. Additional care should be taken to achieve compatibility 
between the functions. Proper presentation of the diagnostic and 
( 
predictive aspects in map-like displays may produce better results. 
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SECTION 1 
A TAXONOMY OF DECISIONS 
. I 
1. Artificial and Real Decision Problems 
Decision-making is an ill-defined area of· knowledge developed by 
psychologists, economists, statisticians and others. Research has been 
carried out either in laboratories under well controlled conditions or 
in the field where it is often difficult to interfere with the actual 
settings. As a result there are great differences in the methods of 
studying the two situations. Even within the context of psychological 
decision-making the differences are significant. 
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It is common in laboratory studies to use well defined decision 
settings with few and clear performance criteria. In industrial studies 
however there are many constraints. One of the most important is the 
need not to interfere and disrupt the decision process. Another, perhaps 
more important, is the researcher's almost total lack of knowledge about 
the characteristics of the processes he studies. He does not understand 
many aspects of the decision setting because of the lack of time or lack 
of technical expertise, and he does not understand the behavioural 
aspects of the decision process because of the limited research tools 
and resources he has available. Observations, interviews, or 
questionnaires are the usual research tools and these are unlikely to 
give anything more than a rough idea of what is going on in the decision-
maker's head. Add the two well recognised facts, that the decision-
maker rarely knows what he is doing (or if he knows may be unable to 
verbalise it) and also that the system designer rarely knows what he 
wants the decision-maker for, and the type of problems the psychologist 
studies become clear. 
Real world decision problems are excellent examples of ill-defined 
problems. What then can be said about these ill-defined decision 
problems? Reitman (1964, 1965) was among the few who discussed il1-
defined problems. He started his discussion by stating that problem 
. solving in general (linear programming, dynamic programming and human 
problem solving) is exclusively concerned with what Minsky (1961) .ca11ed 
well-defined problems. These are the problems in which there are 
. i 
systematic ways to decide when a proposed solution is acceptable. Human 
decisions in most cases fail to meet this criterion. Each problem, 
according to Reitman, consists of the initial state the terminal state 
. and a sequence of operations by which the initial state is converted to 
the terminal state. It is not unusual in decision situations to know 
only partially each of the three components. In diagnostic tasks, for 
example, the operator has to decide what is wrong, what should be done 
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and how it should be done. In many situations objectives and constraints 
are quite loose# 
be found. 
Alternative courses of action are not given but must 
The definedness depends on the existing constraints in the decision 
problem. If the number of constraints is small the problem tends to 
be ill-defined. One of the characteristics of the ill-defined systems 
is that there are many solutions, and it is difficult to decide which 
solution is the best. As the number of constraints increases the 
solution space decreases and the decision problem becomes particular. 
Sometimes the number of constraints is so high that no solution is 
possible. A high degree of definedness is generally desirable except 
in unpredictable environments where it may well lead to maladaption. 
It is evident that the main difference between artificial and real 
decision problems is the degree of definedness. Artificial decision 
problems tend to be better defined than real decision problems. 
Artificial decision problems are all those which have specifically been 
designed to study the efficiency of decision processes either human or 
mechanical or mathematical. Some arti~icial decision problems are also 
formulated ambiguously. In many laboratory situations it is not 
unusual that the experimenter has failed to stress the importance of 
the constraints in the problem, and thus subjects each give different 
interpretation of the decision components. As a result the decision 
'problem is not the same for all individuals and uncontrolled sources of 
variance are not eliminated completely. 
• 1 
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The ill-defined problems are not necessarily more difficult than 
the well-defined problems. A decision-maker may perform an ill-defined 
task better, because the requirement in a well-defined task exceeds 
his information processing capacity or demands very difficult strategies. 
2. Taxonomies of Decision Tasks 
Attempts to classify real-life problems have been limited because 
of the i11-definedness most of them possess. Miller (1969) suggested 
eight task archetypes in problem solving. The task archetypes were 
ordered according to their cognitive value and structured by the 
categorical structure of the information requirements. This 
classification, however useful, is rather abstract and covers a wide 
range of problem-solving tasks from simple inquiries to discoveries. 
Reitman (1964) distinguished six types of decision problems on 
the basis of a single abstract three component description (see sect. 
1). The many problems with the attempts to create meaningful taxonomies 
for real decision tasks are the enormous variety of the different 
decision settings, and the lack of underlying features on the basis of 
which any successful taxonomy should be made. 
Turning to the artificial decision settings, it appears that 
attempts to create meaningful taxonomies are more fruitful. The 
proposed taxonomies (Edwards, 1962; Roward, 1968; Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971) differ from one another, the distinctions are not 
always clear and the categories are not exhaustive. The distinctions 
have been made to classify decision models and theories as well as 
decision tasks. 
Decision theorists (Edwards, 195~, 1961, 1962) consider that 
decision theory can be divided in two clearly distinguished parts, 
namely static and dynamic decision theory. A decision situation is 
characterised static if the following requirements exist: 
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1. A fixed set of alternative actions. 
2. A fixed set of environmental states which are not under the 
control of the deds ion-maker. 
3. A fixed set of outcomes corresponding to each action-
environmental state combination. 
A static decision task is formally determined by a triple (s, d, 
g) where s is a set of possible environmental states, d a set of 
possible decisions, and g is a criterion (payoff) uniquely determined 
by a state and a decision. 
It is possible that the states of the environment or the payoffs 
are only approximately known. As a result probability distributions 
are assigned to each sta~e and payoff reflecting the uncertainty for the 
decision setting. Static models have been prevalent in behavioural 
research for several reasons. Static models are simpler and are 
easier to cope with than dynamic models. The experimental methodology 
for studying static models is not complicated. 
In static decisions the individual has state and payoff information 
that allows him to select an action. Once an action is taken and its 
associated payoff is known,the decision-making is over. In dynamic 
models however the fluid aspects of a decision setting, which are so 
typical of many decision situations, are taken into consideration. 
Dynamic models normally involve series of decisions which can be inter-
dependent or independent of one another. Dynamic rasks may be divided 
into two classes, sequential and multi-stage. In both cases the 
decision-maker has to take a series of decisions, bU,t in sequential 
decision-making the transformation rule for the changes of states does 
not depend on decision-maker decision whereas in multi-stage decision-
making it does. Detailed defini tions-for each dynamic task are given 
in subsequent sections. 
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It is clear that the popular distinction between normative and 
descriptive decision theories is now abandoned and a great impetus in 
research has been produced since the two new basic categories of 
decision situations, namely the static and dynamic,have appeared. Each 
of these categories can be sub-divided further, and the new distinctions 
help to discuss meaningfully the analogies between research findings and 
real decision settings. 
3. The Static Case 
Static decision theories can be dichotomised in three possible 
ways (Luce and Suppes, 1965). The first way is whether algebraic or 
deterministic tools are employed. The second way is whether, as a 
result of each decision, a payoff without or with uncertainty is 
determined. The third way is whether a complete ranking of all actions 
is available or a prediction of the. selected action are specified. 
In one of the most influential theories for static decision-
making it has been suggested that the decision-maker behaves so as to 
maximise subjective expected utility SEU. 
J 
n 
SEU. 
J ~ i=l = Y. 1. u .. 1.J (1) 
where Yl , Y2, ••• , Yn are subjective probabilities of the n states of 
the environment and Ul ., U2., ••• , U . are the utilities of the n J J nJ 
consequences of action j. 
Many difficulties arise in predicting choices with the subjective 
utility model because of the two sets o'f unknown. parameters, the 
utilities and the subjective probabilities. There is enough evidence 
suggesting that people rarely behave according to the subjective 
expected utility models. Utility maximisation in many circumstances 
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calls for more so'phisticated human information processing or 
computational ability than man possesses. 
The subjective expected utility theory does no't account for 
consistent intransitivities in choice which can be successfully 
generated in properly designed experiments. As a result, the additive 
difference model has been proposed by Morrison (1962). The alternative 
x = (Xl' x2 ' ••• , xn) is preferred to y = (Y2' Y3' ••• , Yn) if 
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where up u2, ••• ,un are real va1ue .. utility functions and sl~ s2, ••• ,sn 
increasing continuous difference functions. The decision-maker, according 
to the additive difference model, makes first comparisons in each 
dimension i and the results of these comparisons are added to determine 
the final preference. 
A second alternative to the subjective expected utility is the 
concept of risk. The risk is a property of the options and it is 
related to the mean and variance of their outcomes. Options are ordered 
according to the amount of the risk involved, and choice is made so as to 
minimise the risk. Generally, there is little agreement concerning the 
assumptions about the properties of the options which represent their risk 
and inter-relation of the various approaches is difficult. 
Two basic approaches have been extensively examined to study the 
use of information by a decision-maker. The correlational approach 
where decision-makers'integration of i~formation is describ~d'by means 
of correlational statistics, and the functional approach which primarily 
relies on the analysis of variance. 
Several simple models have been developed to capture dec:ision-
makers'policy, the most prominent of which is the linear model. This 
postulates that decision-makers'responses constitute some linear 
combination of the physical or objective values of the information 
dimensions. The success of the linear model in predicting decisions 
has already been discussed. However it is important to underline, at 
this point, Green's (1968) criticism that first order approximations as 
good descriptors of reality or as fictions contributed by the method of 
analysis depends partly on one's purposes. If the.goal is prediction 
in some practical situation, an adequate description will serve. But 
if the goal is to understand the process then analyses that mask 
complexities should be questioned. 
Configura1 effects can be included in the linear model by incor-
porating cross product terms into the equation of the decision-maker. 
However,many practical problems are created when terms that make the 
equations complex are included. For this reason many investigators 
prefer to use analysis of variance to describe complex judgmental 
processes. 
The factors that describe the process must be partitioned in 
relatively few discrete levels. The analysis of variance model 
provides a statistically efficient mechanism for detecting linear, 
curvilinear and configura.l aspects of the judgmental process. A number. 
of studies did succeed in uncovering numerous instances of interactions 
among cues,but the increment in predictive power contributed by these 
configural effects was again found to be small and hence the point made 
by Green is substantiated. 
An extension of the regression approaches described in the fore-
going paragraphs is the information integration theory. . This theory is 
concerned with scaling the information inputs, determining ~eights and 
testing various composition rules. Special attention has been devoted 
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to decision tasks in which a simple algebraic model involving adding, 
subtracting, averaging or multiplying the information inputs serves 
as the substantive theory. The basic theoretical model is 
n 
RF'C+~ 
~=o 
w. s. + e 
1 1. 
(3) 
where R is the decision-maker';s decision, wi is the weight value, and 
si is the scale value respectively, of a piece of information, e is a 
random error and C is a scaling factor (Anderson, 1974). 
The equation (3) is similar to a linear model, except that 
il. 
subjective scale values are employed and as a result ~s not necessary 
for the objective values of the information input to be linearly related 
to the responses. The integration composition rules are based on these 
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subjective scale values, whereas the linear and the analysis of variance 
composition rules are based on the objective values. The additive 
model can also be reformulated to study dynamic decision tasks (Anderson, 
1965; Shanteau, 1970). 
If the information inputs and the judgements or dec~sions can be 
measured on interval scales the composition rules can be tested directly •. 
However when only ordinal properties of the scales are known then the 
theory of conjoint measurements (Krantz and Tversky, 1971; Krantz et al. 
1974) is particularly useful. The theory of conjoint measurements is 
in many respects similar to integration theory but, whereas integration 
theory deals with quantitative laws, conjoint measurement is concerned 
with qualitative laws (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). 
It is fair to stress at this point that the reported theories 
should not be regarded as fundamentally different but rather as 
complementary to each other. The subjective expected utility theory 
and the integration theory, for example, are very much related. Weights 
can be replaced by subjective probabilities and input information scale 
values by utilities. The assumptions of transitivity and independence 
are fundamental to both theories. Their difference lies in the forms 
of environment they apply. The concept of utility may not be 
applicable to information inputs, and the lack of risk· variance in the 
integration theory does not allow the straightforward measurement of the 
utility of gambling. 
4; The Dynamic Case 
Most of the work on dynamic decision-making is relatively recent. 
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It would indeed be very difficult to develop theories and models without 
the availability of some modern mathematical tools or to carry out most 
of the experimental studies without digital computers. A decision 
setting is defined (Lee, 1971) as dynamic if either 
1. Information to decision-maker from past outcomes or from 
information-gathering process is available, and can lead to 
better decisions for forthcoming decisions than would be 
possible, 
or 2. Decisions made by the decision-maker affect which subsequent 
decision situations he will face (Multi-stage decisions). 
If neither 1 or 2 holds the situation is static. 
Dynamic models have been studied in three contexts: 
Bayesian information processing, Information purchase, and sequential 
decision-making in dynamic programming situations (Edwards, 1972). What 
Edwards means by "sequential decision-making" is probably mUlti-stage 
decision-making since sequential decision-making is the theoretical out-
growth of sequential analysis (Wa1d, 1947) and it is concerned mostly 
with information purchase. 
tasks. 
Bayesian information is very often identified with diagnostic 
Diagnosis can be conceptualised as the process of revising a 
subjective probability distribution over a set of n event Eo' El' "" 
E 1 on the basis of some data. 
n-
Formally the events are probability 
distributions. As mentioned in the introduction, Bayes' rule provides 
the mathematically appropriate way to combine prior probabilities with 
the event probabilities after m observations of data xl' x2' ••• , xm 
to obtain the posterior probabilities. The comments made in the fore-
going paragraphs on linear models, regarding the ease with which an 
additive model may be accepted to explain the processes underlying the 
responses, ~.;rere also made by Green (1968) and apply here. 
Another approach to study serial information was developed by 
Anderson (1965). This is a reformulation of the weighted average 
model (e.g. (3)) and it is useful to study the step-by-step build-up 
of a response in response of each datum. The proportional change 
model asserts that the response after n data R is assumed to equal the 
n 
weighted sum of the scale values of each datum xk ' k=l, 2, ••. , n. 
R = R 
n n-l (4) 
where R
n
- l is the response prior to, and Rn the response posterior to 
the presentation of the nth datum; wn and sn are the weight and scale 
value of the nth datum. 
1~en the cost of acquiring information must be included in a 
decision setting with serial irJormation, the decision should be made 
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when the proper amount of information is acquired and no sooner or later. 
For this type of situation another approach has been developed, the theory 
of optional stopping (or information purchase or sequential decision-
making). The decision-maker is asked to build-up an opinion serially, 
favouring event e l or event e2, and he is ch~r8eq with ci cost units 
to observe each ne~.;r inforr:lation item x" At each stage the decision-
l. 
maker has three options, the decision dl that e l is the actual event, 
the decision d2 that e2 is the actual event and the decision u to 
wait and purchase an information item x. at a cost c.. The decision-~ ~ 
maker should minimise the expected cost. This formulation has been 
treated in operational research literature. Most of the psychological 
experiments on optional stopping have been developed within the 
Bayesian framework, and the model has been insufficient to explain the 
observed results (Rapoport and Wallsten, 1972). 
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None of the reported approaches is concerned with action selection. 
Decisions tend to be independent and the stage to stage state of the 
system does not depend on the kind of decision the decision-maker has 
taken. However, inter-dependence of successive decisions is rather 
the exception in real ~.;orld (Toda, 1968), and it does not enable us to 
study decision behaviour over relatively long periods of time. Since 
the decision setting of the present investigation is highly relevant to 
many of the concepts and ideas of multi-stage decision-making, analytical 
formulations and the relevant literature in multi-stage decision-making 
~vill be extensively reported in a separate section. 
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MULTI-STAGE DECISION-MAKING 
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1. General 
) 
I 
It is typical in real-life decision settings not to have to make 
just one decision but a concatenation of decisions each contingent on 
the consequences of previous decisions; implications of present 
decisions may reach far into the future. Sometimes the sequence of 
decisions is definite, sometimes it is indefinite. Military decisions, 
stock market speculation, control engineering and decisions in political, 
business and management settings are all examples. The information from 
the environment is governed by the selected actions. This information 
frequently forces the decision-maker to restructure the sets of states 
and actions of the producing process or to change his objectives. 
Many of the "fluid" aspects of the real decision problems are not 
easily defined. In other situations, the multiplicity of dimensions, 
the frequency of changes in formulation,and the rapidity of 
alteration of coefficien~s in criteria by which efficiency is measured, 
make meaningless the concept of mathematical optimality. In spite of 
these difficulties considerable effort has been devoted, by mathematicians 
and operational research scientists, to formulate and solve some of the . ! 
simpler real multi-stage decision problems. I Psychologists, on the other 
hand, have rarely attempted to investigate 
they are in multi-stage decision settings. 
the lack of psychological research in this 
how people behave 
There are many 
field. Some of 
or how good 
reasons for 
them are: 
a) the formulation of meaningful decision processes is difficult, 
b) the mathematics required to find the optimal solution are complex, and 
c) the experiments are difficult to design and carry out without digital 
computers. 
2. Multi-stage Decision Processes 
Mathematical Definitions 
a. Discrete Deterministic Multi-stage Decision.Process. 
Consider a system whose state ·.S will be generally a vector of· 
N dimensions, and a family of transformations T(s, d) where d 
represents a vector variable which specifies a particular member 
of the family. The d is the decision variable. 
The chosen d will depend upon s, which is to say it will be a 
function of s, d a d(s). 
Dv . 
In discrete deterministic process a choice of a decision variable 
o.t 
d will result a new state of the system. Suppose that an initial 
time and in an initial state which we shall call sl an initial 
decision d1 is made. 
relation 
The result is a new state s2 given by the 
A second decision d2 will result a new state, s3 determined by the 
relation 
And generally an M-1 decision ~-1 will result 
The purpose of the decision process is to choose d1 so as to 
maximise a criterion function: 
There are some analytical and numerical methods of attacking the 
problem of determining a set of d values d1, d2, ••• , ~ 
maximising the above function. 
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The reader who is interested in these methods can profit by first 
reading the article by Obermayer and Muck1er (1964) as an introduction 
and then reading Be11man (1957, 1961), Ka1man (1963) and Pontryegin 
et al. (1962) for more of the details. 
b. Discre'te Stochastic Multi-stage Decision Process. 
In a deterministic process it is assumed that the choice of decision 
vector led to a definite transformation of the system from a state s 
to the state T(s,d). However it is possible that a choice.of d 
may not imply a unique transformation but a set of possible outcomes 
T(s, d, v) where v is a.stochastic vector with a given distribution 
function. 
The state of the system, after the M-l decision has been made, is 
and the criterion function is 
since G is a stochastic quantity the expected G over the stochastic 
variables v1' v2, ••• , vN is to be maximised. MOre details about 
the mathematical formulation of the solution can be found in Be11man 
(1961). 
Real-World Multi-stage Decision Processes 
The foregoing definition of a multi-stage decision process might 
be useful to understand the basic features of this process and some of 
the problems which a human decision-maker faces. Furthermore, since 
the definition is but a simplification of the real process, it is 
obvious that many more difficu1ti'es 'exist. 
~, I 
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The derivation of a set dp d2, ••• ,.~ which maximise the 
criterion function G can be very difficult task, even when the number 
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of decision stages and action choices is a rather small number. For 
example, for a 10-stage decision process where d1 can assume ten different 
values the total number of different policies is 1010. The same 
problem might become even more difficult in stochastic tasks. 
There are many more problems associated with real-world multi-
stage decisions. Some of them are:-
1. The criterion function is not well-defined. 
form of function G is not known. 
That means that the 
2. Real-life problems often have multiple criteria, and it is often 
impossible simultaneously to maximise them all. 
3. The state s of the environment and the number and form of the 
available decision alternatives are often unknown. 
4. The consequences of a particular decision or of a number of 
decisions are unknown. 
5. Some of the tasks are defined in terms of the objectives to be . 
achieved rather than in terms of the transformation for achieving 
the objectives (means for achieving objectives). 
These difficulties are due to the complexity or incomp1e'te knowledge 
of the process. However additional problems are created by the 
inherent limitations on the human's ability to perceive and process 
existing information relevant to his decisions • 
. 'f 
"3. Multi-stage Decision-making in Dynamic Programming Situations 
MOst of the normative studies in multi-stage decision-making have 
been conducted utilising a theoretical framework set up by a branch of 
applied mathematics called dynamic programming. A brief exposition of 
how dynamic programming notions are applied to the study of human 
decision-makers can be found in Toda (1972). The possibility of 
applying dynamic programming to the study of human decision-makers in 
dynamic decision situations was first discussed by Edwards (1962). 
Dynamic programming theory'compares real with optimal behaviour, leading 
to modifiable normative-descriptive models. 
Ray (1963) investigated human control in a deterministic version 
of the Reader's Control Problem (RCP). This is a decision task 
developed by Thomas (1962) and it was used also by Rapoport. RCP 
requires the decision-maker to develop a sequence of n-decisions in 
which the state of the system following decision n is a function of 
h th d .. f h f h h· d· h" • ten eC1s10n, 0 testate 0 t e system t at eX1ste pr10r to t 1S 
decision and of some random element. The decision-maker is aware of 
all past system states and decisions, and thus may determine the 
consequences of his decisio*s for the system status. Ray reported 
that about 50% of his subjects learned to behave optima1ly after many 
repetitions of the same problem. In a somewhat different task K1eiter 
(1970) found that many decision-makers could not recognise that the 
system was dynamic. 
The introduction of a stochastic parameter in the s~me task by 
Rapoport (1966a)had as a result a reduction of 50% of the efficiency 
of the decision-maker. However this investigator reported that there 
were some differences in the procedure, in the value of n (number of 
stages) and, more important, that Ray's subjects repeated the same 
problem several times more than his own subjects. Additionally, 
different problem interpretations were given to the decision-maker in 
the two experiments. Ray did not give a specific interpretation to the 
experimental task, while Rapoport presented it as a business game of 
buying and selling stocks. 
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Rapoport (1966b,1967) investigated an adaptive version of the 
RCP with unknown planning horizons.· He found that: 
1. The closest fit between actual and optimal strategy occurs when 
the number of future stages considered by subjects is seven. 
However, the decision horizon differs from individual to individual, 
from problem to problem between individuals, and it was also changed 
within a single problem. The number comprising an individual's 
decision horizon was varied through a range·of values for each 
. value of the decision-maker's planning horizon. His actual 
decisions were then compared with optimal decisions under the 
assumed horizons, until the horizon providing the closest fit was 
found. 
2. Human behaviour can be characterised as constrained optimal, .provided 
that the structure of task is fully understood and provided that the 
experimenter knows the perceptual and intellectual constraints 
operating in the situation and imposed ,upon the decision-makers. 
Constraints are concerned with long-term memory and short-term 
memory, information processing, over-estimation and under-estimation 
of probabilities, future implication of present decisions, etc. 
Another stochastic version of the RCP was investigated by Powers 
(1969). He found that his subjects came quite close to the optimal 
solution in the later stages of learning.' Sub-optima1 decision-making 
in the initial and intermediate stages of learning might be accounted 
for by subjects' lack of skill in considering simultaneously all 
relevant aspects of the task. Finally, in the later stages of learning 
they made an effort to improve their efficiency by considering the 
characteristics of the stochastic variable as it was influencing the 
system. In another experiment Rapoport (1968) required subjects to 
give estimates of the state-change probabilities. Subjects under-
estimated the higher probabilities and over-estimated the lower ones. 
The estimates did not accord well with a Bayesian learning model. 
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In an attempt to examine the validity of the findings of the 
previous work in more complex decision problems, Embert (1971, 1972) 
studied human decision-making in a two-variable sequential and dynamic 
decision problem. His task is a production scheduling problem and it 
presents many similarities with the Rep. However, the existence of 
two decision variables rather than one introduces problems which 
virtually preclude determination of recursive expressions for the 
'optimal decision sets by intuitive methods. The optimal solution in 
this problem was approximated by a direct computer search. 
In contrast to other investigators Embert found that uncertainty 
did not cause any considerable decrement in the decision performance. 
He found also that the optimal model was providing an adequate 
d~scription of the subjects' terminal performance, ,and this was 
'I'"~~G2.d ' 
teaIIQ,.d by the fact that verbalised decision heuristics were 
consistent with the decision pattern prescribed by the optimal model. 
In addition the decision effectiveness was higher than the decision 
effectiveness in previous work. He attributed his results to two 
main reasons: 
a. His subjects had detailed information about the"stochastic 
element throughout the task. 
b. That it is ,possible that decision performance may improve 
with increased system complexity. 
4. Multi-stage Decision-making in Other Laboratory Situations 
, 
Additional evidence which supported the view that decision 
performance improves with increased system complexity was provided by 
Puscheck and Greene (1972). In a two-sided work game simulation it 
was found that decision performance was better when the decision-makers 
were opposing the most sophisticated computer models. 
(' 
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The human decision ability to predict future states of discrete. 
linear dynamic systems was examined by Rouse (1973). It was found 
that the decision-maker was better than a linear or quadratic extra-
polator but a model with a perfect memory performed much better. 
Finally, degradation of performance under uncertainty was observed 
by Levine and Samet (1973) in a computer controlled task. In addition 
it was found that when the information inputs were more reliable, 
decision-makers made use of them extensively, in the same way as when 
the conflict of the situation increased. 
To summarise, the general impression from normative studies in 
multi-stage decision-making is that man is good at finding simple 
strategies which, in spite of their simplicity, guarantee a solution 
fairly close to the optimal one. 
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The introduction of a stochastic element results in a considerable 
decrement in decision performance. However, a recent study' in a 
system·more complex than those previously studied has shown that the 
differences in performance due to a stochastic element were insignificant. 
The number of future stages considered by decision-makers is 
limited. The limitation is due to perceptual and intellectual constraints. 
This means that decision-makers may have a "time perspective" implying 
less consideration of a stage the further in the future it occurs. 
5. Behavioural Studies of Multi-stage Decision-Making in Real-life Situations 
Although most real-world processes can be viewed as multi-stage 
decision processes, since earlier decisions affect, guide and .serve as 
inputs to the making of later decisions, the situation on which most 
attention has been focus sed by behavioural scientists is the scheduling 
of resources. 
MOst of the organisational tasks in industry are defined in terms 
of goals. The derivation of means to achieve these goals is left to 
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the ingenuity of the person performing the task. In an actual scheduling 
problem studied by Dutton (1964), no alternatives were known beforehand 
and the potential number of actions were many. The exact consequences 
were not known to the operators. The task was to schedule orders on 
a machine according to certain specifications (goals). The number of 
order combinations (alternatives) was beyond the capacities of the 
operators or computer. It was observed that the operator~ used a set 
of very powerful rules which reduced dramatically the number of 
alternatives to a range within the human computational capacity using a 
desk calculator. In other words, the pattern of solutions given was 
keyed to the scheduling goals and furthermore to the computational 
restrictions of the means for achieving the goals. 
The judgmental aspects of the schedu1ersdecisions in production 
scheduling were examined by Fox and Kriebe1 (1967). From observing 
the schedu1ers' actual decisions and subsequent discussions, it appeared 
reasonable to hypothesize that the schedu1er related together in a linear 
way the elements of the priority system which might influence his 
decisions. The comparison of the model's output with the actual 
decisions of the schedu1er indicated that the model described the 
scheduling behaviour with reasonable accuracy. In a somewhat simil,ar 
laboratory situation, Pege1s (1970) tested the efficiency of schedu1ers 
in relation to a simple rule of thumb. He found that only two 
subjects out of a total of seventeen were able to come up with a lower 
total cost than the rule of thumb (a linear 'decision rule). However, 
since his subjects were rather inexperienced, the results might not be 
representative of the behaviour of an experienced schedu1er in a similar 
real-world situation. 
One aspect of the schedu1er's decision behaviour, the run time , 
estimates of fabricator machines, was examined by Dutton and Starbuck 
(1971). Knowledge of the time of day each machine will run out of'work 
was important, because it was helping the schedu1er to construct his new 
schedule at the proper time, thus making best possible utilization of 
the proper information. In agreement with the previous studies, it was 
... _-------
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'found that a linear combination of the elements which were influencing 
the run times of the machine was accurately predicting the behaviour 
of the s chedul er. However, the,scheduler was actually using two non-
linear relations, one of which was very complicated, to generate this' 
simple linear relation. The authors proposed that the scheduler was 
not solving (empirically or otherwise) any complicated equation but he 
,rather had a look-up table of possible values which was used to solve 
the first equation. 
It is clear from the foregoing paragraphs that there is evidence 
that a linear combination of the elements which influence the decisions 
of the scheduler can be an adequate descriptive model of the decision 
process. However this does not mean that a scheduler is a linear 
decision system. He may use non-linear relations or look-up tables 
in order to collapse the dimensions of the task so he can utilize his 
inherent flexibility in arriving at decisions. This ·agrees with 
research in medical diagnosis. Although the medical doctors maintain 
that their judgments are non-linear, a linear relation is the accurate 
predictor of doctor's decision behaviour. 
Some evidence proposes that the decision model of the schedulers 
is influenced by the goals and even more by the computational. 
restrictions for achieving the goals. This implies that a decision 
aid can change the form of the human decision process; but it also 
means that, whatever the form of the decision process, the number of 
elements taken into account in the final stage is a constant within 
the range of human information processing capacity. 
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SEC T ION 3 
MULTI-STAGE DECISION-MAKING AND DECISION AIDS 
It is clear, from the considerable amount of resear.ch in this 
area, that there is general agreemen~ about the need to facilitate 
human decision-making with external means. However, a rather dis-
appointing observation, coming out from most of these studies, is that 
. they lack any detailed examination of the behavioural aspects of the 
tasks. 
A simple and rather inexpensive aid is a scheduling (magnetic or 
otherwise) stateboard. A stateboard has the following advantages: 
i. It makes available immediate information as to the status of 
the system. 
ii. It can be used for advanced planning. 
iii. Due to its simplicity it can be used almost by anyone. 
iv. There is no limitation in the size of the actual display. 
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A characteristic application of a stateboard as scheduling aid is 
found in the Esso London Airport Refuelling Centre. The scheduling of 
the refuelling operations of aircraft with limited number of resources 
and with conflicting objectives was a rather difficult task for the 
operators. Shackel et al. (1968, 1969) proposed, designed and evaluated. 
a magnetic stateboard aiming to provide a memory and planning aid for 
this rather difficult on-line task. The system, although simple, has 
proved to be very efficient and flexible in assisting the scheduler to 
make effective use of the available resources of man-power and equipment. 
A second application of a stateboard as scheduling aid is found in 
the container terminal at Holyhead. The main objective of the 
·schedulers is to transfer containers from ship to train (or lorries) or 
vice versa in the shortest possible time with minimum utilization of 
resources. Although the system was designed to operate on-line, 
technical problems made this rather difficult. As an alternative the 
operators have developed an off-line method of scheduling resources. It 
has been proposed (Brigham, 1974) that this off-line method of operation 
using predetermined "programs" enables schedulers to eliminate an 
"artificial time stress". However it was felt that,alth~ugh off-l:i.ne 
operation of a system may reduce time stress, the general question of 
whether a schedule should be made off-line or on-line cannot be answered 
in terms of time stress alone. At a theoretical level on-line 
scheduling is preferred (see Tocher, 1970). In addition,h~gh levels 
of uncertainty make the off-line mode of operation unworkable in some 
cases. Another application of stateboard as a scheduling aid in a 
different situation is mentioned by Sarkar (1972). 
The major disadvantage of ,the stateboard as a scheduling aid is 
that only a limited number of alternative courses of action can be 
tested. For simple systems with limited number of variables this 
creates no problems. The'very fact that the schedu1er can absorb at 
a glance the status of the whole system, allows him to make perceptual 
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. adjustments in his schedule and to develop heuristic strategies otherwise 
impossible. 
However, there are many scheduling situations in industry in which 
the number of alternative courses of action is excessively large. In 
such cases a computer aid might be more suitable. It is widely accepted 
that, in most cases, completely computerised scheduling is unlikely to 
provide efficient solutions due to lack of the flexibility so necessary 
in real-life situations. Consequently, the use of a man-computer 
interactive scheduling system has found a wide range of applications. 
The interactive approach in scheduling has appeared in two 
distinctively different forms of realization. The first approach 
involves an internal computer programming selection approach according 
to criteria which can be expressed in terms of a formal algorithm. The 
human schedu1er, then, is free to select from the output the schedules 
which best satisfy his own requirements. The second approach does not 
involve any specific computerized selected procedure, but it allows 
users to explore their individual decision consequences. 
A typical application of the first approach is described by 
Seiden (1970). The system furnishes the scheduler with requirements 
and gives priorities based on the level of inventory. However, there 
were many restrictions other than inventory levels to be dealt with. 
Although some of them could be programmed, they would introduce enormous 
complications. Consequently the scheduler was acting as the interface 
between the computer and the production line. As a result the system 
was adequately dynami~ and flexible to adjust to day to, day changes in 
operating conditions, orders and ·priorities. The inventory reports 
generated by the computer were guiding the operator to form his schedule 
on a stateboard but many changes were introduced by the scheduler due to 
the factors not possible to incorporate in the computer program. 
Rice (1969) followed the same approach in the scheduling of the 
corrugator (a machine that 'corrugates paperboard). It was beyond the 
ability of the human scheduler to research and review all possible 
'combinations of orders when selecting only those which will provide the 
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", most efficient corrugator runs. Instead, a computer can execute these· 
calculations rapidlY,finding the orders which will satisfy specifications. 
The scheduler then is free to choose from the output of the computer the 
combinations that will best satisfy the completion of the orders. 
Consequently this type of scheduling was allowing the scheduler to 
concentrate on the most economical combinations without the repeated 
calculations needed to find order combinations that might be economical. 
The comparison of this human/computer scheduling with other completely 
computerized methods has shown that human/computer scheduling is better 
in all aspects of the task. A third application of the same approach 
is given by Ballenbacher (1970). 
The second approach emphasizing the importance of individual 
. decision consequences, has been particularly favoured among 
behavioural scientists. The dynamics of the scheduling'envir9nment 
are modelled in a computer and the human decision-maker can test 
alternative courses of possible actions without handling the system 
dynamics. A first attempt to test the effectiveness of these ideas, 
by modelling the dynamics of a job shop in the laboratory, was made by 
Ferguson and Jones (1969). In contrast to standard simu1ations the 
authors chose to investigate a scheduling decision which emphasizes the 
importance of individual decision consequences. Their goal was not to 
devise an approach to find an optimal mathematical solution, but to 
assist operators in finding and constructing schedules which they found 
useful. This utility was based on a subjective weighting of "hard" 
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facts presented by the computer and "soft" facts gathered by the operators 
of situations extraneous to the computer system. The most importa~t 
findings from this investigation are summarized as follows: 
1. The participants tended to be universally impressed by the flexibility 
of the computer based decisions aid and by the ways in which it can 
assist schedu1ers. 
2. A few of the most capable participants were able to devise manual 
schedules which were the equal of any computer aided schedules they 
made. However the same task could be performed faster with the 
aid of computer. 
Finally, most of the operators took advantage of the similarity 
between the computer process of using the decision rules and the normal 
process they had just gone through in generating a schedule. They 
quickly appreciated the ability they had, due to the presence of the 
computer aid, to generate several different schedules instead of feeling 
forced by time pressures to work on their first schedule. 
A further technical improvement in the above methodology appears 
in a study by Jones et al. (1970). The typewriter terminal used by 
Ferguson and Jones (1969) presented several obstacles to an effective 
conversation between decision-maker and the computer, so it was tested 
against a display terminal. In general, the display terminal was found 
better than the typewriter terminal. Another important finding was 
that the computer aided scheduling (typewriter and particularly display) 
tended to help mostly the weakest decision-makers to bring their 
performance nearer to that of the top deci~ion-makers.The authors 
have concluded that, as the communication between the scheduler and a 
fast calculating device improves, there was a shift in the problem~ 
solving techniques of schedulers. 
Decision-makers with no computer aid were clearly trying to make 
the best decision at each decision point. These decisions were'usually 
inconclusive because it is not possible for most humans to appreciate 
all the possible actions alternatives. 
Decision-makers using a typewriter terminal were mostly concerned 
with the merits of following specific decisio,n rules giving the best 
schedules. But although good rationales can be given for many rules, 
even small changes in operating times and sequences can cause any rule 
to provide a much less satisfactory result. 
Finally, decision-makers using the display were trying to find the 
best combination of rules rather than attempting to reason out the 
logical value of the combination. They saw the computer as a means of 
trying out more alternatives, in contrast to those using the typewriter 
who saw the computer as a means for evaluating rules. However, one 
question which remains unanswered from this study is about the quality 
of decision of the best decision-maker under the various conditions. 
Why was the best manual decision-maker, who had the time to test only 
one schedule, the same as the best decision-makers with computer aid, 
who were able to generate a great number of different schedules? Does 
it mean that he was using some powerful "human heuristics" which could 
lead directly to a good schedule without need to compare many different 
schedules? 
An implementation of the above approach in the scheduling of a 
coil winding shop is reported by Godin and Jones (1969).. As many as 
1062 possible permutations of opera~ors machines and coils had tO'be 
considered. With a purely manual system the scheduler could consider 
only a few alternatives. To broaden the scheduler's capabilities, the 
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interactive computer system devised for the shop provided both 
information retrieval and simulation, so that the scheduler could 
test various alternative assignments and can try to anticipate future 
problem areas. However, the system could not handle all the various 
demands, requests and low probability events affecting the coil winding 
shop. This was a responsibility taken by the hUman operator. 
Another computer based interactive display system, to aid steel 
plant scheduling, was devised by Ketteringham et al. (1970, 1974). The 
decision-maker had to allocate casts or ,parts of casts to various 
soaking pits. However each pit had a different performance and each 
. cast required a different duration of soaking. Therefore it was 
difficult for the unaided decision-maker to layout schedules w~ich 
were satisfying long-term objectives. Many of the difficulties 
encountered in this task could be avoided when the scheduler was able 
to explore alternative courses of action in a computer heating model., 
The interactive system consisted of two displays, one an electronic 
data display - presenting information about the state of the pits - and 
the other an interactive touchwire display by which the decision-maker 
communicates with the computer. ,In this way, the decision-maker could 
test different schedules and choose the one satisfying his long-term 
objectives. However, although many of the difficulties associated 
with the scheduling were overcome, some questions arise about the 
efficiency of an interactive deterministic system of this type, in a 
situation which involves a high degree of informational uncertainty •. 
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An on-line predictive facility in job-shop scheduling simulation' 
was designed and evaluated by H.T. Smith (Smith, 1972; Smith et al. 
1972::; Smith and Crabtree, 1975). Th'e main finding was that a predictive 
aid which allows schedulers to "step backwards and forwards in simulation 
time" did not improve human performance. Another not unexpected finding 
was that there were "large individual strategy" variations among 
subjects. The major conclusion of the investigation was that a 
predictive aid can be useful only if it incorporates some sort of 
human heuristic rules so schedulers test only desirable action sequences. 
Otherwise, excessive amounts of time are required to investigate all 
the possible action sequences and this is unlikely to improve 
drastically human performance in on-line situations. 
A number of investigators have examined the efficiency of 
interactive methods to solve the travelling salesman's problems (Doran 
and Michie, 1966; Michie et al. 1968). A human problem solver using 
a computer graphics facility produced better solutions than unaided 
subjects, but a purely computer generated solution was still better 
although to derive it a great cost was required. Similar findings 
. were reported by Krolak and Felts (1971). 
A further study by Smith (1974) concluded that an interactive 
facility, allowing people to utilise their pattern recognition 
abilities rather than overloading the working memory, produced better. 
solutions than traditional methods in a resource allocation task. 
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SEC T ION 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
-. 
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1. Difficulties with the Classification of Decision-MaKing Tasks 
In retrospect, it must be stressed that the main difficulties with 
any attempt to classify decision tasks are associated with their ill 
definedness. Decision settings are too many, processes and tasks vary 
considerably and there is a lack of common properties on which a 
taxonomy could be based. With the present form of decision tasks it 
may be better to focus the attention o~few, well-define4 tasks which 
have more to offer in terms of common properties. Before any further 
discussion it may be useful to report very briefly some comments about 
the use of normative models and optimisation tools in decision-making 
research. 
The usual experimental approach in this area is to define an ideal 
decision-maker and then compare him with real people. Discrepancies 
between optimal and actual performance are assumed to be small, 
systematic and mostly due to general human limitations rather than to 
individual differences. Every time a specific constraint is observed 
and interpreted, it is incorporated into the model until differences 
between actual and model performance are minimal. Obviously this. 
approach is purely experimental and there ,is no hope to extend it to 
study real decisions. Even within this context, optimisation models 
tend to be insensitive to uncover decision policies and personal criteria, 
and they require very small discrepancies between actual and optimal 
performance. On the other hand they provide guidelines about how human 
performance compares to the optimum one in similar decision tasks, and 
these are often the only guidelines available; also they reveal some of 
the existing human constraints. 
! 
----------------------------------------------------------------~-----
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2. A Decision Tree Representation of Real Tasks; 
For complex real-life tasks any discussion about optimal policies 
and performance becomes futile. Human performance in real multi-stage 
decision settings is better described by using the concept of a decision 
tree. 
tree. 
In principle, every decision setting may be. represented by a decision 
In most situations, however, it is difficult to enumerate 
exhaustively every decision branch since the number of branches becomes 
extremely large. 
The size (or complexity) of a decision tree depends on: 
(a) the number of layers, between goal conception'and goal achievement 
(or number of decision stages between initial and final stage), 
(b) the number' of alternatives per decision p~int, 
(c) the number of inessential branches, and 
(d) the degree of situation uncertainty. 
The inherent limitations of the human decision-maker prevent him from 
making any exhaustive search of the decision tree of the situation. 
Instead, he transforms this tree to a simpler one with the number of 
branches well within his computational abilities (Figure 2). The speed 
of the human search is highly dependent on such factors as experience or 
intelligence, nature of the task, external means of computation, etc., 
In general, the number of stages (or layers of the decision tree) 
of a decision task mayor may not be under the control of the decision~ 
maker. For example, in multi-stage decision-making the number of stages 
of the decision process is fixed. In a 10-stage process the decision-
maker should take 10 decisions. However in a medical diagnostic problem 
the doctor might control the number of decision stages. In fact it is 
certain that there are many different tree structures for the same 
diagnostic problem. One importan~\;reason is that goals in multi-stage 
, 
situations are rather well defined, 'in contrast to diagnostic situations 
where the diagnosis might be a goal in itself. 
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3.' Decision-Making Difficulty and Tree Complexity 
The difficulty of a task should directly be. related to the complexity 
of the decision tree of the situation. The success or failure of the 
human decision process should depend on the quality of the transformation 
T (Figure 2) and on the strength of the final selection procedure. 
It seems that, although the complexity of the decision tree can 
equally be dependent on the four factors a to d'of section 2, the 
difficulty of the decision-making is greater when the number of decision 
stages is large rather than small, although both may have the same number 
of branches (alternatives). This can be clarified by·the following 
example: Assume two tree structures, one with one decision point and the 
other with two decision points, .but both with the same number of branches 
(Figure 3). If only two out of five branches lead to goal achievement, 
and the human decision-maker is to choose randomly two branches only, 
there is a smaller probability of goal achievement in the two-stage case. 
It is not clear what is the relative importance of the factors b, c and 
d but one suspects that they may add to the difficulty as they all enlarge 
the decision tree complexity. It must be recognised however, that the 
contribution of the number of stages to the tree complexity is the most 
significant, since this is the only factor which exponentially enlarges 
the size of the decision tree. (The size of the decision tree or the 
number of alternatives is pX where p is the number of alternatives per 
decision point and x the number of decision stages. The factors b, ~ 
and d of the section 2 affect the base p, whereas the factor a is identical 
to the exponent x.) 
It is now possible to define as a measure of the difficulty of a real 
task the number of stages between goal conception and $oal achievement. 
It is stressed that ta~k difficulty may depend on factors (e.g. factors b, 
c, d, ill-definedness etc.) other than the number of stages, but for many 
well defined control tasks the importance of the latter factor should not 
be under-estimated. There is no direct experimental evidence to back up 
the foregoing argument although it appears to be intuitively correct. 
It is however 'worth mentioning that tasks with long-term objectives (i.e. 
~any decision stages between goal conception and goal achievement) demand 
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particular qualities, not possessed by many individuals. These tasks 
are also the least susceptible to automation,in contrast.to.many 
tasks with short-term objectives which can easily be automated. 
4. A Decision Tree Classification of Four Real Tasks 
Having defined as a measure of the difficulty of decision-making 
the number of stages between goal conception and goal achieve~ent, it is 
now possible to classify four of ~he most representative decision tasks 
in a sequence of increasing difficulty. 
(a) Vehicular control - Manual control of a vehicle is a short-range 
process. In view of an unexpected situation there is not time to 
make more than one decision before the goal is achieved (e.g. 
avoidance of an accident). In other cases (e.g. change of traffic 
light) the decision process can be a two-stage one. Due to the 
small number of decision stages between goal selection and goal 
achievement, the decision process becomes habitual. Humans program 
their activities rather easily when time lags are short.' Assuming 
that humans divide distance into 7 perceptual categories, speed into 
5 perceptual categories and acceleration into 5 perceptual 
categories, then the decision tree has 175 branches. Certainly, 
humans do not need to spend a lot of time making decisions under 
normal circumstances because the criteria for choice are not strict, 
e.g. cruising in an urban street can be carried out by many 
different combinations of speed, acceleration and distance. This 
means that the goal can be achieved by choosing anyone of a great 
number of different branches. In the event however of unexpected 
situations the criteria are rather strict. In such cases, the 
driver should find the corresponding category of distance, judge 
his own speed and select the proper acceleration (positive or 
negative). The variability of behaviour is related almost entirely 
to delays in processing the input (i.e. decision time). Once the 
operator has decided to act the action time does not change 
appreciably even over a variety of stimulus environments. 
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(b) Manual Control of Continuous Processes •. 
In process control the human has to organise serial attention to 
search variables and integrate this information in making decisions. 
Process control usually involves longer time-lags than vehicular 
control. Sequences of activities of process controllers become· 
habitual but this takes relatively longer time to develop compared 
to vehicular control. 
The number of decision stages between goal selection and goal 
achievement is rather small but the time involved is longer. Since 
immediate feedback from control actions is not normally available, 
the controllers develop empirical rules of action selection which 
guarantee acceptable solutions. Although the lack of immediate 
feedback and the long time lags involved make the task more difficult 
than vehicular control, system failure because of uncertain events 
is rare. Finally, good control criteria are well defined and strict. 
(c) Scheduling. 
One might say that the major difference between scheduling and 
process control is that the former is intermittent andthe.latter 
continuous. However in both situa,tions the human decision process 
is intermittent. 
The number of decision stages between goal selection and goal 
achievement in scheduling is usually longer than in process control. 
Scheduling is a multi-stage decision process. 
In a multi-stage decision process each decision affects subsequent 
decisions. In order to achieve objectives the best combination 
of a number of successive decisions should be found. The major 
difficulties in scheduling are n~t concerned with long time-lags 
(although they might contribute to ··the difficulty), but with the 
large number of action sequence combinations. Choices of actions 
are made in terms of heuristic rules, although experience from the 
---------.--------------------------------------------------------------------
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past may guide future dec'isions. Although the two previous tasks 
are normally carried out on-line, scheduling very often is carried 
out off-line. 
In contrast to process control, where the number of actions taken 
by the decision-maker is under the control of the decision-maker, 
the number of actions in scheduling is predetermined. Finally, 
it is debatable whether decision performance in scheduling tasks 
becomes habitual. 
(d) Planning. 
Planning can be either at the job shop level, based mainly on up 
to the minute decisions, which is identical to;scheduling, or 
decision-making which involves relatively few actions but 
manipulation of large volumes of information. In planning 
decisions of the second type the time lags are very long. As a 
result, input and system uncertainty are critical factors in 
achieving the planning objectives. Although objectives are well 
defined in the long-term, choice of criteria for achieving them, 
might be at the discretion of the planners. Due to multiplicity 
of operating criteria, choice of actions is based mostly on 
empirical selection rules or on very complex simulation models. 
Normally, it takes a long time before a planner realises whether 
his goal(s) have been achieved or not,but the consequences in cases 
of failure are rather serious. Feedback information is not normally 
available at the time of the decision. 
5. Decision Trees, Memory Load and the Contribution of Predictive Aids 
As mentioned, people convert the environmental decision tree to a 
simpler one well within their computational abilities. Decision aids 
including predictive displays enlarge the size of this "subjective" 
decision tree. It is generally accepted that the size of the subjective 
decision tree is determined by the working or short-term memory. 
.... ---_ .. _--- --- ~-~------------------------------
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The fact that there are serious limitations in the number of 
absolute judgements of information variables does not seem.to be 
responsible for failures in taking the proper decisions. Humans can 
find devices to overcome this disadvantage (Miller, 1956). The most 
serious cause is the small capacity of the short-term memory structure 
and the relatively long time required to transfer information from short-
term to long-term memory. Although the number of items which can be 
kept in the short-term memory is about ten (Miller, 1956) it seems that 
not more than two or three items can be dealt with when a task is 
carried out (Simon, 1969) One recent experiment on the limitations of 
subjects when they search tree structures confirms this view. Olshavsky 
(1971) found that when memory aids are not allowed the memory capacity is 
reduced to perhaps two to three chunks and it is verY fallible. Where 
experiments appear to show that more than two chunks are retained across 
an interruption, the phenomenon can almost always be explained by the 
fact that' subjects recode the stimulus into a smaller number of chunks 
before storing it in short~term memory or that the times allowed to the 
subjects permit them to pass some items to the long-term memory. 
It seems that a critical constant in decision-making situations is 
the time per alternative evaluation. This presumably is not an absolute 
constant but varies within subjects, between subjects of different 
experience, and with different display formats. However it should not 
vary very much, since the primary factors defining this constant are the 
information processing and action evaluation limitations of the human. 
The ratio of the action selection time available over the time per 
alternative defines how many alternatives can be evaluated and consequently 
what is the probability of achievement of a goal. Obviously a decision 
aid which does not allow enough time for alternatives evaluation is 
unlikely to be of great help (see Smith, 1972, for example). On the 
other hand, if the number of alternatives is reduced extensively, in 
addition to the problems of system inflexibility which are created} . 
human problems of boredom arise. 
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Predictive aids help people to enlarge the size of the memory 
chunks and to speed up the search process. They also help the 
operator to reveal solutions which otherwise are difficult to discover. 
In addition, if they are properly designed they may make decisions a 
pattern recognition problem, thus relieving the over-burdened working 
memory. In this way, evaluation of one alternative in the_ predictive 
display is equivalent ~ evaiuation of many alternatives in non-aided 
forms of decision tree search. 
6. Predictive displays and Probability of Goal Achievement 
It is clear-that a predictive system which allows the subject to 
examine the effects of his actions will increase the probability of 
achieving the goals. This is verified with the following example. 
Suppose that a decision situation is described by the decision tree of 
Figure 4. It can be seen from this figure that random search is unlikely 
to lead to goal achievement within a realistic timescale. When the 
decision-maker is able to see the effect of his decisions one step ahead, 
the probability of success is higher. When he is able to see two steps 
ahead, the probability increases even more. Finally, if he is able to 
see three steps ahead the probability becomes one. It seems likely 
that in many cases a predictive model which allows the decision-maker 
to see the results decision one-step ahead can be very useful. Although 
a model which allows preview of many stages ahead seems to be more 
useful, in cases where there is too much uncertainty the costs of 
additional complexity of the equipment or information purchase may not be 
justified. In addition, an external predictive model (i.e. a non-mental 
model), which allows for manipulation of many. stages ahead, may demand 
excessive amounts of time from the decision~aker. As far as predictive 
models are concerned, it would seem very useful to find how many steps 
ahead human decision-makers look and how this is related to decision 
performance. 
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7. The Use of Heuristics 
Certainly, the ability of a decision system'to look ahead is a 
. very important ingredient of good decision performance. However the 
ability to manipulate information and actions in ways which guarantee 
goal achievement is also important. When an intelligent human, animal 
or machine is not able to look ahead effectively because of limitations 
in information storage, information manipulation or action manipulation, 
then some sort of heuristic rules may be used. Heuristic rules do not 
guarantee an optimal solution. They rather help the decision-maker to 
follow a path of actions which is likely to result in a satisfactory 
solution. Heuristic rules are the result of the effort of an 
intelligent system to find a compromise between the environmental needs 
and his own limitations. It seems that.the ability to find efficient 
heuristic rules varies among individuals. In fac~ the success of a 
decision-maker in a control situation depends on the quality of 
heuristics he uses. Although the question of whether subjects can be 
taught to behave optima11y in a strict mathematical sense is an 
interesting research field, even more important seems the question of 
whether subjects can be taught to apply the most efficient heuristics. 
The reason is simple; although human limitations might prevent applying 
optimal rules they are not likely to interfere with applying the most 
efficient human heuristics. 
8. General Guidelines for Research on Predictive Displays 
Predictive displays are regarded as having significant potential 
for future manned systems. There are many applications of the predictive 
display for manual control tasks" (the least difficu1t·decision tasks 
of section 4.4), and very few applications for process control tasks. 
However there is no apparent reason why predictive displays have not 
been used for some of the more difficult decision tasks, as those 
reported in section 4.4. 
""", •• _ ...... _ .... ____ ••• _ ••• _.4 __ ~·~.~·~ _________________________ _ 
It is not clear precisely how the operator makes use of the 
predictive displays even for the simplest manual control tasks. 
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Predictive displays have traditiopally been based on a fast time (two-scale) 
model of the controlled system, first developed by Kelley(1960) but 
inspired by' Zieb.oltz and Paynter (1954). However, there .is no reason 
why they should not be simple. It is true that apart from some 
knowledge acquired from manual control tasks, there isa total lack of 
guidelines for the design of these displays. Questions about the 
accuracy of the fast time model are very important. Should it be very 
exact and thus expensive? Should it be simpler and thus provi~ 
inaccurate predictions? 
The guidelines for exploring human performance and strategies, 
when using predictive displays in difficult tasks, could be based on 
the concept of decision trees. The way people use predic'tive displays 
for searching the sUbjective decision tree is clearly an important 
question. With the decisio~ tree conceptual;sation of decision tasks, 
it may be relevant to ask how far ahead into the future the operator 
looks (or how many stages ahead). Discrete control tasks and the use 
of predictive displays can also be studied. Apart from the direct use 
of the decision tree as a tool to explore the ability of the decision-
maker to look into the future, the effects of other variables (uncertainty. 
heuristics etc.) may also be examined. 
It was therefore thought desirable to develop a research program to 
look for design guidelines of predictive displays and to investigate 
decision strategies and performance in a realistically difficult decision 
setting. 
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PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
The present study has been conducted with two.main aims in mind: 
1. To study human decision-making abilities in a multi-stage decision 
setting and particularly under conditions of input uncertainty. 
2. To develop decision aids which utilise human abilities to the most 
by creating an effective man-computer co-operation in a challenging 
predictive mode. 
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In order to provide a vehicle for the exploration of these issues, 
a problem environment in the form of laboratory scheduling task was 
constructed and experimentally presented to a number of subjects. Having 
identified the main areas of interest a number of specific problems were 
selected for detailed investigation under controlled conditions. These 
problems are described in brief by the following questions: 
"" 
1. How is decision performance affected by various amounts of input 
uncertainty? 
2. Is a predictive display a valuable aid for improving decision 
performance .in this particular task? 
3. Is a heuristic aid useful? 
4. Does the effectiveness of either or both predictive and heuristic 
displays diminish by the presence of a high amount of input 
uncertainty? 
5. If yes, does the provision of information about the variance of 
the underlying uncertainty distribution lead to an improvement 
in decision performance? 
6. If this variance is reduced by means of some optimal statistics 
or by weighting evidence from various information sources, is there 
any further improvement? 
The independent variables were selected to enable these important 
questions related to the human decision-making in real~life multi-stage 
decision settings to be explored. It was thought also important to 
investigate the strategies of different operators, and this was achieved 
by recording the subjects inputs partly by the computer and partly by 
I . 
.. ~,'.-. ----.-_ ... -_ .. -
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direct observation. These strategies may change with the different 
variables. It was decided to perform objective analyses to study how 
the decision-maker explores his environment rather than performing more 
esoteric analyses with verbal protocols. 
It was hoped that, as a result of the series of experimental studies, . 
a number of practical recommendations would be made with regard to 
(a) human decision-making difficulties in multi-stage decision situations, 
(b) predictive aids, and (c) ways of handling the environmental uncertainty • 
. . 
72 
THE DESCRIPTION OF THE LABORATORY SCHEDULING TASK 
· .. ~----~--~-~--~~--~------------------------------------------------------------~------
1. The Decision Problem 
In order to understand the decision process it is necessary to 
introduce briefly the main features of the soaking pit scheduling 
problem described by Ketteri~gham et al. (1970): 
"Steel is made to a particular quality in cast sizes of around 
140 tons. The hot metal is then poured into moulds to make 
ingots of about 5 tons each. The steel is then allowed to 
cool, the length of cooling time required being dependent on 
the steel quality. When the ingots have cooled sufficiently, 
they are stripped from the moulds and sent to the soaking pits 
for reheating. The 20 pits vary in size and other 
characteristics but their common purpose is to: heat the ingots 
to a.temperature suitable for rolling. The length of time 
the ingots take to reach rolling temperature is dependent on 
a number of parameters,the most important of which is the 
length of time the ingot. took to cool down. Other factors 
involved are the size and efficiency of the pit and quality 
and amount of heating gas available. Clearly it is desirable 
that the ingots should spend the minimum amount of time in the 
pit provided that they are at the required rolling temperature 
when they are drawn. 
The scheduler's main criterion is to maintain a constant flow 
of hot ingots to the rolling mill the operation of which is 
very expensive, around £600 per hour. The decisions taken by 
the scheduler are mainly concerned with the allocation of a 
cast or part of a cast to a soaking pit. Each pit has a 
different performance and each cast requires a different period 
of soaking. Therefore with the time lags involved the scheduler 
is faced with the difficulty of predicting the long term effects 
of his decisions. In the present situation he uses his 
experience and a few crude rules to satisfy short term cost based 
objectives. He ~s incapable of calculating the long term 
effects of his decisions which could adversely effect future mill 
operation" • 
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It became apparent from this description that the complexity of 
the problem and the number of parameters involved, would make any 
detailed simulation of the pit scheduling task in the PDP-l2A computer 
prohibitively difficult. On the other hand, this very complexity made 
the attempt to simulate this process more appealing since it leaves 
ground for choice and manipulation of the parameters considered most 
appropriate for a laboratory decision problem. These parameters were 
chosen according to their generality, i.e. how often they were met in 
other decision situations and according to their interpretability, i.e. 
how easily they could be interpreted in a computer program. The main 
aim in mind, during the initial stages of the design, was not to create 
any kind of face validity or to reproduce the actual task but to develop 
a tool suitable for the systematic investigation of a number of questions 
which are known to be important in discrete sequenti~decision situations. 
In the computer simulation (Figure 5) ingots are heated in soaking 
pits until they reach the temperature for rolling. There are four pits, 
two with 10 time unit soaking times and two with soaking times of 15 and 
20 time units respectively •. When an ingot is ready, a further 3 time 
units must be allowed for unloading before the pit can be used again. . 
The ingots arrive at random intervals with long term mean of approximately 
5 time units and the objective of the task is to allocate the ingots to 
the pits so that there is more or less constant interval of 5 time units 
between the times when they are ready for rolling. 
The computer simulation speed is variable. During the development 
of the task, one time unit was equivalent to half a minute of the real 
time. This time scale was considered to be satisfactory since it has 
been found that subjects were able to deal with the task without being 
under considerable stress, or boredom. One advantage of using a 
variable simulation speed was that the ingot arrival times and soaking 
pit times remain constant integers. Thus the difficulty'of the 
, 
arithmetical computations involved in the task was not affected by . 
changes in the rate at which the ingots arrive. The time units are not. 
intended to bear any resemblance to the process times of actual soaking 
pits. 
75 
All subjects ~egardless of experimental conditions had information 
about the state of the soaking pits, the program' of the ingots arrival 
times and a measure of the success (or failure) of their previous 
actions. For a human operator to function effectively these three types 
of information must be provided. The ingot arrival times were chosen 
such that the achievement of objectives was always possible. 
2. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty was introduced by displaying estimated rather than 
actual ingot arrival times to the subjects. The estimates were drawn 
randomly from rectangular distributions with location parameters equal 
to the actual ingot arrival times and scale parameters linearly decreasing 
as the actual arrival times approach. The estimates are updated after 
every 10 time units and they become more accurate, although not completely 
accurate, at the time of the actual arrivals. The ingot arrival times 
estimate program, together with the actual arrival times for the trials, 
are shown in Appendix 3. 
3. Task Software 
The task has been developed on a PDP-l2A computer, .to allow on-line 
experimental control and data capture. The initial software of the task 
was written by Mr. A.J. Carpenter, technical programmer. However 
numerous changes and modifications were subsequently introduced by the' 
author as a result of the experience gained from the pilot experiments 
and of discussions with various people. 
4. Task Interface 
The task interface consisted of a Visual Display unit and alphanumeric 
keyboard (Figure 6)". Depending on the experimental conditions, subjects 
may have access to the following information displays: 
Input Information Display 
This display! showed the arrival times of the incoming ingots 
(Figure 7). Depending on the experimental condition the actual or 
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the estimated arrival times were introduced. As mentioned in section 
2, these estimates were updated every 10 time units. 
State Display 
The state of the four pits was presented in this display (Figure 8) • 
I,f one of the four pits A, B, C or D is occupied, the number of time 
units before the initialisation of the unloading process is shown. If a 
pit is free or unloading the figure 0 is displayed. The soaking times 
for the four pits are also included in this display. 
Heuristic Display 
This display shows a list of pit selection sequences in the 
recommended order of consideration (Figure 9). This allo:ws the 
operators to choose only among actions which are likely to be successful. 
In general, these selection sequences start with the pits with the longer 
soaking times, i.e. D or C. This has been found to be a useful rule of 
thumb, although there does appear to be some theoretical justification 
(Appendix 2). 
Predictive Display 
a) Display PDl - (Figure 10).This is a computer generated display which 
shows in advance the effects of allocating ingots in a particular 
way, and therefore enables the operator to foresee' the consequences 
of possible future actions. 
The operator is able to plan the operation of the four pits up to 
thirty-five time units ahead of the current simulation time. There 
is a time scale in the upper part of the display, having as origin 
the current simulation time t and expanding up to time t + 35 time 
units. Between the original time and the end of the time scale 
t + 35 the times t+5n (n = 1, .••• , 5) have been introduced. 
The pits are loaded by keying in their names and the desired load 
times. If the produced schedules are satisfactory they can be 
retained and implemented. Otherwise the display is cleared and 
another schedule is produced. 
b) Display PD2 - 'Figure 11).This is a similar display to the PDl in 
which the ingot arrival times have been included. The operator 
performs all necessary decision activity without consulting other 
displays. 
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c) Display PD3 - :Figure 12).This display presents information about the 
, 
amount of the uncertainty. Instead of displaying the expected ingot 
arrival times, the intervals within which the ingots will definitely 
arrive have been introduced. 
The arrival of ingots is indicated by a message saying "ingot 
arrived", plus an additional auditory warning. If the pit chosen for 
loading contains an ingot or is at the process of unloading a visual 
indication is given. Visual indications also appear when the operator 
violates other task constraints,i.e. he types wrong commands on the 
keyboard or he performs various illegal actions. A list of the various 
visual indications is presented in Table 1. 
The operators were able to switch between-the displays or allocate 
pits by typing messages on the keyboard. 
Additional messages are included when the predictive displays are 
avai,lable (Table 2). Throughout the trial the current simulation time 
is shown in the corner of the VDU. 
5. The TaslO 
The task consisted of allocating a number of ingots to pits in 
such a way that a constant output flow of ingots at a rate of about 
one ingot per five minutes, would be achieved. ,At the same time, 
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~ystem constraints must be satisfied, such as the requirement to 
allocate the ingots to the pits as soon as possible and the need to 
allow three minutes after an ingot is ready before the next ingot can 
be loaded in this pit. All subjects were given the same general 
instructions about the objectives of the task, and special instructions 
for each treatment as appropriate. These were given in written form 
(see Appendix 1) and repeated orally to ensure that all subjects had 
understood. A learning session followed until the subjects were fully 
familiar with the task. The average duration of the learning session· 
was over one hour. The subjects were science or engineering research 
workers with age ranging between 25 and 30 years. 
6. Performance Index 
In the foregoing paragraph it was mentioned that the main objective 
of the task was to maintain a constant output flow of ingots, with one 
ingot per five minutes as the target. The error score considered 
appropriate was the average of the absolute differences between the actual 
ingot output intervals and the ideal target interval of five minutes, 
corrected by the total ·of the ideal target intervals. 
Error Score: [ /:;'1 I (ni +1 
where ni is the unloading time of the ith ingot, I is the sum of the 
ideal absolute differences and n is one less than the total number of 
ingots. If the subjects failed to allocate an ingot, n decreased 
accordingly. 
7. Preliminary Experiment 
In the course of developing the task a number of preliminary trials 
were carried out to test the task software and the ability of subjects 
to manipulate the task. In particular it was considered important to 
ensure that the task was·sufficient1y motivating for the subjects, and 
that the level of task difficulty and the choice of the performance index 
were appropriate to reflect differences in performance between the 
condi dons. 
Six subjeets were given the general instruetions(see Appendix 1) 
and performed one test trial. .The speed of the simulation was double 
the speed of a real time task (i.e. 1 time unit = 30 sees. instead of 
1 min.). Eaeh trial lasted approximately 45 minutes and a total of 
16 ingots had to be allocated. 
It was considered particularly important at this stage of task 
development to find out whether differences in performance due to 
uneertainty were significant, as uncertainty would be one of the 
principal issues in the main experiments. Uncertainty was introduced 
by displaying estimated rather than actual ingot arrival times to' the 
subjects. Three subjects performed the task first with uncertainty 
and then without, and three subjects performed the task in reverse 
order, to balance the presentation order. 
The results of these preliminary trials are shown in Table 3. 
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It was clear that the performance of all six subjects was better 
without uncertainty than with uncertainty. The differences between 
the conditions was significant at the 0.05 level (Two Tailed Walsh 
Test). Differences in performance between the first and second trials 
were comparatively small. 
One main observation was that without uncertainty subjects were 
working off-line, i.e. the allocation of ingots to pits could be 
calculated in advance on papei~ With uncertainty these off-line 
schedules were of no value, since the actual arrival times were not 
known. Under conditions with uncertainty, subjects were working o~~ 
line. This was confirmed by assessing the amount of on-line activity 
which was the number of times the various alternative displays were 
selected. It can be seen in Table 4 that this amount is smaller 
without uncertainty than with uncertafnty. Again, there is a 
significant difference between the conditions (p<:.05, Two Tailed Walsh 
Test) and the order effects were comparatively small. 
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The results from the preliminary eXperiment have been particularly 
encouraging and only one further improvement was .considered necessary. 
This was the reduction of the total number of actions from sixteen to 
eight. The main aim was to decrease the duration of the trials by 
ten to fifteen minutes. It was thought that such reduction would not 
greatly affect the size of the score differences since it was observed 
that most of the error was produced at the first stages of the trial 
but at the same time alertness would be kept at a satisfactory level 
throughout the trials. 
8. Main Features of the Decision Situation 
The main aim of developing a task such as the scheduling task was 
to create a medium to allow a detailed investigation of various issues 
which are thought to be important in multi-variable decision situations, . 
and particularly where the operator has the responsibility for 
important minute to minute decisions. 
of the task are: 
a) The Task was system paced 
Accordingly, the main features 
In contrast to other experiments where the task is self-paced, 
subjects had virtually no control upon the timing of their actions. 
As soon as the auditory message was warning them that an ingot had 
arrived they had to allocate it immediately •. Any delay meant that a 
system objective was ignored •. 
In deterministic conditions the subjects had a clear idea of the 
decision times involved but with uncertainty they did not exactly 
know the time they had before an ingot was arriving. 
b) The Task had multiple objectives 
The first objective was to keep the error score (as it was defined 
in section 6) as low as possible. A second objective was to load a 
pit not earlier than three minutes before it was emptied. Finally, 
allocation should take place immediately after the arrival of ingots. 
I 
I 
Subjects were advised to attempt to satisfy all three objectives. 
However, it became apparent from the pilot experiments that the task 
difficulty was such that only partial satisfaction of the three 
objectives would be achieved. As a result, a clear hierarchy of 
objectives was formed with the achievement of low error score as the 
highest priority and the immediate allocation as the lowest priority. 
The different utilities of the three objectives were explained to the 
subjects. However, it was left to them to decide how much and when 
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to ignore the low utilities objective for the sake of the high utility 
objective. It must be pointed out that it was stressed to the subjects 
that satisfaction of all three objectives was possible. 
c) The uncertainty was affecting the system input 
In general uncertainty may affect either the operator's input 
information or it may affect the system state after an action has been 
taken. It seems that little can be done if the latter type of uncertainty 
is present, since the operator has no control whatsoever. Although there 
is evidence that the operator responds to input uncertainty in simple 
tasks, it will be of interest to see how uncertainty affects him in a more 
realistic situation. 
d) The task.had the form of soaking pit scheduling 
It has already been stated that the similarity with the actual 
soaking pit scheduling task is rather superficial. It however appeared 
necessary to create a task which looks realistic to the subjects and at 
the same time allows the experimenter to test his hypotheses in a 
reliable· way. On the other hand any attempt to create a comprehensive 
soaking pit scheduling simulation would create many problems such as 
exceedingly'high learning times, definition of representative performance 
indices, co~plex hardware and software-etc. The task was easily 
understood but at the same time allowed subjects to use different. 
strategies and to reflect individual performance differences. 
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'1. 
I 
EXPERIMENTAL PART 
i I 
1. Introduction to Experireents 
The main objectives of the experiments were: 
1. To study performance variations in relation to the experimental 
variables. 
2. To collect as many data as possible regarding the decision activity 
of the operators ~"ith the minimum interference. 
Looking back on previous investigations it became clear that 
individual differences produce performance variations which have tended 
to obscure or mask the treatment effects. Of course this is a problem 
universal to human factor experiments, .but it is when the tasks are 
complex, as in the case of multi-stage decision-making, that these 
individual differences tend to become much greater than those in simpler 
experiments. The way to minimize the effects of the individual 
differences is to select the subjects with care, so that they come 
from similar social and educational background, to train them 
extensively, and to use experimental designs which minimize these 
differences. 
The subjects were selected from the academic environment. Although 
this choice might be a little controversial s~nce the objective of 
this research is to make specific proposals for a wide range of industrial 
tasks, it is the author's opinion that this was fully justified. Hith 
very fe~" exceptions it is unlikely that a decision situation involving 
high risks, in terms of material costs and human lives, will be managed" 
by people without adequate educational background. Even if one disregards 
the undoubtedly enhanced intellectual abilities and mental capacities of 
such people, it is almost sure that the sophistication of the present 
decision systems demands increased knowledge to create a clear mental 
picture of factors ~"hich affect each situation. 
Special care was also taken to minimize individual differences 
by extensive training. It was almost certain that the subjects were 
fully familiar with the task, but of course it is admitted that they 
had not the kind of experience as is acquired over a long period. It 
can be argued that many real decision tasks could easily be carried 
out by someone with short time experience. Long term experience is 
often related with the social part of the job, interaction with other 
people and definition of the prob~em in unfamiliar situations. This 
view was confirmed by some operators in real scheduling situations. 
There are many occasions where it is the human information processing 
limitations" preventing the operator from finding the best solution, 
and these limitations appear to be independent of the amount of 
experience. 
Finally, individual differences were minimized by careful choice 
of the experimental design. Repeated measures experimental designs 
were chosen as the most appropriate. These designs are undoubtedly 
very useful but it is necessary to use them with great caution. 
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A satisfactory picture of the subjecfs decision activity was formed 
from the combined use of information coming: 
(a) from a careful observation of sUbject1s behaviour, and 
(b) from the way the various displays were used. 
It was considered impractical to examine decision behaviour by means 
of introspective techniques (protoco1s etc.) because, in addition to 
their many disadvantages, it was almost certain that they would interfere 
with the decision activity in this rather demanding task. It was 
predicted that internal models and heuristics were relatively simple· 
and hence these activity measures would be adequate to reveal them. 
The experimental part of this study describes the four main 
experiments. The experiments are closely inter-related and each one 
is a consequence of the preceding experiment. During the experiments 
special attention was taken to introduce only changes and modifications 
relevant to the objectives of the investigation. 
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2. The Experiments 
2.1 First Experiment - The effect of uncertainty on decision performance 
The question concerning the effects of uncertainty on decision 
performance was dealt with in the first experiment. As mentioned, the 
research findings from previous investigations were conflicting and 
therefore it was thought necessary to test the effects of various 
amounts of input uncertainty on human performance. Three levels of 
this variable were involved. In the first level the uncertainty was 
zero, e.g. the input arrival estimates were the true arrival times. In 
the second level a moderate amount of uncertainty was introduced 
(Medium uncertainty). Finally, the third level involved a high amount 
of uncertainty. The amount of uncertainty associated with each 
arrival estimate depended on the value of the location parameter of the 
distribution from which the estimate was drawn and on the current 
simulation time (see Figures 13,14 and· 15 for an explanation).' 
The data were collected and analysed in terms of a two-factor 
experimental design with repeated measures on the uncertainty. The 
second independent variable was the presentation order of the various 
uncertainty levels. Since a repeated measure experimental design was 
used, it was useful to see whether any sequence effects were present. 
The twelve subjects used in the experiments were considered to be a 
random sample from a population of subjects. With three levels of 
uncertainty a total of six different presentation sequences were 
formed and the subjects were assigned randomly in each presentation 
order. 
2.2 Second Experiment - The effectiveness of predictive and heuristic 
displays in pre-determined conditions 
The value of the predictive and the heuristic.displays with exact 
input information was considered in the second experiment. Predictive 
displays have already been examined in a variety of applications and 
their use as aids in manual control situations has already been 
demonstrated. However there is only a limited number of studies on 
the efficiency of predictive displays in discrete decision tasks and 
the findings are inconclusive. 
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It was therefore necessary' to test the efficiency of the predictive 
display in the laboratory environment of the soaking pit scheduling 
task. The difficulty of this task is less than that of the two other 
laboratory simulations of Ketteringham et al. (1974) and Smith (1972). 
There is however a variety of real-life tasks whose difficulty is similar 
to that of the present simulation. The predictive facility was very 
simple to use, a form of a computer generated stateboard where a number 
of different alternatives can be tested readily and efficiently. Special' 
care was taken to enhance the pattern recognition aspects of the 
With judgemental process rather than overloading the working memory. 
simplicity as the main aim, it was thought as not appropriate to 
incorporate any storage facility in the predictive aid. Such a 
facility would help the operator to keep, for future comparisons and 
possible implementation, the alternatives which he thought as best. 
However, although useful when the number of alternatives is high, a 
storage facility would make the present predictive aid unnecessarily 
complex. It was hoped that the operator would be able to remember 
the display pattern which corresponded to the best actions alternative. 
Nevertheless, although the present arrangements are considered 
satisfactory, the addition ofa storage facility may be necessary in 
more complex systems. 
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The second independent variable was the availability of heuristics. 
The use of heuristics in easing task complexity has often been over-
looked. It is recognised that human operators use heuristics of one 
form or another in most decision situations (Brigham, 1974). However 
no investigation has been made of the possibi1it~ of teaching to . 
operators the best heuristics and hence of ~proving their performance. 
The heuristic display of the present investigation contained action 
sequences in the recommended order of consideration. Using this 
display allocation is made of the first three ingot arriva1s,but in 
most cases selection of a sequence leads to some further forced 
allocations. This does not guarantee long~term opt~isation but 
nevertheless the nature of the task was such that a wise simultaneous 
choice of the first three or four actions was adequate for a very high 
level of performance. For every input condition at least one of the 
displayed pit selection sequences could lead, if chosen, to an almost 
complete satisfaction of all the objectives. It was a question for 
the experimenter to investigate whether the operators could make good 
use of this display. 
A two factor repeated measure desig~ was used with repeated measures 
on one factor. Each factor had two levels, the availability or not of 
the predictive display and the availability or not of the heuristic 
display. The 'heuristics' variable was the confounded one. The 
different conditions and presentation sequences were randomly assigned 
to the operators. 
2.3 Third Experiment - The effectiveness of predictive and heuristic 
displays in uncertain conditions 
Predictions frQm a deterministic model in uncertain environments 
are likely to be misleading or inadequate. This statement is not as 
obvious as it may seem. Studies of the predictive instrument in manual 
control applications have shown that it is particularly useful in 
uncertain conditions. In discrete decision situations, however, it is 
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likely that the environmental changes are not taken into account since 
predictions tend to be a laborious business and therefore slower. In 
changing environments therefore good predictions now may be inaccurate 
later. This issue has never been examined in any of the existing 
studies although clearly it is a very important one. In the fu~ure, 
predictive displays are likely to be used in uncertain on-line decision 
settings where it is not possible to make advanced plans and where 
therefore complete automation may not be effective. 
Similar questions arise about the efficiency of the heuristic aid. 
Any decision about a particular action sequence may prove to be a·failure 
when input information changes. Subjects then may ignore this display 
for a variety of reasons. It was hoped that this experiment would re~eal 
some form of heuristics utilisation to cope with the changes of input 
information. 
The medium level of uncertainty was chosen as the more suitable for 
this experiment. Findings from the first experiment demonstrated that 
. both high and medium level of uncertainty produGed degraded performance; 
however, it was thought more appropriate to use input information with 
some degree of predictability to enable people to combine the estimates 
and thus facilitate human inferences. How completely degraded input 
information affects performance with deterministic prediction aids was an 
issue which remained unanswered. 
Finally, a similar design to that of the p,revious experiment was 
used. In both experiments it was decided that the sequence effects 
would be insignificant because of the prolonged subject training and 
thus the presentation order of the different conditions was randomised. 
2.4 The Fourth Experiment - The effectiveness of probabilistic 
predictive displays 
Three different ways of displaying uncertain information were 
evaluated in the fourth experiment. The only independent variable was 
the type of input information. The arrival estimates were first 
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presented on the predictive display in the same form as on the input 
information display. Each estimate was located in the corresponding 
position in the abscissa. Not all input estimates were displayed ,since 
the prediction span of the display was only 35TU and it was also 
considered unlikely that the operators would look so far into the future 
with the amount of uncertainty present. It should be noted that this 
arrangement is no different from that of the previous experiment,except 
that the task was made easier since the amount of switching between 
displays was reduced and the short-term memory was relieved. 
The second level of the independent variable was to introduce the 
intervals within which the ingots will definitely arrive. This clearly 
was an improvement compared to the previous display, since the operators 
had a clear idea of the uncertainty involved and therefore could take it 
into account when they made their predictions. It was also hoped that 
no unnecessary schedules would be made, since, the high amount of input 
uncertainty would discourage operators from putting too much weight on 
inp~t estimates with high uncertainty. 
In the third t~e of presentation, arrival intervals with reduced 
variance were displayed. The reduction of the intervals was achieved 
by weighting present and past information by means of Bayes theoremCct. y.i5). 
• •• i'l'\.vet".se. • Each est1mate was we1ghted lnth the :re .. erse of 1ts squared var1ance 
and summed to the previous estimate. The sum and the associated 
weighted variance produced an arrival interval which tended to be 
shorter than the present arrival interval alone. In this way, an 
average reduction of twenty percent in the length of the interval has 
resulted. It would be interesting to see whether this reduction in the 
uncertainty would have any appreciable effect on the performance of the 
operators. In an applied setting a similar reduction in uncertainty 
may be carried out serially, as in the present investigation, or in 
parallel combining uncertain information inputs from different sources 
(and this may involve considerable cost). 
. , 
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A one-factor repeated measures design was used with the eight 
subjects as a random factor. Presentation order was also randomised 
as the sequence effects were taken as insignificant. 
Throughout the experiment~ considerable care was taken to minimize 
learning effects. This was achieved by explaining in detail the nature . 
and objectives of the task, by providing extensive instructions and 
visual'aids and by ,running test trials before the main experimental 
session (see also section 5 of the description of the laboratory 
scheduling task). As mentioned, the average duration of the learning 
session was over one hour. This corresponds to three test trials. 
From previous experience with the task (preliminary experiment) this 
learning session had been found adequate to ensure performance levels 
near to a steady state. The subsequent results reinforced the belief 
that score variations were mostly attributed to the independent 
variables and to random variations • 
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THE RESULTS AND THE ANALYSES 
- '. 
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1. Generh1 
Statistical analyses were performed on two main indices, the 
performance index and the amount of on-line activity.. The number of . 
violations of each of the two secondary objectives was also measured'~ r.S05cU-Sb) 
The performance index (error) was indirectly assessed from the computer 
outputs using the equation from section 6 of the description of the 
, laboratory task. This index was considered to be the most significant 
measure of excellence of the different displays. 
Analyses of variance were performed for each. of the four experimental 
designs using both sets of scores. In this way a total of eight different 
analyses of variance were performed. As mentioned, repeated measures 
designs were used throughout the experiments. The main reason for that 
was the subject heterogeneity which often obscures treatment effects. In 
order to ensure that the data are suitable for the analysis of variance a 
number of assumptions should be tested (Kirk, 1968): 
a. The n subjects in the p levels of the confounded variable constitute 
random samples from the same population. 
b. The treatments'represent fixed effects • 
. c. The popu1ations are normal. 
d. The variances and co-variances of the population are equal. 
These assumptions are discussed in detail in the appropriate sections 
of various statistical texts (e.g. Kirk, 1968). With the exception of c, . 
all the foregoing assumptions,were actually tested before performing 
analysis of variance. Unfortunately the samples were too small to be 
able to perform any test of normality. There is no reason, however, to 
suspect that the popu1ations were not normal. 
The analyses of variance!although useful to identify potentially 
significant phenomena, are almost totally inadequate to explain why 
these phenomena take place or to identify individual strategies. The 
analysis of the individual strategies was based on observation of the 
subjects and on the computer output records of the on-line activity. 
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It was clear that at least some of the pheomena observed by the 
experimenter were confirmed subsequently from the computer records. In' 
that way it was possible to study the different interaction modes and in 
part the types of search used by operators to explore the problem 
environment. Although it would be desirable to carry out a complete 
investigation of the ways people explored the decision trees of the 
situation, this proved to be extremely lengthy and it would go far beyond 
the scope of this research. It was possible, however, to form a rough 
idea of the search types from the existing analyses. 
__ . ~ .as .... 
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FIRST EXPERIMENT 
THE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON DECISION PERFORMANCE 
95 
Experiment 1: The Effects of Uncertainty on. Decision Performance 
The aim of this experiment was to examine how decision performance 
is affected by various amounts of input uncertainty. Three levels of 
this variable were involved (no uncertainty, moderate and high amount of 
uncertainty). This was the first independent variable. The second 
independent variable was the presentation order of the various levels. 
1. Statistical Analyses 
1.1 Performance Scores 
The performance scores for each trial are shown for all subjects in 
. . 
Table 5. The variance table of the performance index for the POxU'design 
(PO = Presentation Order, U = Uncertainty) is shown in Table 6. It will t 
be seen that the main effect due to Uncertainty is significant at the 1% 
level of confidence. Figure 16 shows the performance index score for the 
three different levels of uncertainty. For demonstration purposes the 
performance index from the preliminary tests (T) is also presented. The 
values of uncertainty on the abscissa are only relative and correspond 
to the 25th TU of a trial as it is seen at the time interval between 
simulation times 0 and 10 TU. 
significant. 
Presentation order effects were not 
Once the overall test of significance led to rejection of the null 
hypothesis, attention was directed to explore the results in order to 
find the source of the effects. The Tukey multiple comparison test was 
considered appropriate and the results ~re shown in Table 7. It will be 
seen from this table that the aposteriori comparison revealed significant 
effects between each of the two uncertainty conditions and the deterministic 
condition but not any significant effects between the two uncertainty 
conditions. 
1.2 On-line Activity 
As mentioned, the number of times the various alternative VDU displays 
were selected was a good indicator of the amount of on-line activity and 
this was used as a score. The results summary, the analysis of variance 
and the mUltiple comparison test for this· score are shown in Tables 8,9 
and 10, respectively. 
It will also be seen from Table 9' of the analysis of variance on 
the amount of on-line activity that the effect due to "treatments" was 
significant at the 1% level of confidence. Figure 17 shows the 
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average on-line activity for the different uncertainty levels. On-line 
activity was almost double tinder uncertainty. The aposteriori comparison 
'revealed significant differences between each of the two uncertainty 
conditions and the deterministic condition but not any significant 
differences among the two uncertainty conditions. 
2. Decision Analysis 
A satisfactory picture of the subject's strategies was formed from 
the c·ombined use of information coming (a) from a careful observation 
of subject's behaviour during the experiments, (b) from the total time 
of utilisation of each VDU display, and (c) from the notes which subjects 
had kept during the experiments. 
2.1 Deterministic Task 
2.1.1 Activity Analysis 
(a) Observation. 
It was observed that subjects were controlling the sy~tem off-line 
or on-line. When people were working off-line they performed 
advance schedules of their decisions on pencil and paper. On-line 
activity was very low. During the on paper scheduling activity, 
subjects had either the input or the state display on the scope. 
With the input display on the scope the subjects were able to 
glance and pick up the next two or three arrivals to continue their 
scheduling and at the same time find out when the next arrival 
takes place and thus program their actions. Alternatively, they 
could have the state display on the scope and all arrival times 
written on the paper. This, however, could create disruptions 
in the scheduling activity. 
A number of subjects attempted to control the syste~ on-line. 
On-line activity was high and each display was kept under 
observation for considerable time. Pencil and paper activity 
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was low. MOst of those subjects behaved rather randomly although 
one or two of them knew exactly what they were doing. 
(b) Computer Outputs. 
Looking at the utilisation times of each display (Table.ll, 
heading D) it became apparent that people were using the displays 
in a number of different ways. Broadly speaking, these can be 
categorised into two groups as follows: 
(i) These subjects were mostly using the state display. There 
were those who used the state display for. on-line control, 
finding out which pit was available and allocating accordingly. 
Two subjects were working all the time off-line having all 
the input arrivals copied on paper. One subject was working 
off-line and on-line without much success. 
(ii) These subjects were predominantly using the input display 
but they made use also of the state display. . They were 
mostly working off-line but they checked the quality of 
each action as soon as it was made~ 
(c) Pencil and Paper Activity. 
4 
It was clear from the subject's paper and pencil activity that· 
exhaustive search for the various action alternatives was not 
carried out. Most subjects selected the three to four (sometimes 
even less) first arrivals and tried to fit different pits. When a 
selection satisfied their concept of good solution, they continued 
their search until all ingots were allocated. The different 
trial allocations were made pseudo-randomly, certain combinations 
for example which clearly were very bad never appeared on the paper~ 
But on the other hand the search was never highly' selective as was 
the type of search presented later on the "heuristic" display. 
The number of different trials combinations varied among 'subjects 
but it seems that it never exceeded the four to five. This, 
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however, does not preclude the possibility of some mental search 
which was not noted on the paper. Assuming that the simultaneous 
advance decision for the first four allocations had to be taken to 
achieve long-term satisfaction of objectives, this would demand 
search among approximately twenty-four combinations. It would 
therefore be difficult to expect that many of the subjects would 
come out with the best solution. 
2.1.2 Activity Patterns 
Two main patterns can be described, one for off-line and the other 
for on-line control (Figures 18 and 19 respectively). These 
patterns were formed using almost entirely information from the 
computer output but nevertheless they were in line with previous 
observations. The off-line model shown in Figure 18 consists of 
thre.e states 1, 2 and 3. The ratio tIlts was for all subjects 
between 2 and 10 (tI,tS are total times the input display and 
the state display were on the screen). Only a few of the 
possible transitions took place and the associated probabilities 
have been introduced. The expressions "Read Input" and "Check 
State" are hypothetical as the computer cannot distinguish what 
the operator does with the displays. However, from the amount of 
time a display was kept it is possible to form some idea of the 
use of each display~ As it appears from Figure 18 most of the 
activity consisted of (a) observation of the input display, (b) 
loading an ingot and subsequent observation of either the state 
or the input display. The considerable amount of activity 
between the input display and the planning paper was not assessed. 
The data in Figure 18 are only valid for subject 1 but other 
subjects had also similar activity patterns. 
The second activity pattern describes on-line control (Figure 19). 
The ratio tI(.tS was between 0 and 0.3, i.e. most of the time the 
state display was observed. MOst transitions took place between 
the state 3 and the state 2, (State Display and Loading) and 
between the state 3 and the state 1 (State and Input Display). 
As most of the time was spent by operators watching the state 
display, off-line control was limited. This was also confirmed 
from observation of the operators activity. With the exception 
of two operators all resorted to on-line control with relatively 
limited off-line activity. 
2.2 Task with Uncertainty 
2.2.1 Activity Analysis 
(a) Observation. 
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Most of the subjects attempted to construct off-line schedules at 
the initial stages of the trials,but because of the existing 
uncertainty, they changed to on-line control. Several subjects 
were very attached to strategies and methods of search acquired 
from previous experiences but, because the available decision time 
was little, they were forced to a very selective search. Others 
chose alternatives which previously had provided good solutions. 
One subject acted quite randomly. 
When it was realised that the input estimates were inaccurate many 
subjects adopted a control strategy which relied on the state 
display'to find available alternatives. Only one or two input 
estimates received attention, those which corresponded to the. 
shortly arriving ingots. The subjects were satisfied:if 
objectives were achieved on a short-term basis. In some cases 
final decision was taken shortly after an ingot had arrived 
already. 
(b) Computer Outputs. 
It is clear from the utiiization times of each heading display 
(Table 11, headings M and· B) that there was considerable difference 
in the ways the system was handled. In almost all cases little 
or no on-line activity appeared before the arrival of the first 
ingot, but considerable amount of on-line activity appeared 
immediately after. This reassures that most of the off-line 
activity took place before the arrival of the first ingot, i.~. 
when the amount of uncertainty was not known. 
.. ,,-_ ... _--
From,Tab1e 11, it will be seen that the subjects can be divided 
into three groups although some variation within subjects took 
place. 
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(i) There were those who made extensive use of the input display. 
Similar activity was observed within subjects. Inmost 
cases it was difficult to use the state display effectively, 
(ii) These subjects observed the state display most of the time. 
They tended to disregard input information and they made use 
of pit availability information. By observing which pits 
wer'e available they weregues sing the approximate time an 
ingot was due to arrive and where to allocate it. Although 
this strategy was successful when one or two pits were 
available and the guess was correct, it did not help very 
much when the number of empty pits was three or four (at the 
initial stages of the trial) and the guess of arrival time 
was incorrect. 
(iii) These subjects were also making use of the state 
information. However, they did not totally disregard the' 
,input information and consequently they were able to guess 
rather more successfully when an ingot was due to arrive. 
Although most of them used the "pit availability" strategy 
as a method of decision making, it is very likely that some 
used different techniques. It is likely that a degree of 
off-line search in isolated decisions was possible particularly 
when most of the pits were empty. 
(c) Pencil and Paper Activity., 
As mentioned, most of the off-line activity was observed before the 
arrival of the first ingot. Most subjects had prepared detailed 
schedules which became obsolete when the estimates were updated. A 
few tried to keep up with the off-line control and constructed new 
2.2.2 
schedules each t~e the estimates were updated. Others gave 
up and, the pencil and paper activity was stopped. Finally, 
there where those who tried to keep up some off-line records of 
what was happening, on the basis of which they tried to find out 
satisfactory alternatives. From the records it became obvious 
that no subject made any attempts to infer the actual arrival 
times. 
Activity Patterns 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that.:the two main 
activity patterns of off-line and on-line control have also 
appeared under uncertainty. The main difference between the 
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activity patterns with and without uncertainty seems to be the 
amount of on-line activity between the input and the state display, 
which increased considerably. An increased interaction between 
the input and state display was also observed when the control 
was predominantly off-line. 
Looking at the relation between ,performance and the ratio tIlts' 
one suspects that the subjects who made balanced use of the state 
and input displays were better than subjects with extreme values 
of the ratio. However, the existing data were inadequate to 
establish any meaningful relationship between'the ratio tIlts 
and performance, although it is almost certain that excessive 
use of the input display (very big values of the ratio) made it 
difficult to produce very good performance. 
3. Conclusion 
It was clear that the medium level of the input uncertainty resulted 
in a considerable deterioration in decision performance. On the other 
hand a further increase in uncertainty produced no significant 
performance deterioration. Significant increase in the on-line activity 
was observed but the on-line activity was not affected by the changes in 
the amount of uncertainty. The analysis revealed two broad categories 
of control, one which was predominantly off-line and one which was 
predominantly on-line. 
SECOND EXPERIMENT 
THE USE OF PREDICTIVE AND HEURISTIC DISPLAYS 
IN DETERMINISTIC CONDITIONS 
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Experiment 2: The Use of Predictive and Heuristic Displays in 
Deterministic Conditions 
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Main objective of this experiment was to test the efficiency of 
the predictive and the heuristic displays with exact input information. 
A two factor repeated measure design, was used. The 'heuristics' 
variabie was the confounded one. For each variable there were two 
levels, the availability or not of the predictive and heuristic displays. 
1. Statistical Analyses 
1.1 Performance Scores 
The performance scores for each trial are shown for all subjects 
in Table 12. The variance table of the performance index for the HxP 
design (H = Heuristic Display, P = Predictive Display), is shown in 
Table 13. It will be seen that the main effect due to predictive 
display was significant at the 5% level of confidence. Figure 20 shows 
the performance index scores without and with predictive display. The 
availability, of predictive display resulted in a very significant 
reduction in the score but the variability of the scores was also great. 
There was virtually no effect due to heuristic display. 
1.2 On-line Activity 
The on-line activity scores for each trial are shown for all 
subjects in Table 14. The variance table for the HxP design is shown 
in Table 15. The main effect due to predictive display was significant 
at the 1% level of confidence. Figure 21 shows the on~line activity 
score without and with predictive display. The on-line activity was 
very much greater when the predictive display was available. 
Again no effect due to heuristic display was observed. 
2. Decision Analysis 
Analysis of the subject's strategies was made on the basis of 
(a) observations, (b) the interpretation of the recorded activity on 
the computer output. 
2.1 Observation 
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There were differences in the ways the predictive display was 
used. It was clear that the subjects, when controlling the system 
with the predictive display, concentrated more on long-term satisfaction 
of objectives. 
are available • 
. ahead. 
This is one great advantage when predictive facilities 
Each subject was looking three or four decision stages 
Some subjects were using the predictive display extensively, trying 
each combination they had in mind, others were testing only selected 
alternatives which were results of mental search. In fact, it was not 
unlikely that some subjects rejected alternatives by "trying" 
alternatives mentally on the display, since the analog form of the 
predictive display facilitated this type of search. 
The search lasted until a satiSfactory picture appeared on the 
screen. Subjects were able to "recognise".a satisfactory solution. 
In a task of this kind very few solutions can be good in the long-term 
and a solution was easily rejected or accepted. 
rarely kept in mind for further consideration. 
Alternatives were 
It was observed that subjects carried out search in different ways. 
Some were building the solution step-by-step, each time deciding whether 
an allocation could be part of a more general solution. Others were 
testing a number of allocations simultaneously and from the pattern 
appearance they could judge whether the solution was acceptable. There 
were also those who in the process of building a step-by-step solution 
were testing a number of allocations at the same arrival time, finally 
leaving the best and eliminating all others. 
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There were many differences also in the ways the heuristic display 
was used. There were those,who tried the recommended allocation 
sequences in the same order as it was shown. As soon as a sequence 
satisfying their subjective criteria had been found, the search was 
discontinued. Another form of search was visual, subjects were choosing 
from the heuristic display what they thought to be the best sequences. 
The choice was the outcome of mental search. They were also those who 
observed the display briefly and became more selective, i.e. there were 
always starting their search with C or D. Finally, there were those 
who almost completely ignored the presence of the heuristic display 
because they found it difficult to use. 
Similar behaviour was observed when both heuristic and predictive 
displays were available. Almost all of the types of search were taking 
place which had been observed when only the heuristic di~p1ay was 
available; the search however, was faster and therefore more exhaustive. 
Because of the many variations, it was very difficult to say whether the 
presence of the heuristic display made the search on the predictive 
display more efficient. Probably some subjects had gained from this 
constrained search, others found it difficult to adapt, and others found 
the effort unnecessary. 
2.2 Activity Patterns 
As expected, activity patterns were different depending on the 
type and number of displays a subject was using. It was clear that 
there were a number of different activity sequences for the same displays. 
These provided some information about how the task had been conceived and 
represented by each subject. Generally, the more complex the display 
and the more displays available, the more complex form these activity 
sequences had assumed. The activity patterns will be discussed in an 
increasing order of complexity. 
(a) Patterns with.heuristic display. 
With the heuristic display available, three different activity 
patterns were formed (Figures 22, 23 and 24). It will be seen from 
these patterns that the heuristic display was not used extensively. 
This was expected since the primary use of the heuristic display was 
·to allocate the first three ingots at the initial stage of the trial. 
The amount of loading was always the same, but the state and 
transition probabilities depended on the total amount of actions and 
thus they differ for the various trials. It was not practical to 
measure the total amount of time each display was observed but it may 
roughly be considered as proportional to the state probability. 
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The pattern of Figure 22 is that of on-line control as in the previous 
experiment with the addition of the heuristic display. The inter-. 
actions between the Look State (4) and the Look Heuristic (3) and the 
Look State (4) and the Look Input (1) are roughly of the same magnitude. 
Another more complex pattern of activity is that of Figure 23. At the 
initial stages of the trial (when the heuristic display was available) 
the subject knew from the input display when the next 2-3 ingots would 
arrive; he examined the state display and chose one sequence from the 
heuristic display. At the arrival times he loaded the ingots 
successively, without further looking at any display with the exception 
of brief glances at the input display to remind himself of the next 
arrival. At later stages the pattern was similar to that of Figure 19. 
One of the interesting features is the amount of open loop behaviour 
demonstrated by the presence of the loop on the load state. This loop, 
with its high probability of occurrence, suggests cyclic activity with 
predetermined decisions and no need to have immediate feedback after each 
action had been taken. The pattern of Figure 23 seems to be the super-
position of two elementary patterns. -.. The transition probabilities 
P(1,2), P(4,2) and P(3,2) show that most activity has taken place when 
the subject was performing on-line with a pattern similar to that of 
Figure 19. Only one third of the loading activity (about three ingots) 
were loaded with the aid of heuristic display. 
In the pattern of Figure 24 an interaction between the input and the 
heuristic display was observed. The subject was examining the input 
and the heuristic display, deciding about an action and implementing 
it. He would also observe the state to see whether his action was 
successful. When the heuristic display was not used, the typical on-
line activity pattern was observed. Again, on-line activity occupied 
the major part of the trials. 
(b) Patterns with predictive display. 
With the predictive facility available the subjects had a number of 
different options. They could call the predictive display, partially 
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clear it, clear it completely or test alternatives by introducing ingots 
in different pits. The analysis has revealed three activity patterns. 
There were those who had the'predictive display as the centre of their 
activity (Figure 25). There was no activity stream between the. 
different states other than that which was passing through the predictive 
display. Figure 25 shoes that the major activity was that of testing 
alternatives on the predictive display. Significant activity also was 
the clearance of individual inputs other than the total clearance of the 
predictive display. This implies that the subjects stored two or three 
arrival times, and tested various alternatives by inter-changing the 
arrival times on different pits. This is reinformed by the amount of 
the input-predictive display interaction which is only one third of the 
test-predictive display interaction. 
The activity of Figure 26 bears significant resemblance with that of 
Figure 25. However, there is an increased proportion of total clearances 
followed by observation of the input display. The high degree of 
interaction between the test-predictive display interaction compared to 
the clear-predictive display interaction demonstrates that the subjects 
were not attempting to find only the next best allocation but tried to 
explore allocations for a number of ingot arrivals spread into the future. 
The third activity pattern is shown in Figure 27. There is lack of 
total clearances and very few partial ones. It seems that sometimes 
the subject needed to remind himself of the exact arrival time of the 
incoming ingot, and so he checked with the input display before the 
actual loading. 
(c) Patterns with predictive and heuristic display. 
With the predictive and 'heuristic display available the activity 
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patterns became very complex.' Basically they had the form of a hexagon 
(Figure 28) with the centre occupied by the predictive state and the edges 
by six other states. Most subjects had an activity pattern resembling 
that of Figure 28. Heavy use of the test and the input state was made, 
the heuristic state was used at the initial stages, and the clear states 
were thinly used throughout. 
A rather different pattern is shown in Figure 29. T.ransitions to 
the test state f.ollowed the heuristic state instead of going through the 
predictive state., Similarly, there were few direct transitions from 
the input to the test state. 
3. Conclusion 
With the pr.edictive display, there was a substantial reduction 
in the error which was statistically significant. In contrast, the 
availability of the heuristic display had practically no effect on 
performance. A number of different activity patterns were observed, 
depending on the type and number of display used by the subjects.' 
THIRD EXPERIMENT 
THE USE OF PREDICTIVE AND HEURISTIC DISPLAYS 
IN UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS 
109 
110 
Experiment 3: The Use of Predictive and Heuristic'Disp1ays 
in Uncertain Conditions 
Main objectives' of this taskwere to test the efficiency of the 
predictive and heuristic displays with inaccurate input information. 
A two factor repeated measure design was used. The theuristics t 
variable was the confounded one. For each variable there were two 
levels, the availability or not of the predictive and heuristic 
displays. 
1. Statistical Analysis 
.1.1 Performance Scores 
The results for the performance scores are sunnnarised in Tab1e.16. 
The variance table of the performance index for the HxP design is shown 
in Table 17. It will be seen that the main effects due to predictive 
display and heuristic display are not significant. Figure 30 shows the 
performance index scores without and with the predictive display. The 
availability of the predictive display enabled improvement in the 
averaged scores but the great variability of the scores has prevented the 
effect becoming significant. From Table 16 this appears to be due 
partly to an interference effect caused by the 'heuristics' display. 
1.2 On-line Activity 
The on-line scores for each trial are shown for all subjects in 
Table 18. The variance Table for the HxP design is shown in Table 19. 
The main effect due to predictive display was significant at the 1% 
level of confidence. Figure 31 shows the on-line activity score without 
and with predictive display. As expected, the on-line activity was very 
much greater when the predictive display was available. 
No effect due to heuristic display was observed. 
, 
2. Decision Analysis 
2.1 Observation 
In spite of the fact that much of the workload was reduced 
because of the use of the predictive display, subjects failed to 
respond to the changes in the task conditions due to the introduction 
of uncertainty. Most people treated the estimates as being the actual 
arrivals and planned their activity accordingly.' Only at the very 
late stages of the task were there attempts to compensate the effects 
of uncertainty, .by ignoring _ the secondary obj ectives. 
,... . . ,,~-
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Generally, little can be said about people's strategies at the 
initial stages of the task except that they were much the same as th~se 
without uncertainty. When the estimates proved to be inaccurate and 
the solutions unsatisfactory, there was little time to repeat the whole 
search process. Some people tended to abandon using the heuristic or 
predictive display (or both) and tried to manage the task by increased 
initiative and inventiveness; others tried very quickly to find a new 
solution following the same procedure as before. 
2.2 Activity Patterns 
Whereas the observation failed to unveil any new outstanding 
activity sequences created by the uncertain conditions, the analysis 
of activity output revealed some interesting (although minor) 
differences in the activity patterns. These differences appeared for 
subjects using either the predictive or both the predictive and 
heuristic displays. The activity patterns for subjects having only 
the heuristic display available are very much the same as those without 
uncertainty and therefore they will not be discussed further. 
One rather complex pattern is shown in Figure 32. At one stage 
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the subject had abandoned the predictive facility and resorted to on-line 
control using the input and the numerical state display. This lasted 
only a few minutes and then he repeated the typical predictive display 
oriented activity. 
A number of subjects attempted to adopt activity sequences which 
would save them time. In the activity pattern of Figure 33 there is an 
interaction between the Input State and the Clear State and transition 
from the Load to the Clear State. This pattern reveals two different 
activity sequences, clearance of the display follows the loading and 
after that the input display is observed, to start a fresh predictive· 
action; also, after an updating of the estimates the prediction on the 
predictive display pro~es inaccurate and it is cleared in order to start 
a new predictive action in the light of new evidence. 
Another activity pattern (Figure 34) revealed that at the initial 
stages of the· trial a sequence which has occurred was: Look at the 
input time and the heuristics, and test the combination on the predictive 
display. Later on, the use of the heuristics was abandoned and the· 
observation of the input times was followed either by direct testing (to 
save time perhaps) or by testing through the Predictive Mode. 
In the pattern of Figure 35 there was a high probability transition 
from the Input State to the Test Stage followed by transitions to the 
Predictive Mode. A low interaction between the heuristic and the input 
display was also observed. Another time saving sequence was the 
transition from the Clearance to input display. The closed loop 
activity of these patterns was passing through the Predictive MOde and 
this implies that the subject frequently needed reassurance for the 
results of each test. 
Finally, one of the most complex patterns .is that of Figure 36. 
A considerable amount of the low probability activity sequence and 
transitions is centred around the Heuristic State. The loop Input 
State - Heuristic State - Test State - Predictive Mode - Input State is 
the typical way to use the heuristics and the predictive facility. If 
a combination from the Heuristics State was thought to be:'better' than 
that displayed on the Predictive Mode, the subject would use the 
Clearance State and after that he could test it, without necessarily 
looking on the Predictive MOde. 
3. Conclusion 
The results from this experiment should be treated with extreme 
caution. It seems that the predictive display did improve the 
performance., However, the great variability of the scores,because 
of interference effects due to the heuristic display, has prevented the 
result becoming significant. The availability of the heuristic 
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display did not seem to improve the performance. A number of different 
activity patterns were observed depending on the type and number of 
displays used by the subjects. 
\ 
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FOURTH EXPERIMENT 
THE USE OF THE PROBABILISTIC PREDICTIVE DISPLAY 
IN UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS 
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Experiment 4: The Use of the Probabilistic Predictive Display 
in Uncertain Conditions 
The only independent variable considered was the type of input 
information. The arrival estimates were presented on the predictive 
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display in the same form as on the input information display(Fig.ll). The 
second level was to introduce the intervals within which the ingots 
will definitely arrive(Fig.12) and the third level was to introduce arrival 
intervals with reduced variance (Bayesian intervals). 
1. Statistical Analysis 
1.1 Performance Scores 
The performance scores for each trial are shown for all subjects 
in Table 20. The analysis of variance of the performance index is 
shown in Table 21. It will be seen that there is a significant (1% 
level of confidence) difference between the conditions. Figure 37 
shows the averaged p~rformance index for the three different types of 
presenting the uncertainty. 
Once the overall test of significance led to rejection of the 
null hypothesis, attention was directed to explore the results in order 
to find the source of effects. The Tukey multiple comparison test (\<ttK ,I%S) 
was considered appropriate and the results are shown in Table 22. It 
will be seen from this Table that the a posteriori comparison revealed 
significant differences between each of the tw~ "intervals"· (Unprocessed. 
and Bayesian Intervals) and the estimates, but not any significant 
differences between the Unprocessed and the Bayesian Intervals. 
·1.2 On-line Activity 
The on-line activity Acores for each trial are shown for all· 
I ._-
subjects in Table 23. The analysis of variance of the on-line activity 
is shown in Table 2,~.· No significant effect was observed. Figure 38 
'shows the averaged on-line activity scores for the three different types 
of presenting the uncertainty. 
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2. Decision Analysis 
,2.1 Observation 
Generally very little difference was observed in the ways subjects 
had handled the system in this experiment. This may be either because 
the differences in strategies are small or because it was not possible 
to observe these differences (due to· the fact that all relevant information 
was contained in the same display). 
It seems that the subjects were more relaxed when using this display, 
particularly when the information about the amount of uncertainty was 
included on the screen. This appears to be true from their seemingly 
confident way of handling the system, their own comments, and the 
decreased amount of on-line activity. 
It was clear that people having only the arrival estimates 
. available made little attempt to make any inferences about the time 
arrivals or the amount of the task uncertainty. 
In contrast people who were able to look on the uncertainty 
intervals could make better judgement about the actual arrival and plan 
their activity accordingly. In addition to that it seems that they 
attempted to make "fine" improvements to their performance by ignoring' 
the secondary objectives. 
Generally, the observation method was unable to reveal differences 
between the two ways of presenting the uncertainty information. 
Apparently, there was very little benefit from the reduction of the 
amount of uncertainty achieved by the Bayesian processing. 
2.2 Activity Patterns 
In this last experiment the states of the system were reduced to 
five. The input display was integrated with the Predictive Mode and 
there was no heuristic display. Therefore the activity patterns became 
simpler and only two activity patterns have appeared. 
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These ,two patterns are shown in Figures 39 and ,40. In both 
patterns the interaction between the Predictive MOde and the Test state 
was very high. The activity pattern of Figure 40 was very common. The 
only difference from the pattern of Figure 39 was the clearing of the 
predictive display, following the loading of an ingot. However, there 
is no other conceivable difference between the two patterns. 
It may be noted that the Test State was always 2.5 to 3 times the 
sum of both the Clearing States, which again implies that the subjects 
attempted simultaneously to minimise the error for a number of future 
arrivals. 
3. Conclusion 
The main finding was that, if instead of the arrival estimates the 
intervals within which the arrivals will take place are introduced, 
there is a marked improvement in performance., No significant differenc~'" ~ 
was observed between the two different types of presentation, the 
unprocessed intervals and the reduced intervals (Bayesian). , Only two 
types of activity patterns were observed. 
118 
COMPARISONS 
In this section several important issues are highlighted which 
are considered as relevant to the results of this investigation. They 
are presented separately because the comparisons made sometimes cover 
the whole experimental range and are not always susceptible to normal 
statistical analysis. 
1. Trading of Objectives 
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As mentioned, three objectives should be satisfied in this decision 
task. Generally, it was stressed to the subjects that all objectives 
were important, but at the same time from the written instructions, the 
experimenter~explanations, and may be because of the subjects idio-
syncracies, it was clear that the greate~tweight was associated with the 
performance index. It was almost certain however that most subjects 
tried to keep all objectives satisfied except when they saw that 
ignoring the secondary objectives would result in an improvement of the 
performance index not otherwise possible. 
The Figure 41 shows the trading of the primary and secondary 
objectives for three different experimental configurations. Unaided 
subjects are represented in the 1st group of columns, subjects with the 
predictive display in the 2nd group and with the predictive display and 
the variance of the estimates displayed in the third group. The 
comparisons are made for trials always including uncertainty. 
What Figure 41 implies is of considerable interest. The 
improvement of the performance index ~hich is associated with ~he 
predictive displays has also produced an increased number of times the 
secondary objectives were ignored and mainly an increased number of 
allocation delays. This was something which has also been observed 
by the experimenter. The secondary obj ectives were deliberately ignored;., 
and it took place in order to create fine improvements in the performance 
index, i.e. numerous delays in the allocation of ingots took place in 
order to achieve the primary target of steady output flow. This of 
course is not to suggest that more than a portion of the improvement in 
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the performance index in Figure 41 is achieved by ignoring.. the secondary 
- ", . 
obj~ctive~; indeed, this is impossible. Once a wrong choice had 
been made, the consequences will be there for many decisions to come 
and nothing more than a marginal improvement could be achievedby 
ignoring the secondary objectives. However, Figure 41, does suggest 
that a lot of . ·trCi.din,g ... took place when the predictive displays were 
I . 
used, and the observation confirmed that the predictive displays (and 
mainly the one with the variances displayed) facilitated the use of 
ignoring the secondary objectives as a means for the improvement of the 
performance index. 
2. Cuml1lative On-line Activitx, 
Another issue worth mentioning was the way uncertainty affected 
people's activity when using the predictive display. During the 
observation of the subjects'behaviour it seemed very clear that people· 
under deterministic conditions interact with the system very little 
when their off-line scheduling has finished, whereas under uncertain 
conditions the interaction continued until the very last stages of the 
trial. When subjects used the predictive display, all activity was 
recorded as no pencil and paper was used; therefore it was thought 
reasonable to examine how uncertainty affected the rate of activity 
throughout the trial. 
The Figure 42 shows the average cumulative on-line activity with 
and without uncertainty for subjects using the predictive display. It 
is clear from this Figure that under uncertainty on-line activity 
remained almost constant throughout the trial. With predetermined 
arrivals however, the rate of on-line activity was high at the initial 
stages and low at later stages. This means that the uncertainty has 
forced the subjects to work out schedules throughout the trial as the 
updating of the estimates has not allowed for any early successful 
schedule. This was possible with predetermined arrivals, and at 
later stages of the trial on-line activity was kept at a minimum. With 
one exception, all subjects terminated their on-line activity at some 
time (not necessarily the same) before the end of the trial. 
3. Decision Horizons 
,It has been stressed in the theoretical part that the ability of 
a controller to look ahead is very important. Within the context of 
this investigation the decision horizon is defined as the number of 
stages the decision maker looks ahead or, more simply, the number of 
future arrivals which are manipulated each time as a part of the 
optimisationprocess. 
Generally it is rather problematical to measure the decision 
horizon, but in the present study the predictive facility made the 
task easy. At specified times, the number of ingots tested on the 
predictive display was taken as a measure and this was averaged for 
the whole period of a trial to produce the average decision horizon. 
The two issues which were thought to be relevant in this section 
are: 
1. How the decision horizon is affected by uncertainty, and 
2. How the different predictive displays affect the decision horizon. 
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The average decisionhorison without and with uncertainty is shown in 
Figure 43. It was clear that the average decision horizon under un-
certainty was considerably shorter compared to decision horizon without 
uncertainty. The reduction of the decision horizon under uncertainty 
was not due to a general reduction of the speed of the decision maker 
to judge action alternatives. Figure 44 shows there was not any 
systematic effect due to uncertainty on the rate the action alternatives 
were tested on the predictive display. It seems that under uncertainty 
the decision maker made more exhaustive search for a horizan of fewer 
inputs. 
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Figure 45 shows the decision horizons for the three methods of 
presenting the uncertainty. It is clear from this Figure that the 
decision horizon for the "estimates" is consistently shorter than 
the decision horizon for the "unprocessed" and "Bayesian" intervals. 
Again there is not any systematic effect on the number of actions 
per minute as Figure 46 shows. 
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For comparison reasons the grand averages of the decision horizons 
for all subjects are presented in Figure 47. The highest decision 
horizon appears when the input information was predetermined. The 
introduction of uncertainty has produced a significant reduction of the 
decision horizon. When the estimates were presented in the same 
display the decision horizon remained much the same, however it became 
longer when the variance of the input estimates was presented on the 
display. The reduction of the variance by Bayes theorem did not 
improve the situation. , As with the lIunprocessed intervals" condition, 
the decision horizon remained slightly lower than the decision horizon 
without uncertainty. 
It is reasonable to suggest that decision horizon is affected by 
the amount of uncertainty and that one of the merits of the probabilistic 
predictive display is the improvement of the ability of the decision 
maker to look ahead under uncertain conditions. 
It is interesting to notice that the number of actions per minute 
for the predictive 'displays which included the input information is 
considerably higher than the number of actions per minute when the input 
information is on a separate display (Figure 48). This is expected as 
the predictive faeility is greatly simplified in the former case and 
therefore makes the search simpler and faster. It is clear that there 
is no significant difference,due to type of uncertainty presentation on 
the predictive display ,in the rate at which the action alternatives 
l:.were ,tested. 
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However,it must be pointed out that these comparisons are only 
approximate as they involve different groups of subjects. (In Figure 48, 
Bar 1 involves one group of subjects, Bars 2,3, and 4 involve another 
separate group.) 
It may be possible to increase further the rate at which the 
action alternatives are tested by improving the mechanics of display 
change(e.g. by using a limited number of special function keys instead 
of using the general purpose alphanumeric keyboard of Figure 6). 
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DISCUSSION 
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1. General 
The findings from this research can be discussed within the context 
of specific practical applications and more broadly within the area of 
human decision-making in real-life situations. It was clear that a 
• ••• •• 'l"~ great number of 1ssues wh1ch ar1se 1n complex s1tuat10ns of the ~-
. 'Wc1tc\ 
"'Meg have also made their presence felt in this relatively simple 
simulated decision task. It is the conviction of the investigator 
that there is a real need for research which attacks problems with an 
integrated point of view as far as theories and methods are concerned. 
Theories and methods should be complementary rather than totally 
independent. In this particular investigation there was a continuous 
attempt to keep up with this conviction. 
With the exception of the first experiment, where the findings are 
reasonably independent, it was almost impossible for the investigator 
to resist the temptation to discuss in one and the same section all the 
findings from the three other experiments. However, separation was 
thought necessary in order to compare and contrast the different 
predictive aids under the changing experimental conditions. 
2. The effects of input uncertainty on decision performance 
It was clear that the medium level of input uncertainty resulted 
in a considerable deterioration in decision performance. On the other 
hand a further increase in uncertainty produced no significant performance 
deterioration. Significant increase in the on-line activity was observed 
with uncertainty but the on-line activity was not affected by the changes 
in the amount of uncertainty. 
The analysis has revealed that there were two broad categories of 
control. In the first category the input information was used much 
more than the information about the state of the system. The opposite 
was true for the second category where the "state information" was 
mainly used. It is reasonable to state that on-line control was mostly 
associated with the state information. At this point, it is stressed 
that no division or classification in this research as generally in 
. the behavioural sciences is absolute and conclusive. There is enough 
evidence suggesting that the situation was not as simple as the 
~ , 
investigator would like to to be. There were a few cases where the 
use of the two types of information was of the same order, where off-
line control was associated with the state display and on-lin~ control 
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with the input display. There were even cases where this classification 
was not valid, i.e. a mixed mode of control was used or a form which 
could not be classified. Disregarding these relatively few cases as 
extremely complex, the distinction between off-line and on-line control 
remains a useful one. 
A second general statement, which appears to be true with 
reservations similar to those of the foregoing paragraph, is that for 
accurate input information 'off-line control is preferred to on-line 
control, and for inaccurate input information on-line control is 
probably better • This statement is partly justified from the results 
. and partly from a theoretical point of view which also has some. 
empirical basis. When the input information was accurate (deterministic 
conditions), the comparison between the error scores' and the utilisation 
times of each display (Tables ? and 11) shows that most operators who 
had been working off-line (high. utilisation of the input display), 
achieved on 'average better scores than operators who had been working 
on-line. On the other hand, when the input in~ormation was inaccurate, 
the comparison between the error scores and the utilisation times showed 
that, when operators worked on-line (high utilisation of the state 
display), better scores were produced compared to the scores of those 
who had been working off-line. Generally, it is difficult to say how 
much the state information should be used in order to ensure that the 
control is on-line. The lower limit corresponded to a time slightly 
lower than the time the input display was used, and there seems to be 
no limit at the higher values. 
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From a theoretical standpoint, it is reasonable to assume that, 
if the input information is accurate, off-line control should be 
preferred since it provides the decision-maker with more time to search 
the decision tree of the environment and thus discover the best 
solution. In contrast, if there is a high amount of task uncertainty 
a degree of on-line control is unavoidable. If the amount of 
uncertainty is very high, then any off-line schedules will be proved 
obsolete and the control should be on-line. In the task of the present 
o investigation it was clear that under uncertainty off-line control was 
inefficient. Most subjects attempted off-line schedules at the 
initial stages of the trials, but because of the existing uncertainty 
they changed to on-line control. 
It looks as though a successful way to face the problem environment 
was to make balanced use of both input and state information. Those 
who made use of the state information but did not totally disregard the 
input information were able to guess future arrivals more successfully. 
It is likely that a degree of off-line search in isolated decisions wa~ 
also possible. 
A rather unexpected finding was that the highest level of 
uncertainty did not cause significant deterioration of performance 
compared with the medium level of uncertainty. This is attributed to 
two reasons: 
(a) It has been stated that for inaccurate input information on-line 
control is preferred to off-line control and that on-line control 
is associated with heavy utilisation of the s"tate information. The 
state information does not depend on the uncertainty. If for example 
pits A and D of the state display are occupied, the operator is able 
to~d easily the best i~got arrival times for allocation to B or C, 
so as the objective of one output per five time units is satisfied. 
From the comparison of the actual time of arrival with the most 
appropriate ingot arrival times he is immediately able to choose 
for allocation pit B or pit C. This type of choosing clearly is 
almost independent of the amount of uncertainty involved in the 
input information. 
. (b) For those who made some use of the input information and executed 
off-line schedules for the next one or two ingots, i.e. those 
shortly arriving, the difference in the inaccuracy of the input 
information for the two levels of uncertainty was almost 
negligible. 
It is very likely that the rate of deterioration of performance 
is steeper for smaller levels of uncertainties, i.e. less than 3 bits 
in Figure 16. For very small values of uncertainties (near to zero) 
off-line control is very effective as it allows the operator to plan 
ahead many future arrivals. For uncertainty values near to 3 bits 
the opposite is true, Le. off-line control is much less effective and 
on-line control is preferred. Many of the advantages of the off-line 
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, control disappear as long term planning becomes obsolete because of the 
inaccuracy of the input information. 
There was very little evidence for the way people have actually 
, searched their environment. The evidence from the (off-line) paper 
activity suggested that the search was by no means exhaust~ve. On 
the other hand, it was not completely random. The quality of search 
was related to the time required to examine the consequences of a 
.particular alternative and to the knowledge or not of system heuristics. 
Consequently some were able to carry out a more detailed search than 
others and those who had some idea of the system heuristics attempted 
a selective search with considerable success. However, these statements 
are a little speculative, since a considerable amount of mental search 
. cannot be revealed. 
Under on-line control the search was highly constrained. At each 
time the decision horizon, as defined by the number of empty pits, was 
very short and the width of search waS very limited (the few interchanges 
between the empty pits). There were very few instances of decision-
makers who made a more extended search. 
In other multi-stage decision-making tasks uncertainty has also 
been found to degrade performance, although there is evidence from one 
study which found no such degradation (see p. 44-47 for a full. 
discussion). The degradation of performance because of uncertainty 
was bigger in the present investigation than in the other studies. 
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This may be due to the different form of the stochastic multi-stage 
decision task of the present investigation. Most of the previous 
stochastic tasks were self-paced whereas in the present decision task the 
decisions times were limited. Also in contrast to other investigations 
no information was provided to the operators about the parameters of the 
underlying uncertainty distribution. The interpretation (as a soaking 
pit scheduling task) and the objective function were also different 
from those of the similar studies. There was little attempt by the 
operators to weigh the evidence from the input updating.in order to 
produce better estimates of the arrivals. The uncertain input 
information was either totally disregarded, as in the case of those who 
were totally state display oriented, or partly disregarded when the 
operators used the first one or two most accurate arrival estimates 
(of shortly incoming ingots) for off-line schedules and ignored all 
other estimates. It seems that under stressful conditions and when 
the operator is responsible for many activities he should not be expected' 
to be able to weight evidence, estimate parameters etc. There is 
evidence (p. 21) demonstrating that decision p~.rformance is correlated 
with the parameters of the probability distribution. However this is 
referred to simple experiments where the main role of the operator is 
to estimate parameters. In relatively complex situations, the operator 
should be helped to cope with the uncertainty. Otherwise, he will adopt 
strategies least dependent on uncertainty e. g. similar to the on-1i.ne 
control strategies of the present experimen~ or he will use the inaccurate 
input information,without any processing, as well as he can. Both methods 
are clearly not going to succeed in achieving long term optimisationsince 
they do not fully exploit ~ the available information. 
3. The effects of the heuristic information on decision performance 
The availability of the heuristic display had practically no 
effect on performance. There ~a number of reasons which may be 
responsible: 
a. The activity sequences forced by the heuristic display may be 
too rigid to allow the operators to use their inherent flexibility 
and arrive at a satisfactory solution quickly. 
b. The task was not of very great complexity and the operator could 
find the best solution without the heuristic information. 
c~ Under uncertainty there was not enough time to explore the 
heuristic display. 
d.· The operators may have even better perso.nal heuristics. 
e. The heuristics were not presented properly. 
f. Any improvement in the performance when the heuristics are usable, 
at the initial stages of the trial, is obscured by variations 
when the heuristics are not usable, at the later stages'. 'i 
It was clear from the analysis that some subjects did not make 
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full use of the information presented on the heuristic display and some 
others could not utilise it properly. As expected, the heuristic 
display was used only briefly, at the initial stages of the trial; this 
is confirmed also by the low probability of utilisation of the heuristic 
state in the activity patterns. It was clear that under certain 
circumstances heuristics led to the choice of the best solution at least 
for the initial stages. However, it might be that under other 
circumstances it did not help much because it had interfered with pure 
mental search. 
With the heuristic display available, the off-line version.of 
control was greatly reduced. Of course, the introduction of. the 
heuristic display by itself led to increased interaction.between the 
operator and the system, but it may also be that the switching between 
a number of displays distracted the operator and did not allow him 
to evolve satisfactory off-line control. The heuristic information' 
is not very efficient when used together with the state information, 
without concentrating on off-line, paper and pencil activity. 
The introduction of uncertainty probably made even more difficult 
the utilisation of the heuristic display. If any satisfactory 
alternatives had been found, these would break ,down with the updating 
information and the whole sequence of activities would have to be 
repeated. But as the decision time was limited, it was doubtful 
whether subjects would find or attempt to find the best solution 
through the heuristic information. 
The value of heuristics as a way of cutting down the decision 
branches of the environmental problem has been recognised (see 
Brigham, 1974). However, to the autho~s .know1edge there is not any 
investigation on the evaluation of empirical rules to improve human 
performance. Apparently this issue remains open; much may depend 
on what kind of heuristics are involved and how they are presented. 
, 
If, for example, the present heuristics were used in conjunction with 
the predictive display, if the action alternatives were generated 
automatically, and if the operator had only to evaluate them, the 
results might have been different. 
4. The effects of predictive displays on decision performance 
a. Deterministic Conditions. 
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Under deterministic conditions the predictive display (Figure 20) 
was of great value to the subjects. The reduction in the error 
with the predictive display was substantial and the effect was 
statistically significant. The marked increase in the on-line 
activity makes clear that the subjects made extensive usage of the 
predictive facilities. With the predictive display no arithmetical 
calculations were necessary, the testing of the alternative 
decision sequences was easy and acceptance or rejection of a 
sequence could take place. in a matter of seconds. This was 
facilitated by the analog form of the display. 
No pencil and paper was given to the operators and therefore all 
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the activity was performed interactively. As the activity patterns 
showed, most of the decision activity consisted of interacting with 
the predictive display and with the input information. However, 
considerable differences existed in the way~ the system was handled. 
The introduction of heuristic information did not seem to affect the 
decision performance in any direction. Generally, the presence of 
the predictive display made ~he task so easy that there was little 
ground for further improvement due to heuristic display. 
The existence of many different activity patterns implies that 
performance can be satisfactory even though the operators have not 
the same task representations. It seems that one of the major 
features of a predictive display of this kind is that it allows the 
operator to develop his own type of search, rather than forcing him 
to carry out a rigid sequence of actions. For simple tasks of this 
kind, it may be that great improvements in performance are produced 
by providing a device which presents to the operator a clear projection 
of his own thoughts. Considering the decision tree of the situation, 
the predictive display can be helpful in two ways: by increasing the 
·amount of preview (the average decision horizon was estimated to be 
3.5), and by increasing the speed with which the various alternatives 
were examined. It is possible that the presence of the predictive 
display may also preclude the testing of alternatives which are 
unlikely to be successful. Accurate comparisons of decision horizons 
with and without the predictive ai~ are not possible. Considering 
however the evidence from the paper activity and from the on-line 
control strategies, it seems that operators, when using the predictive· 
display, looked an average of 1 - 1.5 units further to the future than 
the unaided operators. Under certain conditions, this could 
make the difference between short-term and long-term satisfaction 
of objectives. 
b. Uncertain Conditions. 
When uncertainty was present the efficiency Qf the predictive 
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facili ty (Figure .30) was reduced. A reduction in· the error score 
took place, but th~ variability of individual scores was too great 
to produce any significant results. A number of subjects were able 
to· achieve satisfactory levels of performance but others were not 
able to cope when the solutions found were breaking down as a result 
of the updating of the input information. It was clear that a.major 
factor for the failure of the predictive facility to produce significant 
improvements in performance was the almost total lack of attempts 
by the subjects to infer the exact times of arrivals. The 
examination of the times which were introduced in the predictive 
display showed that they were almost identical to the estimates. 
It seems that the operators failed to combine evidence from more 
than one updating and create better approximations of the incoming 
arrivals. 
The realisation that uncertainty was going to break down their 
predictions made the operators cautious. One immediate effect 
was the shortening of the decision horizon, (Figure 43). This 
became more than 1.5 unit shorter than the decision horizon without 
uncertainty. At the same time, the number of actions was not 
consistently affected (Figure 44), which implies that considerably 
more short-term search took place. The decision tree was searched 
in width but not in depth. Apparently the operators appreciated 
that the next one or two arr~vals were adequately accurate and 
therefore were worthy of their attention. Unfortunately, this had 
as a consequence the almost total resignation from any long~term 
satisfaction of the performance index. 
It is clear from Table 16 that there was a considerable 
reduction in the performance error of all four subjects not confounded 
by the heuristic display. This suggests that even a predictive aid 
of this form may be helpful in uncertain conditions. Nevertheless 
it is true that the average performance error ( 0.91) for the 
above four subjects is still much greater than .the performance error 
of ~th?se subjects using the predictive display under predetermined 
conditions ( .15). It is very difficult to determine whether the 
average performance error for many subjects would be significantly 
smaller than 0.91 since no data are available. With great caution, 
it is possible to state that no~ ~ great improvements should be 
expected as this score is not far from both the overall average 
performance error when using the predictive display ( 1.07) in the 
third experiment and the average performance error of operators with 
"Estimates" ( 1.00) in the fourth experiment. 
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Faced with a rather difficult task; the operators tried to find 
some new ways of reducing the performance error. ·As the prediction 
display was action-oriented, 'i.e. it was easy to find when an arrival 
should occur to minimise the error, many operators attempted to improve 
their performance by deliberately delaying the allocations, mostly of 
the last ingots. As mentioned, this could only result in a small 
improvement in performance because once a wrong choice had been made 
the consequences will be there for many decisions to come. 
The presence of the heuristic display if anything affected the 
performance adversely. Some operators did succeed in finding 
satisfactory solutions for the first set of arrival estimates using 
the heuristics, but the subsequent updatings made it obvious that it 
was not after all going to be satisfactory. There was not, however, 
adequate time for repeating a whole sequence of alternatives and therefore 
this rigid type of search was abandoned. Although generalisations are 
not possible with such small numbers of subjects, it may be that the 
combination of predictive and heuristic display may have distracting 
effects on the overall performance. 
It was clear that a predictive aid, without some appropriate 
representation of the uncertainty of the incoming ingots, was not 
going to produce any further significant improvement in performance. 
It was also considered necessary to introduce the information about 
the uncertainty on the same display in order to facilitate inferenc~s 
about the most likely arrival times. 
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Two different types of uncertainty information were evaluated 
(Figure 37). The main finding was that, if instead of the estimates 
(Figure 11) the intervals within which the arrivals will take place are 
introduced (Figure 12) ,there is a marked improvement in decision 
performance. As mentioned, all necessary decision activity was 
performed on the same display in contrast to the previous experiments 
where subjects had to switch between displays. No significant 
difference was observed between the two different types of presentation, 
the "unprocessed intervals" and the "Bayesian intervals" ,in spite of the 
20% reduction in the lengths of the intervals caused _ by the Bayesian 
processing. Apparently the reduction of the intervals was not enough 
to produce any marked improvement in performance. 
It was clear that the improvement in performance was a result of 
the introduction of the uncertainty in an analog form. The predictive 
facility with the estimates of the arrivals on the same display (Figure 
11) was not any better in performance than the predictive facility' with 
the input estimates on a separate display. As may be expected, 
only the amount of on-line activity was considerably reduced. 
The major improvement in performance when information about the 
uncertainty is presented,is ~or the most part attributed to the 
facilitation of problem solutions and also to the systematic violation 
of the secondary obj ectives and especially the allocation delays. 
When the intervals were presented it was rather unlikely that 
the operators would build solutions which break down as a result 
of the updatings. The updatings produced narrower intervals but 
these were always within the previous intervals and thus very few 
surprises occurred. Generally, the operators preferred alternatives 
which would stand the better chance of satisfying the highest number 
of possible combinations of arrival times. . A solution was not 
considered as acceptable unless it was kept satisfactory for slack 
arrival times. The increase of confidence, as a result of the 
introduction of the intervals, produced longer decision horizons as 
Figure 45 shows. There was a systematic increase of the decision 
horizon with the intervals, and it is rather improbable that the 
increase is due to any s!gnificant changes in the speed of evaluating 
the alternatives (Figure 4p). It is almost sure, however, that the 
inclusion of the input information in the predictive display did 
increase the speed of the evaluative action as Figure 48 
shows. 
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The secondary objectives were ignored many times as Figure 41 
shows. This is again attributed to the analog pepresentation of the 
input information and its inclusion in the predictive display. With 
this representation, it was quite easy to find when to allocate a 
particular ingot so as to avoid coincidence of arrivals, and thus reduce 
stress, etc. 
The lack of any further -improvement in performance, in spite of 
the considerable reduction of the intervals as a result of the Bayesian 
probabilistic information processing, was hardly surprising at least 
for this particular task. The main reason was that performance scores 
may be insensitive to anything but drastic alterations of.the 
operational conditions. The result 'from the first experiment is a 
'1 1 h f '" {:tE)'~ tYPlca examp e, were per ormance was lnsensltlve to amounts of 
uncertainty variation. At that time the operator~ strategies were 
- --.--~,,-.~~---------------------------------
the reason; in the present case the same seems to be true. If the 
operator's strategy was involving separate inferenc~s about the exact 
time of arrivals, the reduction could be useful. But the strategy 
based on the solution of "slack arrivals" was less dependent on when 
exactly an arrival would take place. 
The decision horizon for the "processed intervals" remained tmlch 
the same as in the case of the unprocessed interval but considerably 
longer when compared to the I'estimates" (Figure 45).-
5. Activity Patterns 
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The analysis of performance through the activity patterns was 
particularly useful. It is clear that there are large differences in 
people's strategies. Generally, the number of states of the activity 
pattern was greatly affected by the number of displays available and the 
amount of information which was contained in each display. The activity· 
patterns of Figures 18 and 19 are simPle because the operators had to 
switch only among three displays. The activity patterns of Figures 39 
and 40 are also simple because the predictive display contained a great 
amount of information. Simplicity of the pattern implies that complex 
mental functions are performed in (at least) one of the states, e.g. in 
Figure 39 the operator looks at the input information and decides to test 
one or more alternatives in the Predictive Mode. In the.more complex 
activity patterns the observation of the input information is separated 
from the Predictive Mode. From the complex patterns, it may be 
possible to reveal some interesting elementary functions. 
One interesting observation, from the activity patterns with the 
Input State separated from the Predictive Mode, ~as that the number 
of items (or arrival estimates) s~o.red in the short-term memory depended 
on the type of search carried out by the operators. It can be seen 
in Figure 28, for example, that the "Look Input" and the "Test" have 
identical state probabilities. This implies that only one item was 
stored in the short-term memory. The item was individually tested in 
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the predictive display or used to build up a pattern consisting 
of a number of items. The pattern would then be accepted or rejected. 
In Figure 26 011 the other hand, the "Test" state probability is 
approximately double the "Look Input" state probability, which implies 
that, on average, two items are kept in the short-term memory store 
for further testing. 
three (Figure 25). 
The maximum average number of stored items is 
Considering that each item '.:omi.isted of two 
digits and that the above figure. was an average, it is found that six 
to eight digits were at maximum stored in the short-term memory. This 
'number is within the capacity of short-term memory structure (see p.65). 
If the "Look Input" state probability is greater than the "Test" state 
probability then it is almost certain that there are interactions not 
directly related with the testing of alternatives in the predictive 
display. A typical example is the activity pattern of Figure 32 where 
an interaction between the "Look Input" state and the "Numerical State" 
is shown • The average number of items kept in the short-term memory 
. . store is different from the ~verage number·of items considered for testing. 
The activity pattern can also be used to perform a quick and accurate 
assessment of the decision horizon. It is easy to prove* that the 
average number of stages tested ahead is given by the expression 
Du ... P(Test) - P(Clear One) 
2P (Look State, Clearance) 
where peA) is the state probability of the state A. Replacing the terms 
by their numerical values for the activity 'pattern of Figure 25, it is 
found that 
DH ... 0.24 - 0.10 2(0.02) ... 3.5 
* If DH is the average decision horizon, T the number of tested ,inputs, 
. I the number of inputs cleared and C the number of total clearances, 
then it holds that 
DHxC = T - I - DHxC or T-I DH ""-2C 
which also valid if T, I and ,C are replaced by their respective state 
probabilities. 
whereas for the activity pattern of Figure 32 
.00 .. 0.10 - 0.04 2 (0.04) 
0.06 = _ D 
0.08 0.75 
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The comparison of the average number of items kept in the short-
term memory store with the decision horizon, provides valuable 
information about the types of decision search. If both the number of 
items and the decision horizon are great, the operator was using the 
predictive display to build up patterns without intermediate testing of 
individual items. These patterns would then be accepted or rejected 
(typical example of this search is activity pattern of Figure 25) •. If 
both the number of items and the decision horizon are small (Figure 32), 
the operator was storing only one item which would individually test 
in the predictive display. This was an extremely short-sighted search. 
If the decision horizon is greater than the number of items (as in the 
activity pattern of Figure 28) the operator was building up patterns 
without intermediate testing but he. was avoiding to use the full capacity 
of his short-term memory, i.e. the predictive aid was also a memory aid. 
Finally, a number of items greater than the decision horizon (as in the 
activity pattern of Figure 33) implied that the operator was loading 
his short-term memory with more items than those tested in the predictive 
display. 
These are just a few of the differences in the type of search 
carried out by the operators. The activity pattern may also be ~sed 
to highlight differences in the execution of the task. These differences 
were particularly evident with the complex activity patterns. In theory, 
the whole pattern can be descrtbed as a composition of elementary activity 
loops. The decomposition can be carried out empirically, having observed 
the subjects' behaviour, and also from the activity sequences as they 
appeared in the computer output. It might be interesting to investigate 
whether the decomposition could be carried out using the mathematical 
theory of stochastic automata and to compare the two approaches. 
140 
A number of transitions -in'the activity patterns have very low 
probabilities. These have not been eliminated because the activity 
sequences are both meaningful and necessary. The elimination of all 
transitions from Figure 36 with probabilities below 0.05 would result 
in an activity pattern in which no access to input information was 
gained, something which seems totally unacceptable. Low probability 
loops may be particularly important in certain critical stages of the 
decision-making process. This is in line with the view that, although 
behaviour may appear simple when viewed through statistical or 
analytical methods, it may not be so if it is watched more closely. 
The merging of the input and predictive information made the 
activity patterns look almost identical. This, of course, is not to 
say 'that the behaviour had not undergone changes with the merging of 
input and predictive information. It may be useful, in certain 
circumstances, to analyse decision behaviour in complex display systems 
by separating the information sources and thus decompose behaviour into 
the different elementary activity loops. It is recognised,however, that 
this approach should be used with the greatest care. 
It is clear that there are many unexplored questions relating to 
activity patterns. The concept and the method of assessing the 
decision horizon may possibly be used in some real discrete control 
applications. The activity patterns highlighed many individual 
differences. The form of the activity pattern, the decision horizon 
and the type of search may be related to the decision making ability of 
the individual,and thus the predictive display with few modifications 
may even be used as a training device. 
6. General Issues 
The basic philosophy behind the predictive display': is that, since 
control is oriented around the future, predictive information 
appropriately displayed can be very effective in control and decision-
making. This view of course is neither new nor unusual. The 
invention of the first "predictor instrument" was made by Kelley (1960), 
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who was the first to conceive the advantages of two-timesca1e computing 
systems for manual control applications (Ziebo1tz Controllers). A 
rapidly expanding body of research has developed relating to the 
predictor instrument. Many advances on the predictor display technique 
have been made in recent years. Typical applications include submarine 
depth control, spacecraft attitude control, VTOL, ATC, Te1eoperations, 
etc. General findings from the studies on the efficiency of the 
prediction displays include a general improvement of system performance, 
an increase in the human operato~s gain, a decrease of his 1ag and a 
decrease in remnant. Industrial applications of predictive displays 
are few (Craw1ey, 1968; Blake, 1968; Smith, 1972,.Ketteringham et al., 
1970) and none seems to have been developed with a major objective to 
help the operator in situations with information uncertainty. The two 
predictive displays for discr.ete control applications have failed to 
produce any significant improvements in decision performance. The 
predictive facility developed for job-shop scheduling (Smith and Crabtree, 
1975) has failed to improve human performance because of the excessive 
amounts of time required to examine all possible action sequences. The 
predictive facility deviSed to aid the soaking pit scheduler in steelworks 
has failed to improve performance because of human and organizational 
reasons in validation trials (Bibby, 1974 ) .•. 
There ~~a number of differences between the traditional fast-time 
and extrapolation predictive displays and the present facility. These 
differences are reported in Table 25. The present predictive display 
in its simplest form is considered as an analog representation of the 
internal model of the operator. The predictions are generated step-by-
step by the operator and not by a computer model. This is a major 
difference between the predictive displays designed for the control of 
slow response vehicles and the present predictive display, which has 
been designed mainly for industrial applications in stochastic discrete 
decision systems. For ill-defined problems (see p. 28) complete auto-
mation may not be possible, too expensive, or not desirable for some other 
reasons. At present unaided operators control these ill-defined systems 
without very great success. 
,-.----~---.-- .------.~~~. ~ .. ~.~.=-=--=-==-~. ~~---------------------~ 
',' 
The two existing examples of predictive displays for scheduling 
applications present incompatability problems. They are difficult to 
operate and they do not tackle the problem of information uncertainty 
which is very real in many industrial situations.' In addition, there 
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is another very important difference which makes the pr~sent predictive 
display fundamentally different from the others. . It is an integrated 
information display which presents' all relevant information in an analog 
form and therefore enables the user to utilize fully his perceptual 
abilities. It was supported on page 7 that humans seem to use an 
integrated approach to problems which compensates for the inadequacies 
at each particular phase of the decision process. Since they are not 
able to make at the same time mental probabi1istic inferences about the 
input information and action selection, they select strategies compensating 
for both. If the input and the predictive information are in separate 
displays or if they are incompatibly presented to the oper~tor, the 
efficiency of the decision search can be seriously impaired. Solutions 
which can easily be discovere~ if the input and the predictive information 
are compatibly included in the same display, may be difficult to find. 
Search on alternatives which could easily be rejected or accepted as a 
simple pattern recognition problem, may now demand difficult caicu1ations 
and memory capacities far in excess of the human working memory capacity. 
The main consideration when building the present'facility was to 
keep the generation and the operation as simple as possible. Predictive 
aids of this type should be simple to operate and easy to interpret the 
information they show. They should also be cheap and easy to generate 
in small computer equipment. It may not be very difficult indeed to . 
develop such displays using non computer components i~e. the predictive 
display may be developed as an elaborate form of a'dynamic stateboard. 
Some modifications are desirable to improve the quality of the input 
device, i.e. special function keys, suitably labelled w1th simple 
mnenonic code abbreviations,may facilitate the use of the display 
compared to the general purpose alphanumeric keyboard used in the 
experiments. 
I . 
.. 
One additional facility which can be added is automated Bayesian 
processing. to cut down the uncertainty size. This of course would 
depend on the cost and benefit which it is likely to bring to system 
performance. The results from the last experiment imply that 
additions of this kind should be treated with great caution, since in 
most cases they are unlikely to bring about any significant changes in 
performance. Research on Bayesian information processing showed that 
probabilistic diagnoses are considerably facilitated by automated 
processing. However .the benefits may disappear in situations where 
the diagnosis is only a part of the task. 
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It is not quite clear how the human operator makes use of the 
prediction displays and -to what. ,aspects he most attends. It looks as 
though there was a general increase in the decision horizon with the 
predictive displa~ although exact comparisons with the no prediction 
case are not possible. It is however worth mentioning that the average 
decision horizon of subjects using the predictive display was more 
than three stages ahead (Figure 47) whereas the strategy of on-line 
control based on state information would not allow more than possibly 
two stages (the average number of empty available pits at any time was 
less than two). It is stressed that the comparisons are only approx-
imate as an exact assessment of the decision horizons without the 
predictive display is not possible. It is true however that a decision 
horizon of three is probably sufficient to guarantee satisfactory 
performance in the long term. Clearly, the predictive display j,n its 
final form (Figure 12), facilitated the ability to look further into the 
future much better 'than the other displays (Figures 10 and 11). 
The predictive display has also helped the operator to reduce. the 
evaluation time per alternative (p.65). Again exact comparisons with 
the no prediction case are not possible, but it seems as thoygh the time 
to evaluate an alternative was greatly reduced because evaluation with 
the predictive display was a simple perceptual judgement (as mentioned 
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in· the previous section, many alternatives could simultaneously be 
evaluated with one perceptual judgement). In the no prediction case the 
evaluation was numerically made (mentally or with pencil and paper). 
One major contribution of the predictive display was that it has 
enabled the operators to evaluate combinations of alternative courses 
of actions which otherwise would not be possible. Not only the number 
of evaluations was increased because of the easy operation and the 
perceptual form of the display, but many combinations of alternatives 
which would be unlikely to provide satisfactory performance were not 
tested. 
The present findings have indicated that a predictive display 
similar to the one; developed in this investigation can be particularly 
useful. The decision problem was represented as a soaking pit 
scheduling process. However the resemblance was superficial and the 
problem with some minor modifications could easily represent a wide 
range of industrial tasks. It is thought that a predictive facility 
such as the one examined in the present study will be particularly 
useful in situations where the operator should utilize optimally the 
existing resources and keep the system under strict control. Situations 
which eventually may gain from the application of the predictive display 
include unit scheduling, gas and electricity distribution, air traffic 
control etc. Due to its special advantages compared to the other 
decision aids (including the earlier prediction displays), it is believed 
that the present prediction facility will be of use in improving efficiency 
in many discrete control situations. 
145 
. i 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Major Conclusions 
The findings from the investigation can now be summarized in the 
following principles. These principles are proposed as a basis for 
further study and development within the general context of discrete 
and intermittent control situations. The conclusions- are valid only 
for on-line multi-stage decision tasks as they have been defined on 
pp. 40-42 of the theoretical part. 
PRINCIPLE 1 
A great amount of input uncertainty results in a considerable 
decrement in decision performance. 
-lpRINCIPLE 2 
The performance is not largely affected by variations in the 
(higher) levels of input uncertainty. 
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Principle 1 is almost self-explanatory. Imprecise input information 
is generally expected to degrade performance. Principle 2 is explained 
by the type of strategy which was adopted by the operators. On-line 
control strategies based on the (accurate) state information are not 
expected to allow any significant degradations of performance, 
irrespective of the amount of input uncertainty. 
PRINCIPLE 3 
The heuristic information as explained and introduced in this task, 
-
does not seem to affect decision performance in any direction after 
the initial decisions. 
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Principle 3 may be explained either because the decision situation 
was not adequately complex (accurate input information), or because 
heuristics impose a rigid type of decision search not compatible with 
the flexible aspects of human behaviour, or because the presentation 
was not the most appropriate. 
PRINCIPLE 4 
For accurate input information, a simple deterministic predictive 
display improves decision performance. " 
This principle is a consequence of the improvements of the quality" 
of search made by the decision-maker as he explores his problem 
enVironment. His decision horizon lengthens and his speed of generating 
and evaluating alternatives greatly improves. At the same time, the 
simplicity of the predictive display allows full exploitation of the 
flexible and adaptive aspects of human behaviour. 
PRINCIPLE 5 
For inaccurate input information, a simple deterministic predictive ' 
display seems to improve t~e general level of performance. However 
due to the inability of the people to draw inferences ~bout the amo~nt 
of uncertainty, the achieved level of performance is much worse than::",i 
the achieved level without uncertainty. 
The operators may gain from the presence of a deterministic predictive 
display even under uncertainty. The inability of people to draw inferences 
for the amount of uncertainty, or to weigh information f~om updating 
estimates of input informatio"n, is the reason why many deterministic 
'predictions become obsolete. ::In addition, the decision horizons shorten, 
meaning that the ability to look far ahead weakens and thus it is difficult 
for the operators to concentrate on long-term improvements of performance'. 
PRINCIPLE 6 
For inaccurate input information, a probabilistic predictive 
display improves the decision performance. 
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When the stochastic aspects of the environment are also introduced 
in the predictive display, the decision behaviour responds accordingly~ 
The decision search is adapted to the stochastic aspects in such a way 
that as many options as possible are kept open until the ~ime of action. 
At the same time, the decision horizon lengthens and the speed of search 
increases. 
PRINCIPLE 7 
An increase in the precision of the displayed intervals' within which 
an event (arrival) occurs does not seem to affect performance. 
A 20% effective reduction in the length of the displayed intervals, 
using probabilistic information processing, does' not seem to bring about 
any further improvements in performance. Reduction in the length of the 
displayed intervals (of uncertainty effectively) can also be produced by 
improved communication channels, direct links etc. Apparently, 
predictions are insensitive to (small) reduction of the displayed 
intervals in the same way that performance is insensitive to the 
variations in the amount of uncertainty (Principle 2). 
2. Future Developments';'! 
It is believed that the full potential of predictive displays has 
not been fully appreciated. The findings from the present investigation 
have suggested that the use of a predictive computer display led to 
significant improvements in system performance. It should be the 
natural progression of the present investigation to evaluate and test 
-.-,~.--~.--.====~~~~~~--------~-------------------------------------------------------
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the predictive display in simulated industrial control situations and 
implement it once its value has been proven. It is believed that the 
potential range of application of a suitably modified predictive display 
may include transportation scheduling, production scheduling, start-up 
procedures in automated systems, fault administration, air·traffic 
control and intermittent process control situations. 
In addition to the test and evaluation of the predictive display 
there are some important issues which need further investigation. 
These include: 
1. Detailed study of performance fora wide r~nge of uncertainty values. 
2. How heuristics can best be incorporated with the predictive facility. 
3. How to improve the input device (by special function keys, touchwires, 
light pens etc.) 
4. Incorporation and effect of a facility for storing and recalling 
alternative action combinations. 
,. 
5. Study of predictive display complexity, i.e. how precise an approximation 
of the actual process the predictive display should be. 
6. How the predictive display affects human strategies. Detailed studies 
through the activity patterns of the short-term memory, decision 
horizons etc. 
7. Decomposition of activity patterns through observation, protocols 
and mathematical theories of qecomposition. 
8. Construction of a predictive display on a magnetic board. Advantages 
and disadvantages compared to a computer predictive display. 
9. How much the width of input intervals on the predi~tive display must 
be reduced before performanc~ improves. 
10. Predictive displays in larger systems - More than one operator using 
the predictive display, one responsible for probabilistic inferences 
or for interpretation of the input information and the other for action 
selection. 
These are just a few of the issues which need clarification or 
.. . . to further explorat10n. It w1ll be the greatest sat1sfact1on of the 
author if the present thesis will be of use to those who consider 
this area of research worth further study. 
150. 
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through the predictive mode 
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I ~igu"t'e 29: Activity patternl with transit<iDns from heuristic to 
. test state. 
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Figure 30: Experiment 3- Perfomance without and with 
predictive display under uncertainty. 
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Figure 32: Activity pattern with an interaction between the. 
numerical state and the input state 
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Figure 33:Activity'pattern with an interaction between the 
clearance and the input state .. 
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input and heuristic states to the test state 
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Figure 35: Activity pattern with a high probability transition 
from the input to the test state . 
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3 2 
Figure 36zActivi ty pattern with low probability activity around . 
the heuristic display 
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'l~igure37:' Experiment 4- Performance for different types of 
,0£ uncertainty, presentation on the predictive 
display. 
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Figure 38: Experiment 4- On-line activity for different types 
,of uncertainty ~resentation ~n the predictive ,display. 
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Figure 39: Activity patFern with the input information on 
the predictive display. 
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Figure 40: Activity pattern with the input information in the 
predictive display. Transitions from state 1 to 
state 4 have occurred. 
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Figure 41.;: The T'rading of the' primary and secondary objectives • 
. . ,.... _.-. Th'e use of Predictive displays encourages the. operators 
to minimise the performance index by igndring , the other 
two objectives (2, 3). 
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Figure 42: Average ,.:.~tJ)IIlulative on-line activity for the use of the 
predictive display with (2) and without (1) uncertainty 
(second and third experiments). . 
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Figure 43: Average Decision Horizons for individual subjects 
without and with uncertainty. 
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TABLE 1: , VISUAL INDICATIONS 
INVALID INPUT MESSAGE 
FORMAT INACCESSIBLE 
PIT ALREADY LOADED 
PIT UNLOADING 
INGOT NOT ARRIVED 
PIT LOADED 
INGOT ARRIVED 
STATE LOAD TIME 
NO SPACE IN PIT 
TIME TOO BIG 
218 
TABLE 2: KEYBOARD MESSAGES 
F2 Call pit State 
F3 Call Arrival Estimates (or Actual Arrival Times) 
F4 Call Heuristic Display 
LA Load pit A 
LB Load pit B 
LC Load pit C 
LD Load Pit D 
Additional Messages for the Predictive Mode 
FS Call Predictive Display 
DA Call Predictive Display. Previous Activity is 
lost and the actual pit State appears. 
LA Load A ) 
) 
LB Load B ) 
) followed by arrival time 
LC Load C ) 
) 
LD Load D ) 
CA Clear A 
CB Clear B 
CC Clear C 
CD Clear D 
EX Re turn to system mode 
.- '. 
TABLE 3: ERRORS RESULT FOR THE PRELIHINARY EXPERIMENT 
UNCERTAINTY NO UNCERTAINTY 
Sl 2.20 
S2 1.00 
S3 1. 93 
S4 3.27 
SS 1.80 
S6 1.80 
* First trial with uncertainty 
** First trial without uncertainty 
0.93 
0.93 
0.67 
1. 60 
1.47 
0.93 
* 
* 
* 
** 
** 
** 
TABLE 4: ACTIVITY RESULTS FOR THE PRELIMINARY EXPERIUENT 
UNCERTAINTY NO UNCERTAINTY 
Sl 61 16 * 
S2 77 35 * 
S3 135 49 * 
S4 43 30 ** 
SS 77 44 ** 
S6 66 29 ** 
* First trial with uncertainty 
** First trial without uncertainty 
.. 219 
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TABLE 5: RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE P ERFORMANCE .INDEX 
(FIRST EXPERIMENT) 
D 
P01 Sl 0.000 
S2 0.375 
, 
P02 S3 2.625 
S4 0.300 . 
P03 Ss 0.750 
S6 0.625 
P04 'S7 0.625 
S8 0.666 
P05, S9 0.290 
S10 0.125 
P06 S11 . 0.750 
S12 0.750 
D = No Uncertainty 
M • Medium Uncertainty 
B a High Uncertainty 
. . _,. 
- .. ,~ 
-
M 
3.000 
3.375 
3.286 
0.500 
3.286 
0.375 
0.375 
1.875 
0.750 
2.750 
2.125 . 
1.625 
----
-~" 
B D+M+B 
2.286 5.286 
0.375 4.125 . 
2.500 8.411 
0.850 1.650 
2.750 6.786 
2.250 3.250 
1.625 2.625 
0.375 3.916 
0.375 2.415 
1. 714 4.589 
1.625 4.500 
0.125 2.500 
PO • Presentation Order 
~. 
, I .• 
TABLE 6: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX 
(FIRST EXPERIMENT) 
Source SS 
- --~ 
1. BETWEEN SUBJECTS 13.959 
2. PRESENTATION ORDER (PO) 2.300 
3. SUBJECTS WITHIN GROUPS 11.659 
4. WITHIN SUBJECtS 25.626 
5. UNCERTAINTY (U) 11. 432 
6. PO x U 7.755 
7. U x SUBJECTS WITHIN GROUPS 6.439 
8. TOTAL 39.585 
1 PO and' U fi~ed effects.Subjects Random. 
'* p<O.Ol 
df MS F 
11 
5 0.460 0.23 
6 1.943 
24 
2 5.716 10.66* 
10 0.775 1.44 
12 0.536 
35 
221 
E(MS) 1 
\ 
TABLE 7: TEST FOR DIFFERENCES AMONG UNCERTAINTY LEVELS FOR THE. 
PERFORMANCE INDEX (TUKEY'S A POSTERIORI TEST) 
I 
D M B 
D -6.46** -3.92*' 
M 2.54 I 
B 
*If . p < 0.01 
,.: 
, 
I ' 222 
TABLE 8: RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
. (FIRST EXPERIMENT) 
D M B D+M+B 
P01 Sl 14 16 17 47 
S2 25 21 35 81 
P02 ' S3 28 41 48 117 
, 
S4 7 34 24 65 
P03 S5 8 32 26 66· 
S6 17 30 28 75 
P04 S7' 12 26 19 . 57 
S8 9 24 22 55 
P05 S9 15 30 28 73 
S10 16 33 30 79 
P06 S11 16 21 29 66 
S12 7 20 32 59 
D • No Uncertainty PO • Presentation Order 
M • Medium Uncertainty 
B • High Uncertainty 
TABLE 9: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
,(FIRST EXPERIMENT). 
: Source SS df MS F E(MS)l 
--. 
1., BETWEEN SUBJECTS 1182.000 11 
2. PRESENTATION ORDER (PO) 510.330 5 102.066 0.91 
3. SUBJECTS WITHIN GROUPS 671. 670 6 111. 945 
4. WITHIN SUBJECTS 2024.000 24 
, 
5. UNCERTAINTY (U) 1408.66 2 704.330 41.36* . 
\' 
6. PO x U 411.01 10 41.101 2.41 
\ 
7. U x SUBJECTS WITHIN GROUPS 204.33 12 17.027 
8. TOTAL 3206.00 35 
1 PO and U fixed effects. Subjects random. 
TABLE 10: TEST FOR DIFFERENCES AMONG UNCERTAINTY LEVELS FOR THE 
ON-LINE ACTIVITY (TUKEY'S A POSTERIORI TEST) 
D M B 
D -10.77* -11.46* 
M - 0.69 
B 
* p < 0.~1 
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. TABLE 11: trrILIZATIONTIMES OY THE PIT sTATE AND THE INGOT-
ARRIVAL TIME DISPLAYS. 
CIl D M 4-J 
C) 
Q) 
. ., 
STU I TU STU ,.0 ::l 
Cl) 
1 T 485 1323 105 
N 5 9 5 
2 T 358 1496 1407 
N 10 15 12 
3 T 1123 329 639 
N 16 12 22 
4 T 1695 29 1331 
N 6 1 14 
. 
5 '! 1688 17 773 
N 7 l' 18 
\ 
6 T' 1596 :101 1415 
N 13 4 18 
7 T 1598 157 ',906 
N 7 5 13 
8 T 1409 350 664 
N 7 2 12 
9 T N.A. N.A. 519 
N 
'-'1 . 
',,' .15 
. ~' 
10 T 179 1555 1343 
N 8 8 19 
11 T 1566 171 1498 
N 11 5 14 
12 T 1823 0 1505 
N 7 0 13 
--
S = pits state display 
I = Ingot arrival times display 
T a Total time of Utilization 
I TU 
1632 
8 
353 
8 
830 
21 
465 
10. 
974 
14 
252 
12 
733 
13 
933 
11 
1151 
15 
49l 
14 
255 
7 
218 
7 
N = Total number of times of selection 
B 
.... 
STU I TU 
477 1012 
8 9 
1161 490 
17 14 
775 867 
27 21 
880 946 
11 13 , 
1302 464 
16 10 
783 816 
14 14 
1285 442 
10 9 
1142 416 
13 9 
896 921 
16 12 
1494 247 
20 10 
1402 296 
18 11 
1122 517 
19 13 
" ' 
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. TABLE 12: RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX 
(SECOND EXPERIMENT, DETERMINISTIC CASE) 
. I 
NO PREDICTIVE AID PREDICTIVE AID 
, 
SI 0.000 0.000 
S2 0.750 0.500 
NO HEURISTICS 
S3 0.500 0.000 
S4 0.375 0.000 
S5 . 0.000 0.000 
I 
HEURISTICS S6 0.375 .0.000 
87 0.500 0.250 
Ss 1.500 0.250 
. I 
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TABLE 13: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX 
(SECOND EXPERIMENT, DETERMINISTIC CASE) 
Source SS df MS i F E(MS) Hand P Fixed, 
Subj ects Random 
1. BETWEEN SUBJECTS 1.296 7 
2. HEURSTICS (H) 0.035 1 0.03,5 0.17 
3. SUBJECTS W. GROUPS 1.261 6 0.210 
4. WITHIN SUBJECTS 1.110 8 
5. PREDICTIVE (P) 0.563 1 0.563 6.62* 
6. HxP 0.035 1 0.035 0.41 
7. H x SUBJECTS W. GROUPS 0.512 6 0.085 
8. TOTAL 14.749 15 
* p < 0.05 
, i . 
,'I' 
I 
" j' 
. 
TABLE 14: RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE_ ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
(SECOND EXPERIMENT, DETERMINISTIC CASE) 
I NO PREDICTIVE AID PREDICTIVE AID 
\ 
S1 25 60 
S2 16 67 
NO HEDRISTICS 
S3 15 65 
S4, 14 30 
S5 13 69 
S6 19 50 
HEURISTICS .1 
S7 '20 59 
\ 
I , I 
S8 25 87 
. , 
I ' 
') 
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_ TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
(SECOND EXPERIMENT, DETERMINISTIC CASE). 
E(MS) Hand P Fixed 
Source SS df MS F Subjects Random 
, 
1. BETWEEN SUBJECTS 1237.75 7 ' 
2. HEURISTICS (H) 156.25 1 156.25 0.86 
3. SUBJECTS W. GROUPS 1081.50 6 180.25 
4. WITHIN SUBJECTS 8022.00 8 
5. PREDICTIVE (P) 7225.00 . 1 7225.00 60.54* 
6. H x P 81.00 1 81.00 0.68 
7. H x SUBJECTS W. GROUPS ' 716.00 ,6 119.33 
8. TOTAL 9259.75 15 I 
( I 
* p<O.Ol 
, 
I 
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I I 
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TABLE 16:. RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX' 
, l 
( THIRD EXPERIMENT, UNCERTAINTY) 
229. 
NO PREDICTIVE AID PREDICTIVE AID 
SI 2.625 0.500 
S2 2.125 1.375 
~O HEURISTICS 
S3 1.S75 1.500 
I , 
-S4 3.375 0.250 
's 0.375 2.125 
, 5 
S6 0.000 0.500 
HEURISTICS I 
S7 1.000 
" 
, 2.125 
Ss ' 4.000 0.250 
I ' 
, 
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TABLE 17: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX 
(. THIRD EXPERIMENT, UNCERTAINTY) 
Source SS df MS F E(MS) Hand' P Fixed 
Subjects Random 
1- BETWEEN SUBJECTS 4.435 7 
2. HEURISTICS (H) 0.660 1 0.660 1.05 
3. SUBJECTS W. GROUPS 3.775 6 0.629 . 
4. WITHIN SUBJECTS 16.815 8 
5. PREDICTIVE (P) 2.848 1· 2.848 . 1.45 
I 
6.' H x P 2.242 1 2.242' 1.14 
7. H x SUBJECTS W. GROUPS n.725 6 1.954 . , 
t 
, , I 
\ ., 
8. TOTAL 21.250 15 . 
'. . 
( . 
TABLE 18: RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
I (,THIRD EXPERIMENT, UNCERTAINTY) 
NO PREDICTIVE AID PREDICTIVE AID 
Sl 21 120 
S2 21 70 
NO HEURISTICS 
~3 30 75 I 
S4 16 67 
Ss 23 101 
S6 ' 38 I 55 
HEURISTICS 
S7 25 55 
'I 
S8 36 118 
231 
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TABLE 19: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
(.THIRD' EXPERIMENT, UNCERTAINTY) 
Source SS df MS F 
1. BETWEEN SUBJECTS 2693.44 7 
2. HEURISTICS (H) 60.06 1 60.06 0.13 
, 
3. SUBJECTS WITHIN GROUPS 2633.38' 6 438.89 
4. WITHIN SUBJECTS 15412.50 8 
. I 
5. PREDICTIVE (P) \ 12712.56 1 12172.56 27.93* 
6. HxP 85.57 1 85.57 0.19 
7. H x SUBJECTS W. GROUPS 2614.37 .6' 435.72 
, . 
8. TOTAL 18105.94 15 
* p<O.Ol 
, I 
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TABLE 20: RESULTS SUMMARy TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX 
(FOURTa EXPERIMENT) 
, , 
E I B 
S1 0.143 0.575 0.500 
S2 0.875 0.250 0.428 
S3 1.857 0.500 0.857 
S4 1.250 0.125 0.714 
S5 0.750 0.500 0.142 
S6 1.125 0.000 0.142 
S7 1.125 0.125 0.857 
, 
·S 0.875 1.000 .. 0.333 8 ':" . 
E ... The Estimated Arriva1Times were presented. 
I ... The Uncertainty Intervals of the Arrival Times were presented. 
B ... The "Processed" Bayesian Intervals were presented. 
I' • 
. ',. 
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TABLE 21: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDEX 
(FOURTH EXPERIMENT) 
Source SS df MS ' F E(MS) , .Model II 
, 
1. BETWEEN TREATMENTS 1. 720 2' 0.860 6.23* 
2. BETWEEN BLOCKS 1.047 7 0.149 1.08 
3. RESIDUAL 1.942 14 0.138 
, 
4. TOTAL 4.709 23 
* p<O.05 
, \ 
I, 
I ' 
\ ' 
, \ 
0235 
TABLE 22. TEST FOR DIFFERENCES AMONG VARIOUS WAYS OF " ~ 0 ,~~___ ";""__ ;;"" __ "=,;";;",~;"";"~ ___ ,,,,;,,,;,,,,~;,;,,,, __ ~
PRESENTING UNCERTAINTY 
E I B 
°E 4.70 ** 3.84* 
I 0.85 
B 
** p<O.Ol 
* 0.01<p<0.05 
E ... The Estimated Arrival Times were presented. 
I a The Uncertainty Intervals were presented. 
B ... The "Processed" Bayesian Intervals wet:e presented. 
o' , 
I , 
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TABLE 23: RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
(FOPRTH EXPERIMENT) 
E I B 
Sl 47 34 40 
S2 68 58 63 
S3 70 58 40 
S4 92 69 87 
Ss 32 42 32 
S6 31 36 53 
37 I 50 '44 
, 
S7 
S8 46 51 41 
E • The Estimated Arrival Times were presented. I 
I • The Uncertainty Iritervals were presented. 
B = The "Processed" Bayesian Intervals were presented •. 
. " 
. \ 
-- ---------------------~----------------------------------~-------------
TABLE 24: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE ON-LINE ACTIVITY 
(FOURTH EXPERIMENT) 
237 
Source SS, df MS F E(MS), Model II 
1. BETWEEN TREATMENTS 48.320 ·2 24.160 0.26 
2. BETWEEN BLOCKS 5192.030 7 741. 718 7.97* 
3. RESIDUAL 1302.350 14 93.025 
, 
4. TOTAL 6542.700 23 
*i><0.05 
'I 
i: 
\ ' 
. . , . 
" 
TABLE 25: MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE' PtmSENTPREDICTIVE COMPUTER' 
DISPLAY ANn THE TRADITIONAL ~REDICTIVE DISPLAYS. 
Traditional fast-time PCD predictive displays 
Control of continuous slow Control of discrete on-line 
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response systems multi-stage decision systems 
Based on an accurate fast-time Based on a computer model 
simulation model of the system. of varying complexity 
according to system 
requirements and operator 
considerations , ' 
Research made mostly on Research made with 
military and space applications industrial applications in 
mind 
No provision for input Designed particularly for 
uncertainties systems with uncertainties 
Deterministic Predictions in the input or within the 
system 
Inflexible on internal Flexible on internal 
variations of the controlled variations. Possible to 
elements. Wrong predictions include variations due to 
may occur. failures of human or 
mechanical elements 
!. { 
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APPENDIX 1 
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(a) General Instructions 
The purpose of this experiment is to provide information on how humans 
'make scheduling decisions. ,In this experiment your task will be to 
make a series of decisions to schedule the output from a simulated 
steel plant. 
In order to understand the problems associated with your task, it is 
necessary to explain briefly the main features of the controlled system. 
A series of casts are sent to soaking pits for re-heating. The four 
pits available vary in efficiency, so if a cast is sent to pits A or B, 
,10 minutes (simulated time) elapse before it is ready, if it is sent to 
pit e, 15 minutes elapse before it is ready and if it is sent to Pit D, 
20 minutes elapse before it is ready. After re-heating has finished, 
some time should be allowed for unloading the cast. Consequently, three 
minutes must be allowed after each cast has finished, heating, before a 
further cast can be loaded. 
A criterion of good scheduling is to maintain constant out~ut flow of 
casts. An output flow of casts at a rate of about one'cast per five 
minutes, is considered satisfactory. Your objective will be to allocate 
casts to pits in such a way that this criterion is achieved. . 
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Example 
Estimated arrival times of casts pit State 
1 2 6 11 21 22 32 pit Time to unload 
A cJ 
B 6 
C r/J 
D rJ 
A .. B .. 10 
C ... 15 
D ... 20 
If the first cast with estimated arrival time 1 is loaded to the Pit A, 
then it will take 1 + 10 = 11 minutes to be ready and 11 + 3 ... 14 minutes 
before it can be used again. 
The second cast cannot be loaded to the Pit B because this pit is occupied. 
The third cast cannot be loaded to the pit B, because this pit is now un-
loading. Consequently only the cast with estimated arrival time 11, can 
I 
be loaded to the Pit B. This cast will b~ ready after 11 + 10 =21 
minutes. If now the cast with estimate of arrival 2 is loaded to the 
Pit C, it will be ready after 2 + 15 = 17 minutes and if the cast with 
estimate of arrival 6 is loaded to the Pit D, it will be ready after 
6 + 20'" 26 minutes. We can now see that the output flow is: 
11 17 21 26 •• • • 
which satisfies the criterion of about 1 cast per 5 minutes. 
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The remaining three scheduling decisions for the casts with estimates 
of arrivals 21, 22 and 32 are left for you to do in order to get 
accustomed to the task. 
On-line Condition 
You have two main facilities to help you with your decisions. F.irst, a 
display of the pit state which shows the time to go before each pit is 
emptied. From this display you can see whether your previous decisions 
were successful or not. 
The second display shows a list of the estimated times of arrival of the 
casts. Using these two displays you can find the best possible allocati.on 
of casts to pits which satisfies the criterion. 
estimated arrival time display by typing F3. As soon as a cast arrives 
you get a signal which warns you that it must be loaded to the appropriate 
pit. This can be done by typing LA, LB, LC orLD on the keyboard, as 
appropria te. 
N.B. ENTER must be keyed to terminate all inputs. The time is shown 
in the bottom right hand corner of the display. 
(b) Instructions for Uncertainty Condition 
The additional feature is that the estimates of arrivals are only 
approximately correct. Estimates about casts which arrive soon are 
more precise than estimates about casts which arrive later. 
Every ten minutes, there is an up-dating of the list o'f the estimated 
arrival" times. 
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(c) Instructions for Decision Aid 
The Decision Aid consists of a display which allows you to test the 
quality of future decisions. The Decision Aid is initialized by typing 
FS or DA on the keyboard. When you input the message FS the previous 
contents of the display remain unaltered. When you input DA all previous 
contents of the display are lost. The actual state of the pits is 
displayed if you input DA. 
The following list of commands allows you to test various action 
combinations and decide which is the best pit allocation for the incoming 
ingots in accordance with your objectives: 
FS/DA Initialization of the Decision Aid 
LA Allocate Pit A ) 
) 
Allocate pit B ) LB ) Followed by the Load Time. 
LC 
LD 
CA 
CB 
CC 
CD 
EX 
Allocate Pit C ) 
) 
Allocate Pit D ) 
Clear Pit A 
Clear pit B 
Clear Pit C 
Clear pit D 
Return to the on-lime MOde 
(d) Instructions for the Heuristic Display 
This display helps you to consider for selection only the combinations 
of pit sequences which are likely to be successful. In general, these 
selections start with the pit with the largest soaking time since this 
was empirically discovered to be useful rule of thumb. 
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It is almost certain that the best pit sequence is included in the 
list and you are advised to find it using this display. 
T~e pit sequences are arranged according to their choice of success~ 
The display is particularly useful for finding the best pit sequence 
for the first three ingot arrivals. 
(e) Instructions for the Decision Aid 
A I 
B 
c 
D I 
TIME 
7 •• 12 •• 17 •• 22 •• 27 •• 32 •• 37 
7 •• 12· •• 17 •• 22 •• 27 •• 32 •• 37. 
l****~ I*****~ 
'***~ . 
\ 
In this experiment we want to examine ways of helping the decision makers 
in situations involving input uncerta1nty. 
You are already acquainted with the predictive display - the display 
which allows you to test consequences of future actions. The addi ti9nal' 
feature now is that we provide you with some information about the error 
of the arrival estimates. You can see that instead of displaying an 
245 
arrival estimate, the whole arrival interval is displayed. The actual 
arrival might occur any time within this interval but there is always 
more tendency to occur nearer to the center of the interval. You are 
free to predict the arrival times and make your schedules accordingly. 
Inputs 
F5 - The Predictive Display appears on the screen 
DA - The actual pit-state appears on the screen. The previous test 
activity is lost. 
LA) 
) 
LB ) 
) 
LC ) 
) 
LD ) 
followed by the predicted Consequences of loading alternative 
arrival time 
CA ) 
) 
CB ) pits cleared ) are 
CC ) 
) 
CD ) 
LA 
LB EX - followed by 
LC 
LD 
pits are used 
Action is taken immediately after the bell 
signals the actual arrival 
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX 2 
Justification for the RecommendedSelection-Seq~ences in the 
Heuristic Display. 
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In general, if the pits are utilized to the maximum there will ·tend 
to be more pits available at 'a cert~in time and consequently there will 
be wider choice, allowing better selections. In order to utilize 
.maximally the pit with the longest time it should normally be selected 
~ 
whenever available. The pits with the short soaking times can then be 
nested within the longest time pits. In contrast, if the longer time 
pits are not considered for selection with high priority in the initial 
stages of the task, there is always the possibility of long intervals 
between rolling or compulsory selections in subsequent stages. 
The truth of the foregoing arguments can be demonstrated by the following 
example: Let the intervals between arrivals are either 0 or 5 or 10 time 
units, for the first three arrivals. Assuming that all these three 
intervals have equal probability of occurance then the pay-off table '(Table 2. 
is produced. Costs are assigned according to the cost table (Table 2.2). 
It is clear that the selection sequences included in the Heuristic display 
are those which resulted in the smallest costs. 
The same selection sequences also predominate when the frequency of 
occurrence for the three input intervals is not the same. 
I 
TABLE 2.1: Pay-off Matrix. 
Selection 
Sequence 
Arrival 
Intervals 
1st 2nd 3rd 
o 
o 
o 
5 
o 
5 
5 
5 
o 
o 
10 
o 
10 
10 
10 
5 
5 
10 
5 
10 
10 
o 
o 
10 
10 
5 
5 
o 
o 
5 
o 
5 
o 
5 
5 
o 
o 
5 
o 
o 
5 
5 
o 
5 
10 
10 0 
o 0 
10 10 
o 10 
10 0 
10 10 
5 10 
10 5 
5 5 
10 10 
5 10 
10 5 
5 10 
10 5 
o 5 
5 0 
O' 10 
10 0 
Total Costs 
DCA DAC CDA CAD ADC ACD DAA ADD ADD ACA CDD AAC 
1 1 
1-1 
2 1 
2 2 
2 3 
2 2 
,3 1 
21 
1 1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
'2 2 2 
2 2' 2 
2 1 2 
112 
1 2 4 
1 3 4 
300 
12 2 
122 
2 1 3 
2, 2 1 
'0 4 3 
1 2 1 
121 
2 2 0 
200 
113 
203 
1· 1 1 
111 
1 1 1 1 
3 3, 3 2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 1 2 1 1 
30020 
o 300 0 
12212 
2 2 312 
2 2 
o 0 
4 3 
2 1 
1 3 
2 4 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 
1 2 1 '2 2 
21' 1 2 2 
3 1 333 
23342 
2 4 324 
3 3 2 3 5 
43321 
3 3 2 0' 3 
15232 
4 2 314 
2 4 422 
2' 4 3 2 4 
2 2 200 
1 2 122 
o 3 3 3 1 
o 3 413 
42221 
3 3 203 
3 1 1 
1 ,2 2 
4 1 1 
2 2 4 
332 
432 
232 
212 
232 
323 
3 4 1 
321 
322 
300 
124 
241 
105 
1 2 3 
1 
2 
2 
o 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
5 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
2 
o 
1 
43 '42 48 52 65 55 46 56 59 54 61 63 
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TABLE 2.2: Costs for the Various Output Intervals 
Output Intervals Cost 
5 0 
0, 10 1 
15 2 
20 3 
25 4 
5 (j + 1) j 
APPENDIX 3 . 
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Ingot Arrival Time Estimates and the Actual Arrival Times 
First Experiment: The Effect'of Uncertainty on Decision Performance. 
A. 'Deterministic Decision Task 
Arrival Times 
9 10 15 18 27 34 35 40 44 
B. Medium Uncertainty Decision Task 
Arrival Times 
11 14 20 28 29 37 39 43 47 
Arrival Estimates 
time .. 0 
12 16 20 23 33 26 4.4. 51 55 
time = 10 
10 13 22 31 33 35 37 41 50 
time .. 20 
11 14 20 29 28 35 43 44 
time .. 30 
11 14 20 28 29 38 38 49 
time = 40 
11 14 20 28. 29 37 39 42 48 . 
C. High Uncertainty Decision Task 
Arrival Times 
10 11 14 19 28 32 33 37 41 
Arrival, Estimates 
time .. 0 
15 16 14 33 39 17 42 63 21 
, time = 10 
- 10. 12 12" 13 15 :2'~ 25 49 59 
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time IS 20 I 
10 11' 14 19 34 36 38 27 26 
time .. 30 
10 11 14 19 28 32 31 32 34 
time ... 40 
10 11 14 '.19 28 32 33 37 42 
Second Experiment: The Effects of Predictive and Heuristic Displays 
on Decision Performance. 
A. Deterministic Decision Task 1 
Arrival Times 
8 9 14 17 26 33 34 35 47 
B. ' 'Deterministic Decision Task 2 
Arrival Times 
7 8 13 16 25 32 33 38 42 
c. Stochastic Decision Task 1 
Arrival Times 
12 15 21 29 30 38 40 44 
Arrival Estimates 
time .. 0 
13 18 23 32 25 35 34 39 
time ... 10 
12 15 22 33 26 34 44 43 
time IS 20 
12 15 21 29 32 38 38 40 
time IS 30 
12 15 21 29 30 40 42 43 
time .. 40 
12 15 21 29 30 38 40 45 
. 251. 
D. Stochastic Decision Task 2 
Arrival Times 
10 13 19 27 28 36 38 42 46 . 
Arrival Estimates 
time" 0 
12 10 20 27 24 25 39 51 59 
time" 10 
10 17 21 30 31 31 33 37 57 
time" 20 
10 13 19 26 29 39 35 39 45 
time .. 30 
10 13 19 27 28 35 37 44 46 
time .. 40 
10 13 19 27 28 36 38 43 45 
Third Experiment: The Effect of Probabi1istic Information on Decision 
Performance. 
A. Stochastic Decision Task 1 
Arrival Times 
7 8 10 16 24 29 30 34 40 
Arrival Estimates 
time = 0 
6 8 9 13 19 33 41 43 
time" 10 
7 8 10 18 21 32 29 42· 
time" 20 
7 8 10 16 25 27 32 36 
time" 30 
7 8 10 16 24 29 33 42 
time • 40 
7 8 10 16 24 29 30 34 40 
i 
• I 
B. Stochastic Decision Task 2 
Arrival Times 
11 12 14 20 28 32 33 37 41 
Arrival Intervals 
time = 0 
7-11 9-13 13-19 13-21 25-37 
time = 10 
10-11 12-13 13-15 19-23 22-30 
time = 20 
27-29 31-37 28-36 37-45 
time = 30 
31-33 32-33 36-40 37-43 
time = 40 
41-42 
c. Stochastic Decision Task 3 
Arrival Times 
12 13 18 21 30 37 38 43 
Arrival Intervals 
time'" 0 
9-13 12-16 12-20 15-23 
time = 10 
11-12 13-14 19-20 19-23 27-33 
time = 20 
20-21 29-33 37-39 37-41 36-44 
time = 30 
31-32 36-38 37-39 42-46 
time • 40 
I" -41 

